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Abstract 
The purpose of this study was to examine and understand the beliefs and practices 
of Dutch-Turkish Muslims from the perspective of elite and popular religiosity, 
exploring the characteristics of both kinds of religiosity and the various sociological 
consequences, thereby considering the demographic and socio-economic factors in 
relation to both in the context of the plural society of the Netherlands.  
The design of the present study has been shaped by a ‘mixed-methods’ approach, 
in which quantitative and qualitative methods are merged into one research project. 
Within a four-year period (2010 - 2013), the project began with qualitative research to 
explore the various forms and motivations of elite and popular religiosity, so that the 
results of this qualitative research could inform aspects of the quantitative approach. 
The second method consisted of a questionnaire survey that formed the main part of 
the project. I developed instruments of an elite and popular religiosity scale through 
the operationalization of concepts I used in light of my qualitative research of elite and 
popular religiosity. 1165 participants took part in the survey, ranging in age between 
18 - 68 years. 
This theoretical and empirical study yielded the result that the forms and 
motivations of high religiosity vary across different groups. Based on the findings of 
this study, out of the total group of participants who experienced high religiosity, six 
out of ten participants experienced popular religiosity, while only two out of ten 
experienced elite religiosity. I also found that respondents who experienced popular 
religiosity were less open and friendly towards other religions. Moreover, men who 
experienced popular religiosity had reduced views on the equality and rights of women 
compared to men who experienced elite religiosity. It also turned out that participants 
who experienced popular religiosity expressed more (racial/ethnic) prejudice, and 




In this first chapter of our study of elite and popular religiosity among Dutch-Turkish 
Muslims, we present the fundamental outlines of our research. The first section (1.1) 
will discuss my positionality as a Turkish Muslim researcher in the Netherlands. The 
second section (1.2) will give a brief overview of the current situation of Islam in 
Europe and in the Netherlands. This will be followed by a survey of previous studies 
on Islam in Europe and in the Netherlands (1.3). In the subsequent section (1.4), we 
will describe why we are interested in studying the phenomenon of elite and popular 
religiosity. Following this, we will focus on the definition of elite and popular 
religiosity specifically with reference to Islam (1.5). The objectives, problems and 
research questions of the present study are set out in section 1.6. The methodology of 
our study is outlined in section 1.7. Then we shall present the conceptual model in 
subsection 1.7.1. The final section (1.8) will provide an overview of the remaining 




1.1. Positioning Myself Within the Research 
In the present study, I follow two distinctive paths: first, analysing from my position 
as an insider, as a member of the group; second, analysing in light of my position as 
an outsider, as a sociologist of religion. This is first and foremost an empirical study 
of religiosity among Dutch-Turkish Muslims that was conducted by a Turkish Muslim 
scholar who lives in the Netherlands. It is important, therefore, to begin this study with 
a discussion of my own positionality as a Muslim researcher. My background was 
relevant to the research methodologies and the conceptual development used in this 
thesis. As an insider, I had access to many private and public religious experiences 
such as ṣalaḥ, ṣawm, ḥajj etc. while these experiences took place. At the same time, I 
evaluate these practices in the light of a social scientific study of religion. In this 
section, therefore, I will discuss the experienced benefits and possible challenges that 
were produced by my specific background. 
One of the essential instruments of the ethnographic method is participant 
observation. This includes gathering social data in their natural social setting, in which 
researchers have access to the meaning of events and social interactions as understood 
by the group or organization under study. Different typologies of participant observers 
were developed according to their role during the course of research. The basic 
typology formulated by Gold (1958) defined four so-called field roles: ‘the complete 
participant’, ‘the participant-as-observer’, ‘the observer as participant’, and ‘the 
complete observer’. In the ethnographic part of this study, I usually took on the role of 
‘complete participant’ (in virtue of my background) and of ‘participant-as-observer’, 
in order to gain access to a wider group of participants in their social connections. 
These insider positions provided me with excellent opportunities for in-depth 
interaction with various sections of the Turkish community in the Netherlands, in order 
to understand the meaning they ascribed to culture and religion within the context of a 
multicultural society. 
The reason for accepting an insider role was to get close to the behaviours and 
everyday experiences of the Turkish Muslim community in the Netherlands. “Getting 
close”, according to Emerson (1995, pp. 1-2) requires “physical and social proximity 
to the daily rounds of people’s lives and activities; the field researcher must be able to 
take positions in the midst of the key sites and scenes of others’ lives in order to 
22 
observe and understand them” (for examples of this positionality, see: 4.3.1 Qualitative 
Data Collection; Participant Observation). 
The particularities of my life made this process even easier. I was born in Germany 
in 1982.  I was educated in Turkey until I was 9 years old. I first came into contact 
with the Turkish community in the Netherlands when the Turkish Presidium of 
Religious Affairs (Diyanet) sent my father and his family to the Netherlands to work 
there as an imam in 1992. During his period of office in the Netherlands, I attended 
several cultural and religious courses and public meetings with the Turkish community 
in Deventer. I went to the Hagenpoort, one of Deventer’s primary schools. Through 
my studies at the Hagenpoort I built up good relations with numerous friends. 
Although I was a child, these early meetings provided the early experience that 
inspired my future research interests. After nearly three years in the Netherlands, I 
returned to Turkey in 1996, when my father’s period of office ended. 
Many issues and experiences persisted in my imagination when I returned to 
Turkey.  I developed a greater interest in reading literature and watching broadcasts 
about Turkish communities, the largest ethnic group amongst Muslims in Europe. 
Accordingly, an intellectual enthusiasm emerged to conduct this research even before 
entering the field. 
In August 2007 I made my second contact with the Turkish community in the 
Netherlands, and during my MA studies in Leiden I attended various volunteer 
activities. During my studies at Leiden University I built up good relations with plenty 
of people and Muslim foundations with various social-cultural and political 
backgrounds. This second round of experiences strengthened my interest in studying 
the Turkish Muslim community in the Netherlands. When I began my PhD research in 
Leiden, I understood that my earlier observations and involvement in various 
gatherings and ceremonies were all significant sources of background information. 
In addition to these advantages, researching from an insider position provided me 
with some further critical benefits. Because I already had a network of people who 
trusted me, visiting cultural establishments, religious and political institutions, 
weekend schools and sport clubs was easy. I attended meetings, lectures, ceremonies 
and various other events of these organizations to observe the processes while they 
were taking place. Moreover, the extensive knowledge about my own religion that I 
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possessed prevented me from committing basic mistakes. Perhaps the greatest 
advantage was the capacity for einfühlen (intuition or empathy), the ability of taking 
the native point of view: only people who have or have had religious experiences are 
able to understand the meaning of religious commitment (Geertz, 1999). 
The insider position I took on had some disadvantages as well. Someone living 
within a religious tradition may not be able to maintain the necessary distance to 
conduct a reliable and valid analysis. This is partly due to intellectual limitations: one 
is so familiar with one’s own tradition that it is almost impossible to analyse one’s own 
background with a critical eye. A religious attitude can also blind a scholar to possible 
connections between religious expressions and their social context. A sociologist is 
hardly able to construct an interpretation of a ‘pure’ religion that exists independently 
of a social context. Strong loyalty to a particular religious tradition can create 
difficulties in producing unbiased analyses of other traditions (Furseth, Repstad, & 
Woodhead, 2006, pp. 206-7). To avoid these problems, I made every effort to benefit 
from the outsider’s point of view that came from a team of supervisors with expertise 
in various fields, including sociology, psychology, anthropology of religion and 
history of religions. 
Moreover, the goal of the present study is not to evaluate (either positively or 
negatively), but simply to describe the diversity, similarity and complexity of human 
religious beliefs and behaviours. Therefore, in order to overcome various difficulties 
that stem from the insider approach, the present study opts for a mediating stance. This 
approach attempts to remain neutral when it comes to questions of truth and value; 
instead, it focuses on issues of accurate description and comparison at the expense of 
drawing value judgments. This approach attempts to bracket out, or avoids asking, all 
questions about the truth of a person’s claims, termed methodological agnosticism 
(MacCutcheon, 1999). From this point of view, when it comes to writing and analyzing 
the data coming from both qualitative and quantitative research, this study is a form of 
social scientific research that is fully in line with the methods of sociology of religion. 
1.2. Islam in Europe and the Netherlands 
Islam is the second largest and fastest-growing world religion today, with majority 
populations in 56 countries extending from North Africa to Southeast Asia and 




2007). The Netherlands is one of the countries in which Islam is a fast-growing religion 
(CBS, 2009a). Although this growth is fairly recent, Muslims are no strangers to the 
Dutch society. The Netherlands became familiar with Muslims centuries ago in its role 
as a trading nation and colonial power (Rath, Meyer & Sunier, 1997). Before the 
Second World War, small numbers of Indonesian students visited the Netherlands, 
their colonial ‘mother country’, and in the 1950s a few Moluccans (from Indonesia) 
and Hindustani Surinamese (of Indian descent) decided to settle there. These 
communities consisted mainly of Christians and Hindus respectively, but they 
included small numbers of Muslims as well. The number of Muslims increased 
significantly after 1965 as a result of the arrival of foreign workers and their families 
from North Africa (Morocco) and Turkey. The estimated number of Muslims in the 
Netherlands in 1971 was approximately 50,000; in 1975 about 100,000; in 1995 about 
626,000 (Rath, 1997, p. 389) and in 2012 about 825,000 or 4.5% of the Dutch 
population (CBS, 2012). In-depth interviewing in 2015 showed about 5% to be 
Muslim.1 
There are many different groups of Muslims in the Netherlands, of different 
denominations and countries of origin. If we look at the ethnic origin2, we see that the 
vast majority (two-thirds) of Muslims are of Turkish or Moroccan descent. According 
to the latest estimate of CBS, there are 296,000 Muslims of Moroccan descent and 
285,000 Muslims of Turkish descent living in the Netherlands (CBS, 2009a), which 
accounts for 68% of all Muslims in the country (See Figure 5 in the appendix two for 
Muslims in the Netherlands by ethnic origin).  
Debates on ‘European Islam’ figure largely in the discussion of whether Islam has 
already undergone a process of localization by adapting to the European context, or 
whether it is and will “remain an alien transplant” (Yükleyen, 2009). Cherribi (2003, 
p. 196) observes that “over the past three decades Islam has become increasingly 
                                                 
1 Up to a few years earlier, the number of Muslims was estimated on the basis of the religious 
makeup of the country of origin of the parents of citizens. Following this method, the number 
of Muslims was overestimated. For example, in 2004, the CBS estimated the number of 
Muslims in the Netherlands to be 944,000 (almost 6% of the Dutch population) (CBS, 2006, 
2009b). In 2010, Kettani estimated the number to be 966.000, amounting to 5.8% of the Dutch 
population (Kettani, 2010). 
2 Here, ‘ethnic origin’ means belonging to or deriving from the cultural or religious traditions 
of a specific country. 
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visible in the European public space”. The appearance of Islam took the Dutch by 
surprise. At the height of secularization, the country was surprised to be confronted 
with communities in which religion is very much alive and flourishing, and is 
furthermore a noticeable basis for social organization (Maliepaard & Gijsberts, 2012). 
Muslims currently make up about five percent of the total population3 and Islam has 
become a cultural factor in Dutch society. 
Despite Islam’s rapid growth in Europe and the Netherlands, many in the West 
know little about the religion and are only familiar with the actions of a minority of 
radical extremists. Islam has had a significant impact on world affairs, both historically 
and in the current era (Cesari, 2015; Ramadan, 2009b; Shadid & Koningsveld, 2002b). 
Muslims understand Islam as more than a religion: it is a comprehensive way of life 
that includes spiritual, social, economic and political dimensions (Turner & Nasir, 
2013; Turner, 2003a, 2003b). The reality of European Islam is also very diverse 
(Cesari, 2015). The differences are related to national, cultural, religious and linguistic 
elements and these elements definitely remain important (Dassetto, Ferrari, & 
Maréchal, 2007 p. 3; Huijnk, 2018; Yükleyen & White, 2007). Anyone working on the 
sociology and anthropology of Islam will be aware of this extensive diversity in 
Muslim beliefs and practices. The first problem is therefore one of organizing this 
diversity in terms of an adequate concept (Asad, 1986, p. 5). Unfortunately, this 
challenge has not yet been met successfully with the existing conceptualizations and 
the use of the twin concepts “Islam/Islamic” does not express a coherent object of 
meaning (Ahmed, 2016).  
The Direction of Islam in Europe 
For centuries, Muslim countries and Europe have engaged one another through 
theological dialogues, trade and diplomatic missions, and power struggles. Over the 
last thirty years, however, and to a large extent as a result of globalization and 
migration, the debate has ceased to be a debate of remote and isolated communities 
and has become a debate of endogenous, face-to-face cultural and religious interaction. 
The recurrent question nowadays is: are Islamic religious principles compatible with 
liberal secular European values? (Cesari, 2015, p. 1). There are several models that try 




to answer this question and try to explain the direction of Islam in Europe by focusing 
on a particular aspect of Muslim immigrant life.  
On the one hand, there are some studies that suggest that an inner incompatibility 
between Islam and the West determines the direction of their religious choices. The 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, the train bombings in 
Madrid of 11 March 2004, and the London metro bombings of July 2005 have 
increased the tensions between European society and its Muslim minorities and lent 
support to the essentialist argument of an inner incompatibility between Islam and 
Western democratic, liberal, and secular culture. Some scholars suggested that Islam 
was the new ‘other’ of ‘the West’ incompatible with Western values of freedom, 
liberty, and democracy. Political scientist Samuel Huntington (1993)  suggested that 
global politics would be dominated by a “clash of civilizations” in which Islam would 
replace Communism as the “other” of the Western world. Historian Bernard Lewis 
supported these predictions with historical arguments about an inner incompatibility 
between Islam and Western culture. According to his arguments, the textual sources 
and historical development of Islam are inherently hostile to democracy, freedom, 
liberalism and even peace. He argued that this inner structure of Islam would not 
change over time and was not adaptive, either in Europe or in Muslim societies (Lewis, 
1990). 
Other scholars, on the other hand, with representatives such as Bulliet (2004), 
Bassam Tibi (2001, 2014), Mohammed Arkoun (1996, 2003), Nasr Abu Zayd (2006), 
and Tariq Ramadan (1999, 2004, 2009, 2012) reinterpret Islam in accordance with 
democracy, liberty, and secularism in Europe. Bassam Tibi proposes the emergence of 
Euro-Islam, a form of Islam that is assimilated into the secular European public sphere 
(2014, 2001). This Euro-Islam would limit itself to the private sphere, be pursued as 
an individual form of spirituality and would assure peaceful Muslim participation in 
European cultural pluralism. Tibi speaks out in favour of an enlightened and open-
minded Islamic identity that would be compatible with European civic culture. Bulliet 
argues that Islam and Christianity have the same cradle of a common civilization from 
which they descended “as siblings” in the sixteenth century. He emphasizes the 
similarities in the developments and experiences of the two civilizations (2004).  
In the present study, we are planning to explore the inner differences of Dutch-
Turkish religiosity in relation to social, economic, and cultural aspects. By means of 
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this exploration we intend to examine the possible directions Islam is taking in Europe. 
We seek a middle ground between two types of essentialist argumentation: one is to 
theorize incompatibility between Islam and European culture, and the other is to 
theorize compatibility between them. As many scholars who study Muslim society 
have noted, Islam, like any other religion, does not develop in a monolithic form, 
whether it is hostile to European values or assimilated, as the term ‘Euro-Islam’ 
suggests. It develops in a multiplicity of forms, such as political Islam, official Islam, 
popular Islam, spiritual Islam and radical fundamentalism, combining both radical and 
moderate religious voices. This inner-Islamic difference is important in order to 
understand what Muslims make of their religion in Europe, and to grasp the direction 
that Islam is taking on the continent. This then brings us to the argumentation 
suggested by Nielsen (1999, 2007), in which he points to the fact that since there is 
more than one way of being European, in terms of religious practice, culture, and 
identity, there are more ways than one for Muslims to become European. 
1.3. Academic Research into Islam in Europe and the Netherlands 
Studies on Islam in Europe address multiple subjects such as the development of 
mosques and Muslim associations, the struggle to establish Muslim schools in the 
European context (Daun & Walford, 2004; Doomernik, 1991; Wetering & Miedema, 
2012), the status of religious leaders such as imams (Boender, 2007; Ghaly, 2008), the 
history of Islam in the West (Berger, 2014), and social responses to the establishment 
of Muslim institutions (Boender, 2006; Esch & Roovers, 1987; Rath, Penninx, 
Groenendijk, & Meyer, 2001; Rath, 1996, 2005; Rath, Meyer & Sunier, 1997; 
Waardenburg, 1991). Others have elaborated specific social or institutional aspects of 
Islam in Europe, such as the problems of Muslim youth (Nilan, 2017; Vertovec & 
Rogers, 1999), political participation (Cesari, 2013; Klausen, 2005; Shadid & 
Koningsveld, 1996), legal questions and secularism (Berger, 2013; Cesari & 
McLoughlin, 2005; Ferrari & Bradney, 2000; Nielsen, 1979, 1987; Rohe, 2007),  
radicalization of Muslims (Coolsaet, 2008; Pargeter, 2008), and conversion to Islam 
(Köse, 1996), the complexity of the increasing presence of a multitude of Muslims 
(Vinding, Račius, & Thielmann, 2018). There is hardly a topic relating to Muslims or 




Islamic studies has also become a well-established discipline in the Netherlands 
(Berger, 2015). From the 1980s onwards, scholars increasingly turned their attention 
to the religious beliefs and practices of Muslim migrants in the Netherlands (Broex, 
1982; Custers, 1985; Koningsveld & Shadid, 1992, 1997). Initially, the focus was on 
Islam in general (Jansen, 1987; Koningsveld, 1982) and the ways in which it was 
practiced by Muslims (Landman, 1992a, 1992b; Waardenburg, 1983). Some of the 
literature was about Islamic education and how it should be provided by schools (Ter 
Avest & Bakker, 2013; Esch & Roovers, 1987; Genç, Ter Avest & Miedema, 2011; 
Rietveld-van Wingerden et al., 2009; Ter Avest & Rietveld-Van Wingerden, 2016; 
Wagtendonk, 1987). Some studies focused on Islamic minority law (fiqh al-aqalliyāt) 
(De Kroon, 2016; Shadid & Koningsveld, 1996a). 
After the 1990s, a tradition of anthropological and ethnographic research developed 
concerning Muslim experiences of religion and religious identity (Andree & Jonge, 
1990; Ter Avest & Bakker, 2009; Dessing, 2001; Rath et al., 1997; Sunier, 1996; 
Verkuyten & Thijs, 2010; Verkuyten, Thijs, & Steven, 2012; Verkuyten & Yıldız, 
2009).  
In the 2000s, while the public and political debate on integration focused 
increasingly on Muslims, academic research rose to the challenge in order to answer 
basic questions such as: Who are the Muslims?, What do they want? and What is the 
role of Islam in their lives? This research into the praxis of Islam would soon dominate 
the study of Islam in the Netherlands (Berger, 2015). This resulted in studies on a 
diversity of issues, such as religion and culture (Buijs, 2009; Buitelaar, 2006; Huijnk, 
2018; Phalet & Wall, 2004), Muslim youth (Bartels, 2000; De Koning, 2011, 2008; 
Heijden, 2009; Nabben, Yeşilgöz & Korf, 2006; Pels, Gruijter, Doğan & Hoek, 2006; 
Phalet, Lotringen & Entzinger, 2000; Roeland, Aupers, Houtman, De Koning & 
Noomen, 2010), everyday lived Islam (Dessing, 2013), mosque architecture (Arab, 
2013; Roose, 2009), female circumcision (Bartels, 2004; Dessing, 2001; 
Kolfschooten, 2004; J. Smith & Longbottom, 1995), choice of marriage partners (De 
Koning & Bartels, 2005; Hooghiemstra, 2003; Speelman, 2001), experience of the 
public sphere (De Koning, 2010), headscarf issues (Hoekstra & Verkuyten, 2014; 
Lorasdağı, 2009a, 2009b; Moors, 2009; Motivaction, 2011), socio-psychological 
matters (Hoffer, 2009; Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2012; Speelman, 2016; Verkuyten, 
2010; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2012), use of multi-media (Konijn et al., 2010). After 
29 
that, many studies on radicalization and orthodox trends among young Muslims began 
to appear (Cherribi, 2010; De Koning, 2009, 2013; Gielen, 2008; Komen, 2014). 
Challenges in Studying Islam 
As is understood from this large body of research, the examination of the religiosity of 
Muslim individuals has gained increasing salience, and the ‘native voice’ has become 
an important topic nowadays. However, very little information has been gathered 
about the daily practices of Muslims in ways comparable to how information has been 
gathered about other religious groups. In this regard, sociology, psychology and 
anthropology of religion - specifically the European social sciences - still remain 
marginal when it comes to Muslims and production of data that can be compared to 
those existing for Protestants, Catholics, or Jews (Cesari, 2015, p. 3). 
One of the problems here is the scant attention paid to non-Christian religious 
experience. In the last few decades, approaches to religious orientation employed to 
measure various ways of being religious have emerged strongly in Western scientific 
literature, focusing in particular on Christian religious experience. The divisions that 
have been applied in the study of religion draw on a range of terms such as 
‘authoritarian’ and ‘humanistic’ religion (Fromm, 1950), ‘primary religious 
behaviour’, ‘secondary religious behaviour’ and ‘tertiary religious behaviour’(Clark, 
1958), ‘committed’ and ‘consensual’ religion (Spilka & Allen, 1967), ‘intrinsic’ and 
‘extrinsic’ religiosity (Allport & Ross, 1967), ‘mythological’ and ‘literal’ religion 
(Hunt, 1972), Religion as ‘ends’, religion as ‘means’ (Batson, 1976), ‘high-
involvement religion’ and ‘low-involvement religion’ (Beit-Hallahmi, 1989) and so 
forth. To a certain extent, these various terms and propositions used in different 
disciplines exhibit characteristics comparable to those of ‘elite’ and ‘popular’ 
religiosity, as conceptualized by scholars studying Islam. 
Although the notion of elite and popular religiosity has been in circulation since the 
17th century, its usage in both theoretical and practical Islamic studies was vague and 
ill-defined until the last few decades, when there was an increase in studies with this 
angle. However, field studies in this area have been few compared to theoretical studies 
(Çapçıoğlu, 2004, p. 210).  
This religious diversity forms a challenge for Turkish research in sociology of 
religion of Islam. The challenge lies in the task to find the appropriate measurements 
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that will allow us to comprehend the different characteristics of religiosity in Turkey. 
The measurements which assume a monolithic and one-dimensional Turkish Islam no 
longer seem to be sufficient. There is a growing need to assess the varieties of religious 
orientations, such as intrinsic versus extrinsic, ultimate versus instrumental, personal 
versus institutional motivations in ritualistic dimensions; esoteric versus exoteric, 
differentiated versus undifferentiated knowledge in the intellectual dimension (see 
section 3.3). 
Adaptation of Scales in Studying Islam 
At the end of the 20th century, scholarly interest expanded to include living Muslim 
peoples as a subject of study, and studies in the field of sociology gained in importance 
through this time.4 Many multidimensional religiosity scales have been proposed in 
recent years (see Appendix five: Measurements in Turkish Sociology and Psychology 
of Religion). They are either inspired by or adapted from European or American 
religiosity scales and have been translated into Turkish (Zuhal Ağılkaya-Şahin, 2012). 
The most influential approach to developing religiosity scales in Turkey is the 
multidimensional approach of Glock and Stark (1969). Early efforts (e.g. Yaparel’s 
(1987) Religious Life Inventory) as well as later attempts (e.g. Ayten’s (2009) Brief 
Islamic Religiosity Scale) referred to Glock and Stark’s (1969) model and developed 
multidimensional religiosity scales for the study of Turkish Islamic religiosity.  
Allport & Ross’ concept of religiosity is another inspiration to Turkish sociology 
and psychology of religion research, when it comes to developing measurements of 
religiosity. Scales based on religious orientation (e.g., Hoge, 1972) have been 
identified as suitable for measurements in different religious contexts since they do not 
refer to a single explicit religious system (Karaca, 2001a). Kayıklık (2000) was one of 
the researchers who adapted the Religious Orientation Scale by Allport & Ross (1967) 
to Turkish culture. With minor differences, Gürses (2001) advanced an equivalent 
measure. According to their results, religion is an aim for the intrinsic religious person. 
Hökelekli (2005) defined this kind of religiosity as ‘psychological needs religiosity’ 
4 Over the last two decades, the number of field studies has exceeded theoretical studies in 
Turkey. According to Şerif Mardin, field studies in sociology of religion that are conducted to 
explore the Islamic understanding of the masses supply more important and valuable data than 
theoretical or normative studies of the country’s religious landscape (Mardin, 2012).  
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in relation to the functions of religion. In contrast, for the extrinsic religious person, 
religion is a means by which he/she intends to achieve goals such as social acceptance. 
The elite and popular religiosity scale developed in this study is inspired by both 
the Glock and Allport scales and will be the combination of these two. In chapter 3 we 
will discuss this issue in depth by indicating pros and cons of these two measurements. 
1.4. Elite and Popular Religiosity - Contested Concepts 
If we look at the comprehensive academic literature on popular religiosity, the 
difficulty of our task is immediately apparent: scholars do not even agree on the choice 
of a term to refer to the phenomenon. In our view this is mainly due to the fact that 
they come from considerable different scientific backgrounds. Many academic 
disciplines, in particular since the 1970s, have contributed to the study of popular 
religiosity: social sciences (sociology, anthropology, psychology), religious studies 
(comparative, historical), theology (systematic, liturgical, practical) have approached 
this complex phenomenon from different viewpoints, creating the confusion 
mentioned above. Examples of terminological differences are diffused religion, folk 
religion, mass religion, common religion, popular piety, popular faith and popular 
Islam. We should indicate that the term ‘popular religion’ is preferred in Anglophone 
literature, while the term ‘popular religiosity’ is found in other language areas, such as 
in German (Volksfrömmigkeit or Volksreligiosität), Italian (religiosità popolare) and 
Spanish (religiosidad popular) (Zaccaria, 2010, p. 4). These examples make us 
understand Badone’s (1990, p. 4) comment that “as a scholarly category popular 
religion is problematic”. This causes frustration among scholars about a term whose 
meaning has become increasingly less clear over the past few decades (Carrol, 1992, 
p. 6), so much so that some have advocated abandoning it (Christian, 1981; Grehan,
2014). Given the complexity of the debate on popular religiosity, we definitely cannot
hope to offer a comprehensive, unifying conceptual definition. Instead, in line with
Berlinerblau, we suggest that the term must be used with some caution, thereby making
it clear that the term cannot be regarded as unproblematic and conceptually
unambiguous (Berlinerblau, 2001, p . 607).
However, this does not mean that the term is abandoned in the present study. On 
the contrary, we will use it, but, rather than looking for just one academically unifying, 




within ‘popular religiosity’ as employed by us in our research. This means that instead 
of a conceptual universal definition, we will offer an operational contextual definition 
of both elite and popular religiosity. Namely, we will offer a list of contents, 
motivations and cognitive styles that, in our view, characterize popular religiosity, 
which differ from the contents, motivations and cognitive styles that characterize elite 
religiosity. These can be analytically and empirically investigated in the Dutch-
Turkish Muslim community (see 3.3). 
It can be said that no universally accepted definitions of Religion, Culture, and 
Popular Religion have been produced. Working definitions are not necessarily perfect, 
complete, or universally accepted, but they can provide a practical starting point for 
further exploration (Clark, 2012, pp. 2-3). Contextualization of our object of study will 
enable us to overcome the lack of consensus among scholars of popular religiosity: the 
attempt to offer a-historical and universal definitions of religion (Asad, 1993, p. 29). 
From this perspective, religion is not considered as absolute in the trans-historical and 
transcultural sense but is subject to historical and cultural differences. Considering 
Berger’s approach (2014, p. 26), when we speak of ‘Islam’, this is with the 
understanding that these notions and their interpretations are specific to their time and 
place, whether as a doctrine or a cultural system. Therefore, our approach to elite and 
popular religiosity in this study can be seen as the opposite of universalisation: the elite 
and popular religiosity that we are dealing with is neither a-historical nor universal in 
character, because we investigate elite and popular religiosity in Muslim society, more 
precisely in the Turkish Muslim society, and more specifically in the Dutch-Turkish 
Muslim society existing in the Netherlands. 
1.5. Definition of Elite and Popular Religiosity 
Most researchers who have written about religion in general seem to agree that there 
is no single religious orientation, but rather a wide range of different experiences that 
can be focused on religious objects (Allport, 1950; Hood, Spilka, Hunsberger & 
Gorsuch, 1996; Spilka & Allen, 1967; Weber, 1963)  
Many scholars who study Muslim society have also noted that Islam, like all 
religions, is not monolithic. Although most Muslims adhere to certain fundamental 
tenets, the practices, interpretations, images and realities of Islam differ across time 
and space (Ahmet, 2016). Max Weber indicated that investigators of human culture do 
33 
not want to discover universal rules that will help them to explain a particular culture; 
but rather want to understand the uniqueness and particularity of a culture (1949, p. 
72). 
The variety of Muslims living in Europe in terms of regional origin and ethno-
national identity plays an important role in the make-up of Islamic religiosity in 
Europe, because the Islamic orientation in the countries of origin is still influential on 
Muslim immigrants, especially when it comes to Turks (Huijnk, 2018, p. 83). Olivier 
Roy argues that ethno-cultural differences are going to disappear as Muslims in Europe 
de-link culture from religion (Roy, 2004). However, he notes that, in comparison with 
other Muslims, Turks tend to preserve their language and ethnonational identity (Ibid, 
123). Other scholars suggest that the religious and ethno-national identities of Muslims 
in Europe are inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing (Cesari, 2004, p. 178). 
Observations on Turkish Muslims in the Dutch society confirm this (Yükleyen & 
White, 2007). The ethno-national division among Muslims justifies examining the 
diversity of Islam within one group, such as Pakistani, Moroccan, or Turkish Muslims, 
because the religious organizations of Muslims are divided along ethno-national lines. 
The focus on one faith group, however, bears the risk of constructing Muslims as a 
coherent group while ignoring the inner-Islamic difference and the characteristics that 
some of them share with other individuals and groups (Spielhaus, 2011). There are 
various sources of religious diversity within a single ethno-national Muslim 
community, and Turkish society today experiences various types of religiosity as well. 
Data from both theoretical and practical studies confirm the existence of different 
religious orientations (Akşit, Şentürk, Küçükural, & Cengiz, 2012; Arslan, 2003, 2004, 
2008b; Coştu, 2009; Kirman, 2005; Tanyu, 1976). Therefore, the inner-Islamic 
difference to which we draw attention here is of great importance in understanding and 
explaining this religious diversity. Taking this inner-Islamic difference into account, 
this study is concerned with investigating the distinctive characteristics of Islam in 
Turkish culture. In order to do so, we suggest two conceptions related to the Islamic 
tradition, namely khawāṣṣ (elite) and ʿawāmm (popular).  
The notions of khawāṣṣ and ʿawāmm have deep roots, dating back to the initial 
period of the Muslim tradition. Before offering our contextual and operational 
definition, we would like to introduce some earlier approaches to these concepts. There 




religiosity; (1) the praxis approach, which refers to the religious practices and beliefs 
of individuals (2) the economic and social approach, which refers to the social or 
economic status of a group. In this section, I will briefly review how the concepts of 
khawāṣṣ and ʿawāmm are evaluated by these approaches. 
Ethical traditions in Islam, in particular all Sufi traditions, generally classify the 
whole of humanity into three ranks to point out the inner-Islamic differences and to 
address the different religious contents, motivations and cognitive styles that lie behind 
religious beliefs and practices. The ranks are: the common folk or general mankind 
(ʿawāmm); the elect or elite (khawāṣṣ); and the super-elect (khawāṣṣ al-khawāṣṣ). The 
ordinary level of religious experience refers to ʿawāmm while elite religious 
experience commonly refers to khawāṣṣ and only rarely to khawāṣṣ al-khawāṣṣ. On 
the one hand, the concept of ʿawāmm is mostly used for those who pay attention to 
Sharia law, the exoteric side of religion. Simultaneously, ʿawāmm refers to those who 
are formalistic and yet cannot grasp the inner aspect of religion, the esoteric side of 
religion. The concept of khawāṣṣ, on the other hand, is used to indicate inner aspects 
of religious beliefs and practices. 
The fasting of the general public (ʿawāmm) involves refraining from satisfying the 
appetite of the stomach and the appetite for sex. The fasting of the select few 
(khawāṣṣ) is to keep the ears, the eyes, the tongue, and hands, and the feet as well as 
the other senses free from sin (Ghazālī, 1938, book 6, trans. 1992). 
This brief anecdote from Al-Ghazālī’s Revival of the Religious Sciences, one of the 
Sufi classics from the 11th century, illustrates the use of the praxis approach in the 
ritualistic aspect of religion. Here, ʿawāmm refers to ordinary types of religious 
behaviour, namely popular religiosity, while khawāṣṣ refers to the spiritual, inner 
aspect of religious behaviour, namely elite religiosity.  
Khawāṣṣ and ʿ awāmm types of commitment can be exemplified in light of the other 
four dimensions of religiosity as listed by Glock, i.e. the ideological, intellectual, 
experiential and consequential dimension - in addition to the ritualistic dimension. 
There appear to be at least two forms of religious belief that fall within the ideological 
dimension. Elites (khawāṣṣ) tend to emphasize verification (taḥqīq) of beliefs, which 
includes doubt (irtiyāb) and questioning (tafakkur). Those who experience popular 
religiosity (ʿawāmm), on the other hand, tend to emphasize imitation (taqlīd) through 
a blind trust in tradition, which implies that family elders, the cultural environment and 
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society are imitated as a second-hand experience. Among the beliefs and practices 
discussed by Muslim ethicists and Sufis, there are verification (taḥqīq), doubt (irtiyāb), 
questioning (tafakkur), and imitation (taqlīd) or second-hand experience. When we 
look at these kinds of examples given by Muslims ethicists and Sufis, we can say that 
‘elite and popular religion’ needs to be defined on the basis of the religious practices 
and beliefs of individuals - not on the basis of the non-privileged social or economic 
status of a group. 
Nearly comparable conceptions of ‘elite’ and ‘popular’ are used by sociologists to 
explain the structure of Muslim society. Gellner identifies unvarying features of 
Muslim societies. Building on the work of Ibn Khaldūn, he suggests a dialectic 
between city and tribe, each with its own form of religion. According to him, the 
central characteristic of Islam is that it was divided internally into the high Islam of 
the elite and the popular (‘low’) Islam of the common people. High Islam, Gellner 
believes, is carried by urban elites who are largely recruited from the bourgeois trading 
classes, and it reflects the tastes and values of the urban middle class. Popular Islam, 
on the other hand, is usually associated with the pre-urban stages or nonurban, 
nonliterate/illiterate levels of society and is  produced by the village, or the common 
people (Gellner, 1983). In the same way, in Şerif Mardin’s writings on Turkish 
religiosity, this inner-Islamic difference, as mentioned above, is associated with central 
Islam (Merkez İslamı) and peripheral Islam (çevre İslamı) - generally based on the 
distinction according to lifestyle (urban/rural) (2006). As one can immediately 
understand, these sociologists have put the economic and social approach at the centre 
and have explored religiosity in the context of socio-economic conditions. Within the 
economic and social approach, elite and popular religiosity refers to the religious 
tendencies of strata characterized by a high or low degree of social and economic 
status. Among the groups discussed by Gellner and Mardin are the urban elite, the 
bourgeois trading classes, the lower middle class, the middle class, urban middle 
classes, labourers, peasants, central Islam and peripheral Islam… On this basis, it could 
be assumed that when these sociologists spoke of ‘elite and popular religion’, they 
proposed a type of religiosity associated with a given society’s economically or 
socially privileged classes or non-privileged groups, instead of referring to the 




When we look at studies on Turkish religiosity, it can be said that theoretical 
research in religious studies (theology, ethics) was indeed insufficient to determine 
these concepts in relation to socio-economic terms, but that at the same time practical 
research (sociology, anthropology) is also inadequate to explore Muslim religiosity in 
terms of inner-Islamic differences. The spiritual and intrinsic dimensions of religiosity 
were mostly ignored or studied separately by the sociologist, without taking the 
interrelatedness of elite and popular religiosity into account, while the relation with 
social and economic factors was largely neglected by the scholars of religious studies.  
This is also the case for the Dutch Muslims. As Berger points out, there is very little 
information in the literature about socio-economic issues relating to Muslims: but 
more information is available on Moroccans and Turks (Berger, 2015). Religion is 
neither used to identify inner-Islamic pluralities nor to explain the behaviour of 
individuals in socio-economic terms. In order to fill this gap in the present study we 
plan to concentrate both on the inner-Islamic differences of religiosity and their 
relation with the socio-economic situation in the Netherlands. From this point of view, 
the approach to elite and popular religiosity that we use takes the following form:  
‘Elite religiosity’ and ‘popular religiosity’ are constituted by specific types of 
religious praxis and belief generally exercised by certain socio-economic strata.  
This approach suggested by Jaques Berlinerblau (2001) is called the synthesis 
approach and is inspired by the works of Max Weber. This approach will be developed 
in more detail in chapter 2. We believe that this approach will help us to understand 
the inner aspects of religiosity without losing sight of the influence of social and 
economic factors. 
Here, we briefly anticipate the way in which we interpret elite and popular 
religiosity, the object of our research. In the context of the present study, elite 
religiosity is understood to refer to the spiritual, internalized, intrinsic, and committed 
outlooks of Turkish religious experience that are highlighted by ethicists and Sufis, 
but also by sociologists and psychologists of religion, by exploring the religious 
cultural system that is generally produced by spiritual elites primarily for their own 
religious life and tradition. Popular religiosity in this context refers to the conventional, 
extrinsic, and consensual elements of Turkish religious experience, which are 
emphasized by sociologists, psychologists and anthropologists of religion by exploring 
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the religious cultural system generally produced by the masses for their own religious 
life, likely to include beliefs, practices, religious knowledge, and religious experiences 
of individuals. The main focus is on the characteristics of religiosity and its relation 
with socio-economic factors rather than on the content of particular theological beliefs. 
We also assume that certain objective positions within the socio-cultural field 
generally go hand in hand with certain forms of religiosity.  Chapter 2 of this study is 
dedicated to understanding elite and popular religiosity in depth. In this chapter, we 
will elaborate on the relations between religiosity and culture. This chapter describes 
the theoretical perspectives of social stratification and religious market with respect 
to the emergence of elite and popular religiosity. Chapter 3 will further elaborate on 
these conceptions, particularly with a view to the Islamic context. 
1.6. Objectives, Research Problems and Research Questions 
The objective of this study is to contribute to the body of knowledge about the 
characteristics of religiosity of Turkish-Dutch Muslims in diaspora, in relation to 
socio-economic aspects of the Dutch plural society. Our research is exploratory and 
descriptive. It seeks to examine and understand Muslim beliefs and practices from the 
perspective of elite and popular religiosity, exploring the characteristics of both kinds 
of religiosity, considering demographic and socio-economic factors in relation to both. 
The aim is to discover the relationship between elite and popular religiosity and the 
various sociological consequences of both in the context of the plural society of the 
Netherlands. The choice for explorative and descriptive research is motivated by the 
fact that there is no strong theory formation available regarding elite and popular 
religiosity and its relation to socio-economic aspects, in particular regarding Muslims 
in a plural context. 
In light of this objective, the problem under investigation is the characteristics of 
religiosity of Dutch-Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands and how this relates to their 
socio-economic status, which will be investigated in this study using the theoretical 
elaborations presented in chapter 2. In our research, we formulate hypotheses about 
this relation. We cautiously call them hypotheses, we might also say expectations 
because of the exploratory character of our study and the lack of robust theory on elite 
and popular religiosity and their relation with cultural and social differentiation in 
diaspora. Still, we draw on existing literature and preliminary observations in the field 
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in order to arrive at a number of hypotheses. Based on the results of the analyses of 
our empirical findings, we will then see whether these hypotheses can be confirmed or 
need to be refuted.  
The main research questions have been formulated in relation to our objective and 
the problem we have stated above; (1) ‘What forms and motivations characterize elite 
and popular religiosity, what are the patterns in the relationship between elite and 
popular religiosity, and how does this relate to the socio-economic status of Dutch-
Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands?’ (2) ‘What are the socio-psychological 
differences in behaviour and attitudes among Dutch-Turkish Muslims who experience 
elite and popular religiosity, respectively?’ These questions will be further explored in 
the following chapters, and they will be discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
1.7. Methodology of the Thesis 
Sociology of religion is the study of beliefs, practices, and organizational forms of 
religion using the tools and methods of the discipline of sociology. This study follows 
a structural-functionalist approach. In this model religion has reciprocal relations with 
other elements of the social structure, and therefore a change in the structural elements 
of society will be reflected in religion and religious phenomena, or vice versa, a change 
in the position of religion will bring about certain changes in society. According to this 
approach, religion has functions in every social layer of a society and corresponds with 
various social functions and roles within these different layers (Cunningham, 1999, p. 
42). 
This objective investigation may include the use of quantitative methods such as 
surveys, polls, demographic and census analysis, or qualitative methods such as 
participant observation, interviewing, and analysis of archival, historical and 
documentary material, or may draw on a ‘mixed-methods’ approach combining both 
qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques. The design of the present study 
has been shaped by a ‘mixed-methods’ approach, in which quantitative and qualitative 
methods are merged into one research project.  
Scholars have identified various possible forms of mixed-methods design and have 
even devised a classification based on a basic typology in the field of evaluation 
(Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989). This classification distinguishes four types: 
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complementarity, development, initiation, and expansion. (1) Complementarity seeks 
to use the results of one method to elaborate on the results of another method; (2) 
development seeks to use the results of one method to help develop or inform another 
method; (3) initiation seeks to recast the results or procedures of one method in order 
to question the results of another method; (4) expansion seeks to extend the breadth or 
scope of an inquiry by using different methods for different research components 
(Greene et al., 1989, p. 259). Our method is based on the first and second types. Figure 
1 illustrates the design we use in this study. 
Figure 1 - Exploratory mixed method design 
 Building 
This design is typically used to develop quantitative instruments when the variables 
are not known, or to explore preliminary qualitative findings collected from a small 
group of people with a randomized sample from a larger population.  
Within a four-year period (2010 - 2013), the project began with qualitative research 
to explore the various forms and motivations of elite and popular religiosity and the 
social location of these religiosities, particularly focusing on Dutch-Turkish Muslims 
living in the Netherlands. One of the essential instruments we used was participant 
observation, which was briefly discussed already in section 1.1.  As a cross-sectional 
study, the research design also included an extensive literature review, so that the 
results of the qualitative research and literature review could serve as a basis for 
aspects of the quantitative approach.  
The second method was a questionnaire survey that formed the main part of the 
project, with the clear research goal to investigate Muslim beliefs and practices in the 
context of elite and popular religiosity. We used four different questionnaires; (1) a 
general religiosity scale, (2) an elite religiosity scale, (3) a popular religiosity scale and 
(4) measurements for the consequential dimension.
The general religiosity scale (1) was designed to obtain information under the five
dimensions based on Glock and Stark (1962). This part of the questionnaire focuses 
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on high and low religiosity. The result of this part of the survey was used to identify 
respondents who experience a low level of religiosity and to remove them from the 
sample, because they are unable to assist us in our search for three elements of religious 
orientation, namely motivation, cognitive style, and content. 
The use of an elite religiosity scale (2) and a popular religiosity scale (3) 
distinguishes the present study from most other studies. These instruments are 
developed through the operationalization of concepts we use in our study of elite and 
popular religiosity. This part of the questionnaire was designed to highlight the intra-
dimensional aspects of Glock’s five dimensions by considering the ‘elite’ and 
popular’, ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ aspects of religiosity. This part of the study is 
therefore not designed to examine the difference between high and low religiosity, but 
rather the difference between elite and popular religiosity. Our initial method, 
consisting of participant observation and literature study, was generally useful to 
design this part of the questionnaire. 
The consequential dimension (4) is considered here as the relation(s) or even 
possible influence(s) of being an elite or popular religious person. This part of the 
questionnaire will reveal the effects of elite and popular religiosity in peoples’ day-to-
day lives. The consequential dimension was chosen to cover a wide range of life issues, 
including modernity, gender issues, sectarian issues, segregation issues, in-group 
attitudes, social relations, and attitudes towards Christianity. These four measures were 
developed to obtain a quantitative picture of Muslim religiosity and its sociological 
manifestations. The methodology of this study will be elaborated in detail in chapter 
4.  
1.7.1. Conceptual Model 
In order to achieve our goal and to face our research difficulties, this study uses the 
concepts that are illustrated schematically in the following figure: 
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TV and Internet 
Attitudes towards other religions 
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In-group/Out-group Attitudes 
This model illustrates the possible relations between the concepts used in our study. 
The model indicates that the notion of elite and popular religiosity is localized under 
the umbrella of high and popular culture. Consequently, one of the sub-questions to 
answer our first research question5 is ‘How can the relation between religion and 
culture be characterized, and how do we understand popular and elite religiosity?’ A 
justification for the study of religion by relating it to cultural differentiation can be 
found in different disciplines such as sociology, psychology and anthropology of 
religion (Bell, 2006; Belzen, 2010; Forbes & Mahan, 2005; Foucault & Carrette, 2013; 
Geertz, 1971, 1973; Mirsepassi, 1992;  Scupin, 1993). Our study analyses high and 
popular culture on this basis.  
Furthermore, we try to understand the concepts of elite and popular religiosity by 
conducting a social scientific study of religion. The above schematization of elite and 
popular religiosity represents these forms of religiosity as two circles. However, the 
present study does not view the relation between elite and popular religiosity as static 
and clear-cut. We will not overlook the dialectical character of their interrelatedness. 
The second sub-question of this study deals with these aspects of religiosity: ‘What 
are the characteristics of elite and popular religiosity in the context of the Turkish - 
and possibly also Dutch - society and how is this related to socio-economic status? 
This entails exploring the relation between elite and popular religiosity in terms of 
beliefs, rituals, experiences and knowledge, while monitoring the effect of population 
characteristics. The following population characteristics will be taken into account: 
gender, age, educational level, income, and generational differences. These 
characteristics are included in our model because, according to the existing literature, 
they can influence the relation between elite and popular religiosity.  
The lower part of the model represents socio-psychological attitudes related to elite 
and popular religiosity. To measure various non-religious attitudinal affects in 
response to the second major research question stated above, the present study makes 
use of several attitude scales.  
                                                 
5 RQ1: What forms and motivations characterize elite and popular religiosity, what are the 
patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity, and how does this relate to 
the socio-economic status of Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands?’ 
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1.8. Organization of the Thesis 
This concluding section of the introductory chapter provides an overview of the 
following chapters. The thesis is divided into six chapters.  
Chapter 1 includes a general overview of the study. This part introduces the theme 
of the thesis, and the immediate cause that led to the research questions, and presents 
an overview of the chapters. 
Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical background of the main concepts in light of a 
social scientific study of religion. The notions of great and little traditions, high and 
popular culture are introduced and developed upon in a broader context (2.1). First, 
we discuss how the category of the ‘popular’ is approached by structuralists and 
culturalists (2.1.1) Second, this concept is elaborated upon in light of Turkish 
sociology. More specifically, this section seeks to investigate the links between culture 
and religiosity drawing on the works of Ziya Gökalp and Fuad Köprülü (2.1.2). After 
elaborating these approaches, we propose a third approach based on Gramsci’s 
writings. In this part we highlight the importance of investigating the cultures of the 
elites through comparison and synthesis with the cultures of the masses. (2.1.3). 
After presenting this introduction on elite and popular culture, this study will shed 
light on the notion of elite and popular religion and its acquired meaning and content 
in the social scientific study of religion (2.2). I will explain Weber’s status 
stratification (2.2.1) and religion and rational choice theories (2.2.2) in order to explain 
elite and popular religion from a sociological perspective. Following this, we will 
discuss the earlier usage and meaning given to the terms elite and popular religiosity 
in different disciplines (2.2.3). This study will then propose adding a different 
definition of ‘elite’ based on a synthesis approach (2.2.4). Our operational definition 
will be particularly built in chapter three, however. Finally, the criticisms levelled 
against the concepts of elite and popular religiosity and against similar or overlapping 
concepts such as great and little traditions, will be considered and refuted up to some 
degree (2.2.5). 
Chapter 3 will shed light on a somewhat narrower context and will focus on elite 
and popular religiosity in Islam. In part 3.1, I will indicate discussions on the 
conceptualization and operationalization of religiosity. Here I will elaborate on how 
the subdivision between ‘elite’ and ‘popular’ influences research in the social scientific 
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study of religion. The first section of this part mainly discusses two-dimensional 
religiosity scales (3.1.1). The second section of this part, I will make a comparison 
between the two-dimensional scale devised by Allport and Ross (1967) and the 
multidimensional religiosity scales conceived by Stark and Glock (1968) (3.1.2). 
In part 3.2, continuing from chapter 2, I will try to evaluate elite and popular 
religiosity in the context of Muslim sociology. I will try to show what the concepts of 
great and little Islam mean, and how these terms apply to the case of Islam, by drawing 
on the works of Ernest Gellner and Clifford Geertz (3.2.1). I shall then focus 
particularly on Turkish sociology of Islam by drawing on Şerif Mardin, Ahmed 
Karamustafa and Ali Yaşar Sarıbay (3.2.2). In section 3.2.3, I will discuss some 
criticisms of elite and popular religiosity and come up with some suggestions. In the 
next section (3.2.4) I will elaborate on the study of elite and popular religiosity in 
Muslim philosophy of religion, thereby referring in particular to the works of Al-
Ghazālī. 
The remainder of the chapter (3.3) discusses the theoretical framework of this study 
and develops various hypotheses that will be tested in chapter 5. I will present the 
possible content of the components of religious commitment under five headings: the 
ideological dimension (3.3.1), ritualistic dimension (3.3.2), intellectual dimension 
(3.3.3), experiential dimension (3.3.4) and consequential dimension (3.3.5). These 
parts of the study provide an operational definition of elite and popular religiosity. This 
section proposes an understanding of elite and popular religious forms and motivations 
through observation of Dutch-Turkish Muslims in context.  
Chapter 4 outlines the methodology for the study (4.1). The objectives, research 
questions and hypotheses are discussed in more detail in part 4.2. I will then continue 
to discuss the research design and the working methods in section 4.3. In this section 
I will explain how I use a mixed-methods approach. Then, I will discuss the collection 
of qualitative data during my research and problems I faced during field work (4.3.1). 
Then, in section 4.3.2, I will indicate quantitative tools for data collection; paper-based 
survey and web-based survey. Further on in the chapter, I will address measuring 
instruments that were developed through operationalization of the concepts that I used 
in this study of elite and popular religiosity (4.4). Reliability analyses of the scales are 
rendered in section 4.5. The data analysis methods are explained in section 4.6. 
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Chapter 5 provides findings and data analysis, testing the hypotheses developed in 
chapters 2 and 3. In this chapter, I first present the demographic characteristics of the 
sample as drawn from the 2013 Census information (5.1). Secondly, I analyse data 
from the general religiosity scale (5.2).  
Then I turn to the other part of the empirical question posed in this chapter: what is 
the social location of elite and popular religiosity? (5.3) This discussion begins with 
the factor analysis of the elite religiosity scale and the popular religiosity scale (5.3.1). 
Next, I address the average means of elite and popular religiosity (5.3.2). 
Subsequently, I continue to determine which population characteristics (gender, age, 
educational level, income etc.) have a significant correlation or association with the 
elite and popular religiosity scales. A series of ANOVA analyses will be applied in 
this section (5.3.3). Next, I present some social factors influence religious education 
of the respondents in relation to elite and popular religiosity (5.3.4). Then I will shed 
light on socio-psychological attitudes that are affected by elite and popular religiosity 
(5.3.5). This part of the scale constitutes our consequential aspect. The consequential 
aspect will reveal the effects of elite and popular religiosity in peoples’ day-to-day 
lives. 
Finally, chapter 6 consists of three parts. We start by summarizing the main 
hypotheses of the thesis and the empirical results (6.1). The discussion section (6.2) is 
divided into five parts. First, ‘Reflections on Glock’s Five-dimensional Scheme’ 
(6.2.1) discusses the validity of Glock’s 5-dimensional scale in light of the findings of 
this study. Second, ‘Multi-voiced-ness of Religious Identity’ (6.2.2) will discuss the 
patterns of the relationship between elite and popular religiosity. Third, ‘Social-
Cultural Factors Affecting Religiosity’ (6.2.3) will discuss factors that may have an 
impact on elite and popular religiosity. Fourthly, in section 6.2.4 ‘Socio-Psychological 
Factors Affected by Elite and Popular Religiosity’, we continue to examine the 
processes and mechanisms by which religiosity may affect the socio-psychological 
attitudes of general populations. Finally, section 6.2.5 ‘Spirituality and Religiosity’ 
illustrates the relevance and significance of spirituality in the sociology of elite and 
popular religiosity. Finally, we conclude by presenting some recommendations for 




The first part of this chapter addresses the main question in this research project: 
What forms and motivations characterize elite and popular religiosity, what are the 
patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity, and how does this 
relate to the socio-economic status of Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the 
Netherlands? Robert Redfield (1956) argued that two levels of culture run through 
complex civilizations, the “great tradition of the reflective few” and the “little tradition 
of the unreflective many” (pp. 41-42). Elite and popular religiosity gain their place in 
society and its culture. In order to understand elite and popular religiosity, therefore, 
we first need to explore the meaning of great and little cultures, due to the close 
relationship between culture and religion (Clark, 2012). 
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2.1. Culture and the Concept of Elite and Popular 
Many sociologists have abandoned the assumption that a single dominant culture holds 
society together. They assume that societies are naturally diverse and ask instead how 
some groups can establish their own customs and values as normal, so that those of 
others are viewed as subcultural deviations from the norm (Akdoğan, 2012; Keskin, 
2012; Weber, 1946). 
An influential model for the study of world religions was proposed by Robert 
Redfield. Through a series of articles written in the early 1950s and most fully in his 
final short book Peasant Society and Culture: An Anthropological Approach to 
Civilization (1956), he argued that two levels of culture run through complex 
civilizations, the “great tradition of the reflective few” and the “little tradition of the 
unreflective many” (Redfield, 1956, pp. 41-42).  
The great tradition, the ‘orthodox’ form of the cultural/religious centre, belongs to 
the urban elite. It is the religion of the reflective few, refined in schools and temples, 
and is “consciously cultivated and handed down” (Redfield, 1956, p. 70). Great 
traditions have also been named ‘orthodoxy’, ‘textual traditions,’ ‘high traditions,’ 
‘philosophical religions’, and ‘universal traditions’ (Lukens-Bull, 1999, p. 4). The 
little tradition is the ‘heterodox’ form of the cultural/religious periphery. It integrates 
many elements of the local tradition and practice. It is the religion as it is practiced in 
daily life by ordinary people (in Redfield’s assessment, the largely unreflective 
majority; 1956, pp. 41-42). The little tradition is taken for granted and is not subject to 
a great deal of scrutiny, refinement, or improvement (Redfield, 1956, p. 70). Little 
traditions are also designated by the terms ‘local tradition,’ ‘low tradition’, and 
‘popular religion’ (Lukens-Bull, 1999, p. 4). 
The great vs. little tradition dichotomy emerged in response to the challenge of 
understanding the social organization of tradition. Richard Antoun stated that “the 
social organization of tradition” is an essential process in all complex societies. It is 
the process by which different religious hierarchies are created between the common 
people and the elite, through cultural brokers who act as mediators between ordinary 
people and the elite (Antoun, 1989, p. 31). These hierarchies shape the form that 
religious practices take by imposing communicative constraints (Hefner, 1987, p. 74). 
In addition, it is essential to know the specific relations between adherents of great and 
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little traditions in each local setting. Redfield agrees that although anthropology may 
be largely concerned with local religious practice, it cannot disregard the 
interrelationship between these two aspects of tradition (1956, pp. 86-98). 
Although there is some criticism on Redfield’s two-dimensional conceptualization 
of culture6, it cannot be underestimated as an operational tool to understand the notion 
of culture. His ideas have exerted influence on academics and public intellectuals for 
a long time. After Redfield, analogous conceptualizations have been used to define 
dual traditions running through any of the major civilizations, such as: ‘high culture’ 
and ‘popular culture’ (Gans, 1975), ‘highbrow culture’ and ‘lowbrow culture’ (Levine, 
1988), ‘high culture’ and ‘low culture’ (Brottman, 2005). 
Cultural and Religious Diversity in Islam 
Medieval Islamic thinkers have referred to the distinction between high culture and 
popular culture in their writings. Bīrūnī (d. 1048), who is regarded as one of the 
greatest scholars of the medieval Islamic era, commented on the social differentiation 
of society. His study of Indian culture, which can serve as Bīrūnī’s contribution to the 
study of religion, reached its climax in his major work Tahqīq mā li’l-Hind min maqūla 
fī’l-‘aql aw mardhūla (1958), known in the West as Alberuni’s India: An Account of 
the Religion, Philosophy, Literature Geography, Chronology, Astronomy, Customs, 
Laws and Astrology of India (Sachau 1910). First of all, although Bīrūnī recognized 
that the Indian civilization was different from ancient Greek civilization, he thought 
that they were similar and even that they had been in agreement in the distant past. He 
believed that there existed a basic “original unity of higher civilization” (Rosenthal, 
1976, p. 12) between them, and he opened the eyes of educated Muslims to Indian and 
Greek science and philosophy, so that both could be integrated into a single intellectual 
worldview. Bīrūnī held that both in India and in Greece there had been - and still were 
- philosophers who, through their power of thought, had arrived at the idea of one God,
corresponding with the message that had been revealed to the prophets. This kind of
universal religious thought developed by Indian and Greek philosophers was only the
possession of a literate elite, the khawāṣṣ, anywhere. In contrast to this, the illiterate
6See especially Lukens-Bull, 1999.  
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masses, the ʿawāmm, both within and outside Islam, tend to give way to the innate 
human disposition towards idolatry (Lawrence, 1976, pp. 24-47; Watt, 2003). 
It is interesting to relate the results of the more empirical approach of Bīrūnī with 
the view on Indian religions given a hundred years later by the theologian al-
Shahrastānī. Al-Shahrastānī discusses Hinduism in his Kitāb al-milal wa’l-niḥal 
(“Book of Religious and Philosophical Sects”) in the chapter on the Ārā’ al-Hind (the 
Views of the Indians). In the six sections constant attention is paid to the Sabians, the 
Barāhima, the three groups of the ashāb al-ruhāniyyāt (Those in favour of spiritual 
beings), the ‘abadat al-kawākib (star-worshippers), the ‘abadat al-asnām (idol-
worshippers), and finally the Indian philosophers (Al-Shahrastānī, 1846). While 
Bīrūnī divides the Hindus into the literate elite and the illiterate masses, Shahrastānī 
marks them according to degrees of religious worship. 
The most influential exposition of the division between elite and popular can be 
found in the writings of Al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), one of the famous Muslim philosophers 
who dealt with this issue in his books. He states that society is divided into a thinking 
and ruling elite, and the masses, whose affairs are entirely in the hands of the elite. 
Religious and doctrinal questions are left to the scholars, and worldly things and 
matters of state fall under the authority of the rulers. Ordinary people have no choice 
but to obey ([1945], 2005, p.24). Al-Ghazālī confined and restricted the scope of 
several of his books in order to reserve them for the elite (here, ‘elite’ refers to the 
philosophical and theological elites which we will later identify) and to withhold them 
from the masses. For example, he openly declared that books like al-Maḍnūn bihi ʿalā 
ghairi ahlihi (“The Book to Be Withheld from Those for Whom It Is Not Written”) 
([1891], 2005a) and al-maḍnūn al-ṣaghīr (“To Be Withheld”) ([1891], 1996) were 
strictly meant for the elite only, and in his other important book entitled Iljām al 
ʿawāmm ʿan ʿilm al-kalām (“Restraining the Ordinary People from the Science of 
Kalām”) ([1891], 1987) he warned against indulgence in the doctrinal absurdities of 
the common people. 
The Arab historian and sociologist Ibn Khaldūn (1332-1406) is well known for his 
in-depth discussions of different forms of Islam, in which he refers to the social role 
of religion in a way that seems to foreshadow Durkheim. Ibn Khaldūn makes a 
distinction between Bedouin and sedentary civilizations and describes their living 
conditions in the second chapter of his work Muqaddimah (“Introduction”). His theory 
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of history is based on the interaction of these two opposing and complementary forces. 
The culture of a ‘sedentary’ society is peculiar to the existence of the monarchic State, 
which enforces its authority on a large unarmed population, collects taxes and inspires 
the rise of arts, thought, education and so on. Contrary to “sedentary” society, 
‘Bedouin’ society is not familiar with the accumulation of population and wealth from 
which the ‘sedentary’ society’s progress stems. (1967, pp. 92-103). 
2.1.1. Elite and Popular Culture: Differentiations 
There are two central approaches to the category of ‘popular’: structuralism and 
culturalism. Structuralism and culturalism are two distinctive theories within the 
discourse on popular culture that serve to theorize the complexities of popular culture’s 
relationship with society (Storey, 2009). Structuralism7, a concept formulated at the 
Frankfurt School, views popular culture as a site where veiled hegemonic ideologies 
are imposed from above by the multinational corporations bred by capitalism. The 
theory is best exemplified via a top-down model. Structuralism considers ‘popular’ to 
be identical with vulgar: popular would be the misrepresentation or distortion of an 
original form, a second-class product to be consumed by the masses. According to this 
approach, ‘popular’ refers to things that are admired and consumed by ordinary people 
(Storey, 2009, pp. 111-133). 
Culturalism8, on the other hand, rejects the consensus that popular culture is 
imposed from above and views it as an authentic expression of mass society.  Social 
structures, in this view, are shaped by human agency and the collective power of 
‘bottom-up’ movements should not be underestimated (Storey, 2009, pp. 37-58). 
Culturalism understands ‘popular’ as a natural form specific to the subordinate groups 
7 Structuralism is a method of approaching culture via a top-down mode. Its principal 
proponents are Ferdinand de Saussure in linguistics, Louis Althusser in Marxist theory, Michel 
Foucault in philosophy and history, Roland Barthes in literary and cultural studies, Claude 
Lévi-Strauss in anthropology, Jacques Lacan in psychoanalysis and Pierre Macherey in literary 
theory. 
8 Culturalism is a way of approaching culture via a bottom-up mode. Its principal proponents 
are Giovanni Battista Vico in political philosophy and rhetoric, Gottfried Herder in 
philosophy, Richard Hoggart in sociology and literature, Raymond Williams in cultural 
studies, E.P. Thompson in social history, Stuart Hall in cultural studies and sociology, and 
Paddy Whannel in social studies and mass media in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  
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or classes, and therefore capable of authenticating  their cultural production (Gans, 
1975; Oliveira, 1994, p. 514). Culturalists claim that social meaning can be achieved 
on any level, especially on the lower levels of the social structure, such as the levels 
of the ‘masses’, illiterate people or ordinary people. These scholars were often 
uncritically romantic in their celebration of popular culture as an expression of the 
authentic interests and values of subordinate social groups and classes. The 
philosophical justification of this perspective in Western literature can be found in the 
writings of Giovanni Battista Vico (1668-1744) and Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-
1803). They distinguished the notions of the “populari” or the “Volk” as the basis for 
an alternate and new meaning of humanism, apart from the rationalizing and civilizing 
processes set in motion by the European Enlightenment (Long, 1987, p. 7325). The 
philosophical justification for this orientation can be found in the writings of Köprülü 
and Gökalp in the tradition of Turkish Sociology, who proposed that it is the ordinary 
people (halk) who are the carriers of culture (Berkes, 1959, p. 30). In the following 
section, we will discuss these conceptions in Turkish sociology. 
Although both approaches broaden the discourse on popular culture and offer very 
interesting perspectives, the more reasonable model, according to us, lies somewhere 
between the two. Storey (2003, p. 51) suggests that the work of Antonio Gramsci is 
instrumental in conceiving popular culture as an arena of struggle and negotiation 
between the interests of dominant groups and the interests of subordinate groups. As 
will be indicated in section 2.1.3, the Gramsci model offers the continuity of the 
dominant social framework, but operates through consent rather than coercion in a 
negotiation process between those who hold power and those who do not (Miller et al., 
1998). 
2.1.2. Elite and Popular Culture in Turkish sociology 
The differentiation between elite and popular is also seen in Turkish sociology at the 
beginning of 20th century. M. Ziya Gökalp’s sociology is predominantly based upon 
this distinction. Gökalp was a highly influential thinker, strongly influenced by both 
the French Durkheimian sociological tradition (focused on the organization and social 
coherence of society) and the German sociological tradition of Ferdinand Tönnies, 
which insisted on a difference between culture and civilization (Alexander & Smith, 




‘folk’ in Turkish sociology: culture, for him, was created by the common folk. He 
distinguished this culture, so defined, from another concept, which he called Tehzib, 
meaning ‘civilized’ culture. This would be the cultural production by an elite (Gökalp, 
1976a, 1976b, 1981, Türkdoğan, 1998, 2005). 
In order to conceptualize his ideas, Gökalp primarily used the notions of culture 
(hars) and civilization (medeniyet) (Gökalp, 2013). He saw modernization as a basic 
factor for progress. However, he argued that modernization only meant that the Turks 
adopted the material aspects of Western European civilization, while the cultural 
essence of the Turks, which according to him is the dominance of hars, should be 
upheld (Berkes, 1959, p. 159). For Western European civilization to take root, he 
claimed, the Turks needed to establish harmony between medeniyet and hars 
(civilization and culture). For Gökalp, Western European material civilization and real 
Turkish culture were highly compatible and, if combined, could sustain progress 
without undermining the true Turkish ethos. Progress therefore required social and 
cultural transformation to revitalize the Turkish ethos, in order for civilization to take 
root (Davison, 1995; Kılıç, 2008). 
With his search for culture in the literature of ‘popular’ Islam, Mehmed Fuat 
Köprülü followed Gökalp’s lead and proposed that it is the (ordinary) people (halk) 
who are the carriers of culture. According to him, the roots of the Turkish spirit lay not 
in the Islamic institutions of the elite, but could be found in myth and folklore; these 
were the areas that had to be explored and uncovered in order for the Turks to be able 
to develop their Turkish cultural and religious identity further, a prerequisite for their 
involvement in Western civilization (Berkes, 1959, p. 30; Dressler, 2016, p. 26). 
In his first footnote to the volume Early Mystics, Köprülü explained that he would 
use the Turkish term halk (the [ordinary] people) as corresponding to the French 
“populaire.” The term would, as he emphasized, not indicate a reduction of any sort 
and should not be seen as referring to a particular social class (2006, p. 1).9 Köprülü 
provided much historical evidence for the antagonism between elite culture and 
“orthodox” religion on the one hand, and rural culture related to “heterodoxy” and 
                                                 
9 Nevertheless, Köprülü was criticized for not always applying the term in such allegedly 
objective, value-free ways, especially when he compared matters of religious orientation, 
social location, and political interests. We will refer to this critique in the following section 
(section 3.2.3). 
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“syncretism” on the other. In a later article on the Anatolian aşık tradition, he discussed 
the role of the Sufi orders in the foundation and development of aşık. Over time, the 
Sufi orders adapted to the social environments in which they lived. Some of these 
orders, in accordance with the religious policies of the government, exhibited an 
“orthodox” character in urban contexts, “appropriate to Sunni dogma,” but in another 
context, for example a tribal environment, they appeared “totally heterodox, that is, 
removed from Islamic doctrine” (Köprülü, 1966, p. 184).   
The structural link that Köprülü posits between the socioeconomic context, culture 
and religious preference can be associated with Ibn Khaldūn’s Muqaddima, which 
Köprülü celebrated as a “philosophy of history” and “blueprint of sociology.”10 For 
Ibn Khaldūn, ‘aṣabiyya (group solidarity) is a source of strength and renewal, and - 
although not entirely absent from the town - at its strongest among the Bedouins. He 
also considers the Bedouins to be generally more virtuous than the city dwellers, who 
follow the law instead of their instinct and got spoiled as a result of their luxurious 
lifestyle (Khaldun, 1967, p. 122). Likewise, for Köprülü, who kept an eye on Ziya 
Gökalp in this matter, Turkish culture was found in its finest, pure ways among the 
peripheral Turkmen tribes of Anatolia (Dressler, 2013, p. 201). 
On the other hand, however, Köprülü’s explanation of the relationship between 
urban and rural life departed considerably from that of Ibn Khaldūn. In Ibn Khaldūn’s 
text, the dichotomy of urban and rural culture was part of a larger, cyclical conception 
of Islamic civilization (Dressler, 2013, p. 202). In Köprülü’s work, the connection 
between the centre and the periphery seems more static and the differences are 
presented as clear-cut distinctions. The other difference is the way they evaluate the 
relationship between centre and periphery with respect to religiosity. Although there 
is no fundamental value difference between urban and rural forms of socioeconomic 
organization and culture in Ibn Khaldūn’s text, he emphasized that rural people tend 
to be more religious due to the hardships of life (Baali, 1988, p. 98). Ibn Khaldūn 
produced extensive discussions on various forms of Islam and specified the social role 
of religion in a way that seems to foreshadow Durkheim. What he did not do, according 
to Dressler (2013), is correlate inner-Islamic differences - for example between jurists 
10 Köprülü respectfully defined Ibn Khaldun as the apex of Islamic historiography and as one 





and muftis [persons who give a fatwā (opinion on a point of law), or is engaged in that 
profession] on the one hand, and the Sufis on the other - with distinction according to 
lifestyle (urban/rural). In Köprülü’s work, on the other hand, the influence of 
Orientalist and Islamic revivalist thought can be seen, which made him portray the 
cultural periphery with reference to religion as impure and inferior (expressed through 
concepts such as “popular”, “syncretic” and “heterodox” Islam) compared to the 
scripture- and law-based Islamic culture connected with urban contexts.11 In 
conclusion, Köprülü can be seen as an initial representative of the (Khaldūnian) idea 
of the opposed but complementary character of urban and rural Islamic cultures in 
connection with the Orientalist division between ‘official’ / ‘orthodox’ / ‘high’ and 
‘unofficial’ / ‘heterodox’ / ‘popular’ Islam (Dressler, 2013, p. 202).  
2.1.3. Complementarity of Elite and Popular Religiosity 
These discussions should suffice to indicate that both in Western and in Turkish 
thought, the concepts of ‘elite’ and ‘popular’ have been commonly applied. I have 
focused on two general approaches so far. On the one hand, those who support the 
structuralist approach juxtapose high culture with popular culture as having distinct 
differences that clearly stand out between the two. Most of them view popular culture 
as outdated and old-fashioned. According to this elitist view, educated people have 
superior cultural values. In this case, popular culture is disparaged as being of inferior 
taste and quality, and expressing the less desirable values of the uneducated majority. 
This definition of popular culture may be regarded as too narrow, because it excludes 
those members of the elite for whom popular culture is more or less experienced as a 
second culture. It may also be regarded as too broad; speaking of ‘popular culture’ as 
if it constitutes a uniform category. This way of defining suggests that popular culture 
is relatively homogeneous (Burke, 2009).  It is observable that any layperson of any 
social status can potentially be either elite or non-elite, depending on the 
circumstances. Moreover, a person who is ‘popular’ in some contexts may be ‘elite’ 
                                                 
11 Sharp changes can be seen in Köprülü’s thoughts on this issue. Although in his earlier 
writings he argued that true literature should not take the vulgar tastes of the masses into 
consideration (Park, 1975, p. 364), after 1913, he changed his position and began to criticize 
elitist perspectives and to see the common people as the soul of a culture (Dressler, 2016). 
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in others. Worst, in this respect, is that this view defines ‘the popular’ only in a negative 
way. 
On the other hand, by protesting against the increasing authority of high culture, 
supporters of the second approach, culturalism, see popular culture as an authentic 
culture, which can stand on its own feet. However, this view results in an equally 
essentialist view of culture: it interprets popular culture as the embodiment of a 
particular class (Bennett, 2006, p. 93). 
What structuralism and culturalism have in common, is thus that they pretend that 
the cultural sphere is divided into two hermetically separate regions, each with its own, 
different logic. While this was clearly unsatisfactory, it was equally clear that the two 
traditions could not be forced into a shotgun marriage either. As Bennet concluded, 
“the only way out of this impasse seemed to be to shift the debate on to a new terrain, 
which would displace the structuralism - culturalism opposition, a project which 
inclined many working in the field at the time to draw increasingly on the writings of 
Antonio Gramsci” (Bennett, 2006, p. 94). 
In his famous essay Osservazioni sul Folclore (“Observations on Folklore”, 
Gramsci 1950, p. 215), Antonio Gramsci brought these approaches together by saying 
that “[t]he people is not a culturally homogeneous unit, but it is culturally stratified in 
a complex way” (trans. Burke, 2009, p. 29). Gramsci’s conception of folklore 
corresponds in many respects to the more expansive category of popular culture (1971, 
1991). He notes that while most intellectuals view folklore as ‘picturesque’ and old-
fashioned, his own conception treats it as a living “conception of the world and life” 
which stands in implicit opposition to ‘official’ conceptions of the world. Gramsci’s 
purpose is not simply to endorse folklore, for he acknowledges that much of the culture 
of subordinate people is conservative and fatalistic. Instead, he proposes that such 
‘fossilized’ conceptions could be disaggregated from those “which are in the process 
of developing and which are in contradiction to or simply different from the morality 
of the governing strata” (Bennett, 2006). According to Gramsci, only by doing this 
could peasants and intellectuals be organized into part of a coalition in which 
communication could take place (Jones, 2006). Without this, Italy would, according 
to Gramsci, maintain a “great social disintegration”, in which the intellectuals regard 
the peasants as bestial, cultureless ‘machines to be bled dry’, and the peasants, 
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overwhelmed by fear, believe that learning is a trick unique to the intellectuals (Jones, 
2006, p. 37). 
Based on a Gramscian approach, our construction of an elite and popular culture 
therefore necessitates a linked operation. This means that we can only approach the 
cultures of the elite in processes of comparison and synthesis with the cultures of the 
masses and vice versa. This makes it crucially important that we abandon any 
assumptions about the superiority of high culture and the primitivism of the masses. A 
cultural project, Gramsci wrote, cannot be some avant-garde movement imposed upon 
people. In line with Gökalp and Köprülü, Gramsci stated that a cultural project had to 
be rooted in the “humus of popular culture as it is, with its tastes and tendencies and 
with its moral and intellectual world, even if it is backward and conventional” 
(Bennett, 2006, p. 37; Crehan, 2009, p. 37). 
These discussions on elite and popular culture form the basis for discussions on 
elite and popular religiosity. We think that this theoretical exploration will be helpful 
in exploring the characteristics of elite and popular religiosity and its socioeconomic 
and socio-cultural location. After this introduction to elite and popular culture, this 
study will therefore continue to shed light on the notion of elite and popular religion 
and its acquired meanings and content in the social scientific study of religion. 
2.2. Religion and the Concepts of Elite and Popular 
Here, I will shed light on Weber’s status stratification and religious market theories to 
explain elite and popular religiosity from a sociological perspective. Following this, 
this study tries to understand the earlier usage and the meaning given to the terms elite 
and popular religiosity in different disciplines. In the next step, I will come up with 
preliminary definitions, which will be reviewed after the results of the statistical 
analysis of the hypothesis for this context have been discussed.  
2.2.1. Religion and Social Stratification: Weber 
In his inspiring studies on religion, Max Weber regularly referred to something called 
“popular religion”.12 In the context of social stratification, he evaluates religiosity in 
12 The terms Weber uses, Volksreligiosität, Massenreligion, and Massenglauben, are generally 
rendered in English as “popular religion”. 
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two categories. He conceptualizes this distinction as “status stratification”. Using the 
musical metaphor of the ‘virtuoso’, he distinguishes between the different 
qualifications of believers. According to Weber, human beings vary in their religious 
capacities and in the special personal attributes needed to achieve the highest religious 
goals. He introduces the term ‘unmusical’ in “The Social Psychology of the World 
Religions”, stating that ‘heroic’ or ‘virtuoso’ religiosity stands in opposition to ‘mass’ 
religiosity (1946, p. 287).  
In his writings on the sociology of religion, Weber’s standard approach is to show how 
the substance of belief is closely associated with the class culture of believers. 
Peasantry, proletariat, aristocracy and bourgeoisie have different material interests and 
life experiences, and will therefore respond to different kinds of religious messages 
(Parkin, 1982, p. 52). Redfield’s theory (1956) can be considered to be parallel to 
Weber’s (1946). Weber’s ‘virtuoso’ religiosity corresponds with the religion of the 
members of the ‘great tradition’ as portrayed by Redfield, while Weber’s ‘mass’ 
religiosity points to Redfield’s portrayal of the ‘little’ tradition in religion. In that 
sense, it can be argued that, with the popularization of cultural-religious elements of 
the great tradition, popular religiosity is the non-derivative ‘mass’ religiosity of the 
members of the little tradition. 
Up to here it can be seen that there are two definitions of popular religion that 
contradict each other to a certain extent. ‘Popular religion’ by reference to the non-
privileged social or economic attributes of a group and ‘popular religion’ through its 
religious practice and beliefs. 
What, then, were Max Weber’s criteria for defining popular religion? 
In an important article, Jacques Berlinerblau suggested to accommodate the 
differences between these two definitions by identifying two main approaches to 
popular religion, based on a Weberian conception. These are (1) the economic and 
social approach and (2) the praxis approach. 
In the economic and social approach13, popular religion refers to the religious 
tendencies of strata not “characterized by a high degree of social and economic 
13 The starting point for understanding the first approach is based on Weber’s section “Religion 
of Non-Privileged Strata” in Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. This 
section contains a wealth of theoretical observations on the religious tendencies of strata not 
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privilege”. Among the groups discussed by Weber are slaves, free day labourers, 
women, peasants, artisans, small traders, the proletariat, the lower middle class, and 
the middle class. On this basis, it could be deduced that Weber, when he spoke of 
‘popular religion’, proposed a type of religiosity associated with a given society’s 
economically or socially non-privileged groups, which constitute its majority 
(Berlinerblau, 2001). 
Nevertheless, closer examination of Weber’s writings on this subject shows that 
social and economic factors, while important, are not of primary significance when 
defining popular religion. In the praxis approach14, popular religion is not defined by 
reference to a group’s non-privileged social or economic status, but by referring to 
religious practice and beliefs. 
Two approaches to the question ‘What is popular religion?’ may be identified in 
Weber’s writings: 
 ‘Popular religion’ is that religion, regardless of its contents, practiced by
groups among the masses characterized by a non-privileged social and
economic status.
 ‘Popular religion’ is constituted by specific types of practices and beliefs
(e.g., magic, an antirational orientation, a close bond with nature, a ‘this-
worldly’ religious attitude, increased preoccupation with salvation and
saviour figures) fostered by a particular group.
“characterized by a high degree of social and economic privilege” (Weber 1978, p. 481). In 
the same chapter, we find references to “popular religion” (1978, pp. 488-92), “mass religion” 
(1978, p. 492) and “masses” (1978, pp. 487-88). Thus, it could be deduced that Weber, when 
he spoke of “popular religion”, proposed a type of religiosity associated with the economically 
or socially non-privileged groups of a given society, which constitute its majority. 
14 In a different passage, however, Weber explicitly defines mass religiosity as associated with 
those who are “religiously unmusical” and not with “those who occupy an inferior position in 
the secular status order” (1958, p. 287). This use of the term contradicts many references to 
the religion of the masses cited above in Economy and Society. In one case, Weber seems to 
explicitly associate Massenglauben (mass religion) with underprivileged classes (1978, p. 492; 
1978, p. 282). In other cases (cited above), practitioners of mass religion appear to engage in 
many of the behaviours associated with groups with a low position in the secular status order 
(e g., magic, inclination towards salvation religion, cults of saints and heroes). For Weber’s 
definition of popular religious beliefs and practices, see section 2.2.3. of this study, “Some 
Characteristics of Elite and Popular Religiosity”. 
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On the basis of this double and seemingly irreconcilable interpretation, Berlinerblau 
has built another, more reasonable, conceptualization. This will be referred to as the 
‘synthesis approach’ and is the approach used in this study. It holds that: 
“‘Popular religion’ is constituted by specific types of religious praxis and belief 
exercised by generally socially and economically non-privileged strata” (2001, p. 613, 
emphasis added).  
From this point of view, the definition of elite religion takes shape as follows: ‘Elite 
religion’ is constituted by specific types of religious praxis and belief exercised by 
strata that are generally socially and economically privileged. Thus, certain objective 
positions within the social field generally ‘go hand in hand with’ certain forms of 
religiosity. 
This assumption suggests that persons with a non-privileged social and economic 
status may experience elite forms of religious practice to a certain extent, while persons 
with a privileged social and economic status may, in turn, experience popular forms of 
religious practice to a certain extent. Although social and economic factors are 
important, they are thus not of primary significance in defining elite and popular 
religiosity.  
In order to clarify Weber’s approach of elite and popular religiosity, it is now 
appropriate to take a look at religious market theory. 
2.2.2. Religion and Religious Market 
Another approach that can sociologically explain cultural differences has its roots in 
the study of the relations between “cultural production and markets”. We can better 
understand cultural differences by looking at the nature of these relations. Its strongest 
advocates, such as Rodney Stark, argue that it represents a new paradigm in the 
sociology of religion (Stark & McCann, 1993). It emphasises the power of the market 
and of competition between religious producers (Dobbelaere, 2004; Kisala, 2004; 
Voyé, 2004; Warner, 1993).  
The main characteristics of religion in modern society, especially in the West, are 
individualism and the decline of the authority of traditional institutions. Modernity 
appears to be generally compatible with the increase of deinstitutionalised, 
commercialised religion (Turner, 2011). In a differentiated global religious market, 
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these segments of the religious market compete with each other and overlap. Under 
competitive conditions, the producers of religious services are forced to face the 
particular challenge of retaining their members and attracting new members, while at 
the same time responding to the needs of their clientele and offering efficient services 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1991; Pickel & Sammet, 2012). 
The ‘religious market’ approach is based on rational choice theory assumptions. 
Rational choice theory emerged as a major item on the agenda of many social scientists 
in the 1990s and its proponents have formed a section within the American 
Sociological Association. The impact of rational choice theory on the social scientific 
study of religion has been enormous in the past decades (Young, 1997). According to 
this theory, the individual’s demand for religious goods is constant. Supporters of the 
market approach, particularly scholars in religious studies, suggest that the conditions 
of the modern age do not unavoidably cause religion to weaken but may even foster it. 
Religious vitality seen in modern times could be the result of competition between 
religious producers (Roger Finke & Stark, 1988; Iannaccone, 1991; Iannaccone, Finke, 
& Stark, 1997). 
Stark and Bainbridge (1985, 1989) describe religious goods as supernatural, general 
and non-verifiable compensators. By the term “compensator” Stark and Bainbridge 
(1985, p. 6) mean “the belief that a reward will be obtained in the distant future or in 
some other context which cannot be immediately verified”. Rewards are “anything 
humans will incur costs to obtain” (1989, p. 27). Since human beings often strive for 
rewards they cannot directly have, they regularly settle for a substitute, a compensator. 
Compensators may be secular or based on supernatural expectations. The 
supernaturally-based compensators can be “magic” or “religion”. Examples of magical 
compensators are promises such as getting a good grade at school, or being cured of 
cancer, or winning back an unfaithful lover. Examples of religious compensators are a 
revelation of the meaning of existence, an afterlife, illumination or the coming of the 
saviour at some unspecified time (1985, pp. 7-30). It is interesting to note that 
compensators are the core element of Stark and Bainbridge’s definition of religions: 
religions are “systems of general compensators based on supernatural assumptions” 
(1989, p. 81). Religious communities can then be seen as organizations that produce 
two things: on the one hand, supernaturally-based compensators, and on the other, 




be produced by any kind of social group. In a revised version of his theory, Stark drops 
the term “compensator”, and talks instead about “otherworldly rewards”, which are 
“those that will be obtained only in a non-empirical (usually posthumous) context” 
(Stark, 1999, p. 268). We see that Stark and Bainbridge focus on the ultimate goals 
that religions often propose. In his writings, Max Weber describes the same 
phenomenon - the “religious market” - as “salvation goals”. 
Max Weber is the most important classic author for the concept of “religious 
goods”. The term “salvation good” is a central one in Weber’s works such as in 
Economy and Society ([1920], 1978) and Collected Essays on the Sociology of 
Religion  ([1920b], 1988). Weber also uses the terms “salvation goals”, “salvation 
means” and “promises of the religions” instead of the term “salvation goods” (Stolz, 
2006). 
Jörg Stolz (2006) mentions four aspects of Weber’s conception of salvation goods.           
(1) Salvation goods are either goals or means. Weber states that religions generate 
salvation goals that may be reached through certain “salvation means”. Individuals can 
use salvation means in a rational way in order to reach future salvation goals, thus 
allowing for a sociological explanation. (2) Salvation goods should not be thought of 
as isolated objects. Rather, they suggest a specific worldview and specific life practices 
of the respective religion. With regard to the worldview, the religious symbol system 
determines from which sad circumstances the group is to be saved and what the state 
of salvation looks like. (3) Salvation goods satisfy different psychological and social 
needs. According to Max Weber, psychological needs can be either compensatory, 
legitimating or intellectual. The deprivation, misfortune and suffering that is felt, cause 
the individual to search for compensation... These psychological needs vary depending 
on the historical situation and the social class in which the individual finds himself. 
This is why distinctive social classes tend to accept and produce different kinds of 
religiosity. (4) Salvation goods can be this-worldly or other-worldly. Weber states that 
many of the salvation goods of the different religions were not, and are not, other-
worldly (such as an afterlife in paradise), but this-worldly. They can be formulated 
positively, as the achieving of good health, long life, happiness, riches; or they can be 
formulated negatively as the liberation from illness and death, unhappiness, poverty, 
defeat in war, slavery, etc. (pp. 18-20). 
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By addressing these aspects of religious goods as described by Stolz (2006), I have 
attempted to show how Weberian and rational choice concepts of religious goods and 
religious markets can be integrated into a larger theoretical framework. This structure 
enables us to understand possible religious forms and motivations of elite and popular 
religious actions. In this study, we prefer to use the concept of “motivations” rather 
than that of “religious goods” to address different characteristics of religious action 
and to analyse elite and popular forms of religiosity. This approach is compatible with 
Weber’s definition of a motivation as “a complex of subjective meaning which seems 
to the actor himself or to the observer an adequate ground for the conduct in question”. 
(Weber 1966, p. 98). Thus, by treating motivations in the way Weber advocates, we 
should be able to come to an explanation of the actual course of behaviour, although 
we do not reduce motivation to merely an actor’s reasons for acting, but also take the 
institutional, cultural and psychological aspects into account. Religious elites, 
according to Weber, are mostly motivated by other-worldly religious goods, while 
those who experience popular religiosity are motivated by this-worldly religious 
goods. In section 2.2.3, I will discuss how the elements of religious orientation, namely 
motivation, cognitive style, and content correspond to both elite and popular 
religiosity, drawing on the works of Weber and other religious studies scholars. 
2.2.3. Some Characteristics of Elite and Popular Religiosity 
In this section, the present study tries to understand different meanings and 
characteristics assigned to the terms of elite and popular religiosity in the context of 
different disciplines. However, our operational definition will be particularly 
elaborated in chapter 3. 
Above we have addressed different religious goods that lie behind religious action 
according to Weber’s writings. Here we will continue to shed light on these different 
religious goods by focusing on the opinions of various scholars of religion that relate 
to elite and popular religiosity. From now on, in order to be consistent in the use of the 
concept, we prefer to use the terms ‘forms’, ‘motivations’ or ‘characteristics’ to 
indicate the various religious goods that lie behind religious action. 
The reader may have noticed that in social scientific and historical research there is 
little to no consensus on what ‘popular religion’ actually means. Terms such as 
‘common religion’ (Towler, 1974, p. 148), ‘folk religion’ (Mensching, 1964, p. 254), 
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‘non-official religion’ (Waardenburg & Vrijhof, 1979), ‘extra-ecclesiastical religion’ 
(Williams, 1989, p. 5), ‘local religion’ (Maltby & Christian, 1982), and ‘popular faith’ 
(Brandes, 1990, p. 186), among others, have served to recast, refine, and, in some 
cases, outright reject the traditional typology of ‘popular religion’. Accordingly, the 
last quarter century of work in this area has seen an explosive increase in definitional 
activity, as well as a vigorous process of producing conceptual clarity.  
Generally, in the scientific study of religion, the term ‘popular religion’ is used to 
refer to the collection of common beliefs and rites and sacred products among humans. 
Critical investigations of the meaning of popular culture and religion from the 
disciplinary orientations of the anthropology and history of religion, and the sociology 
of knowledge, revealed a wide variety of forms of popular religion. Long places these 
varied forms of popular religion in seven categories (1987, pp. 7324–7333). Of these 
seven definitions of popular religion, three are of great relevance to our research 
because of their common characteristics. These are: 
1. Popular religion as the religion of the laity in a religious community
in contrast to the religion of the clergy or other specialists.
2. Popular religion as the pervasive beliefs, rituals, and values of a
society.
3. Popular religion as the religion of the masses in opposition to the
religion of the sophisticated, discriminating and scholarly within a
society.15
Knoblauch defines popular religion as the religious life of ordinary people who 
know and practice it as it is communicated and performed on a family, village, or 
popular level (Knoblauch, 2011). In traditional societies, folk religion is generally 
associated with peasant communities (Bowker, 2003), but in the modern world many 
of its characteristics can be found among the working class and other ordinary people 
15 The other four definitions are as follows: 4. Popular religion as identical with the organic 
(usually rural and peasant) form of a society. The religious and moral orders are also identical; 
in this sense popular religion is closely related to the meanings of primitive and folk religion. 
5. Popular religion as an amalgam of esoteric beliefs and practices differing from the common
or civil religion, but usually located in the lower strata of a society. 6. Popular religion as the
religion of a subclass or minority group in a culture. 7. Popular religion as the creation of an
ideology of religion by the elite levels of a society (Long, 1987, pp. 7324-7333).
66 
in urban societies. In this social context it is often called popular religion (Ellwood, 
2007, p. 153). 
In the Encyclopaedia of World Religions, Ellwood describes popular religion on the 
basis of two fundamental characteristics. First, it is primarily ‘cosmic’ rather than 
historical in perspective, and second, it is mainly passed on orally, through the words 
and examples of family, community members, and spiritual leaders at the local level, 
whether they be imams, shamans, evangelists, priests, or others. Cosmic orientation 
means that those who experience popular religiosity generally have little sense of 
history outside of living memory, except if it is encoded in myth. A significant point 
of attention is how religion fits into seasonal cycles and local geography. If the 
practitioners of the religion are farmers, festivals of planting and harvest are important. 
Oral transmission means that popular religion is learned primarily through face to face 
encounters, from the words of people one knows locally, rather than through intense 
study or by learning about the way religion is known from literary sources or among 
elites (2007, p.154). 
Weber deals with popular religion by placing it in a double category as stated above: 
popular religion “by reference to the non-privileged social or economic attributes of a 
group” and popular religion “through its religious practice and beliefs”. Berlinerblau 
divided Weber’s definition of popular religious beliefs and practices into five 
categories (2001, pp. 611-612). 
1. Engaging in all sorts of ‘magical’ practices (1958, pp. 277, 287, 288;
1968, pp. 201, 210; 1978, pp. 448, 466, 477, 482, 488, 506, 575, 609).
2. Eschewing any tendency to rationalize, putting a heavy emphasis on
tradition and generally being incapable of producing rational
worldviews (1978, pp. 467, 469, 512, 629).
3. Strongly motivated by the forces of nature (1958, p. 287; 1968, pp. 173,
174; 1978, pp. 401, 468, 471, 482).
4. A this-worldly orientation and interpretation of religion - illustrated by
a do ut des16 (1978, pp. 422, 424) or a “coercive” (1978, p. 422) and
16 Do ut des refers to an ancient Latin formula used when sacrifices were made to the gods in 
the hope of fruitfulness and security (see Trompf, 2016).  
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“calculating attitude” (1978, p. 492) towards the gods, and a desire for 
“tangible instruments of grace” (1978, p. 559). 
5. Great deal of interest in the question of salvation and heroic saviour
figures (1958, p. 272; 1968, pp. 173, 201; 1978, pp. 459, 487, 488, 506,
571).
Oliviera (1994) defines popular religion through three characteristics. According to 
him, “popular religion” implies:  
1. Socialization of sacred “goods” - since they are produced for self-
consumption, the popular forms of religion are more accessible to the
dominated classes who cannot afford their own specialists.
2. Absence of doctrinal and theological systematization - which is an
activity of specialists - of religious beliefs and practices, which are
implicitly articulated. Popular religion thus exhibits stereotyped
behaviour, formalism, conventionalism and ritualism.
3. Absence of the institutional legitimacy that only official specialists can
provide - as a product for self-consumption, popular religious forms can
only claim legitimacy from tradition.
The ‘popular’ category, according to Oliviera, embodies different meanings. 
Considered from the social perspective, it opposes what belongs to the ‘dominant’ 
classes; from a cultural point of view, it is the opposite of ‘erudite’; from a political 
point of view, it opposes ‘official’(1994, p 514). 
Popular religion has similarly been defined as exhibiting stereotyped behaviour, 
formalism, conventionalism and ritualism (La Bon, 1896, pp. 63-70; Sezen, 2004), and 
as keeping a distance from profound doctrinal and theological systematization (Günay, 
2002; Mensching, 1976). In this context of popular religiosity, religion represents a set 
of resources for the achievement of particular objectives related to health, wealth and 
happiness. Here popular culture appears as a bricoleur culture (Zubaida, 1993, p. 145). 
What is important for the believer at any given moment is to construct remedies out of 
various elements that suit the task at hand. This highlights the pragmatic aspects of 
popular religion. Practitioners like to keep their options open. In other words, they do 
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not practice a religion on a daily basis but keep religious conceptions ready in case of 
need. Popular religion is mostly fragmentary and ad hoc, and is on permanent standby 
for any occasion when ontological security comes under threat (Ter Borg, 2004, 2008) 
As seen above, the category ‘popular’ embodies different meanings. By means of 
this chapter, our study tried to emphasize these acquired meanings and characteristics 
of popular religiosity in the study of religion. After this brief introduction to popular 
religiosity, the following chapter will focus on elite and popular religiosity in Islam. 
The detailed comparison between elite and popular religiosity with respect to Islam is 
left to the subsequent chapters. 
2.2.4. Religious Elites and Masses 
Two general definitions of ‘elite’ have been proposed by sociologists. The first 
identifies an elite as a group composed of people recognized as having reached the 
highest level in a particular branch of activity. The second definition describes an elite 
as a group consisting of those who occupy the highest position in a social organization 
equipped with an internal authority structure (Bottomore, 1964, pp. 1-3; Giddens, 
1973, pp. 119-20). When applied in the field of religions, a distinction can be made 
between those who are recognized as embodying the highest values of the religion and 
those who hold the highest positions of formal authority in religious organizations or 
institutions (Sharot, 2001, p. 11). 
In this study, however, the term ‘elite religiosity’ does not necessarily refer to the 
religion of elites who have reached the highest values of the religion or who hold the 
highest positions of formal authority. The present study proposes to add a different 
definition of elites based on the synthesis approach: an elite is a group that generally 
exercises specific types of religious praxis and belief. This assumption suggests that 
persons with a non-privileged social and economic status may be viewed as elite in 
virtue of the forms and motivations that shape their religious practice.  
In this study, ‘popular religiosity’ primarily refers to the religion of those who are 
religiously ‘unmusical’; by this term we do not mean to refer to those who occupy an 
inferior position in the secular status order. In other words, in the way it is used here, 
‘popular religiosity’ does not necessarily signify the religion of the masses. ‘Popular’ 
refers to a group that exercises specific types of religious praxis and belief. What 
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makes our respondents elite or mass in this study is not their position in a secular status 
order but rather the forms and motivations that shape their religious beliefs and 
practices. However, we will be monitoring the effect of population characteristics like 
social, economic and cultural conditions and will assume that certain positions in 
society have a strong effect on the ways people believe and practice. 
2.2.5. General Evaluation 
An evaluation of elite and popular religiosity necessitates some defence against 
criticism of these concepts and similar or overlapping concepts such as great and little 
traditions. One criticism of these distinctions is that they create the impression that the 
religions of the learned and the masses are static and unchanging, and can be divided 
into separate compartments in a clear-cut manner, each invulnerable to the effect of 
the other. The dichotomization is seen as leading to a concrete devaluation of popular 
religion as magic, oriented solely towards practical and materialistic ends, without any 
ethical, philosophical values. In contrast, the religious elite is exclusively associated 
with the spiritual, removed from worldly matters (Sharot, 2001, p. 13). 
Based upon the Gramscian approach explained above, this research project rejects 
an interpretation of ‘popular religion’ as if it were the very antithesis of ‘elite religion’. 
The following remark taken from J.B. Segal’s article “Popular Religion in Ancient 
Israel” may be understood as an illustration of this pejorative approach that is rejected 
in this study:  
There were two levels of Israelite religion. The one... is that of established 
sanctuaries and of established dates, a formal religion, in short, which followed lines 
clearly defined and precise in detail. The other is less easy to characterize... Outside 
the borders of the established cult lies the shadowy region of popular superstition, of 
actions that arise from the vague, half-conscious feelings of fear and anticipation that 
have been summed up in the not ill-chosen term of ‘Nature religion’ (1976, p. 1). 
As Sharot rightly notes, these depictions misrepresent the complexity of people’s 
religiosity and disregard the historically dynamic and complex relations between social 
groups that result in religious overlap and integrations. Where one group is assumed 
to have an influence on another, Sharot points out, this is frequently supposed to run 
in a downward direction, from the learned to the unlearned. Specifically, the peasants 
are often regarded as taking a passive stance (2001, p. 13). 
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In many works, ‘popular’ and ‘elite’ spheres are imagined to be exact opposites as 
seen above. In recent research, however, this monolithic conception of popular and 
elite religion has been re-evaluated. As Ellen Badone points out, “rather than viewing 
elite and popular religion as monolithic entities, immutable and distinct, it is more 
fruitful to focus on the dialectical character of their interrelationship” (1990, p. 6). 
In Conclusion 
The use of the terms elite religiosity and popular religiosity in this study refers to the 
patterns of religious action of social actors (religious elites and laity, especially the 
peasant population, i.e., the ‘masses’). Popular religion is not seen as a secondary 
version of an elite archetype, nor is it assumed to be cut off from elite religion or to be 
necessarily opposed to it. Popular religiosity is understood here as referring to the 
conventional, extrinsic, and consensual elements emphasized by the non-elite for their 
own religious life. Elite religiosity is understood here as referring to the internalized, 
intrinsic, and committed outlooks that have been generally produced by spiritual elites 
primarily for their own religious life and tradition. In chapter 3, this study examines 
the operational definition of elite and popular religiosity in greater detail. 
As Bulaç (1995) indicates, these categorisations are only valuable as long as they 
are used as a descriptive and analytical tool to comprehend the multidimensional 
structure of society. These divisions are helpful to measure to what extent elite 
religiosity and popular religiosity overlap, differ, and conflict. Moreover, these 
concepts will help us to understand, by way of empirical investigations, comparisons, 
and explanations, to what extent religious dimensions vary from society to society and 
affect the socioeconomic landscape of the community.  


3. Theoretical and Socio-psychological
Foundations of Elite and Popular 
Religiosity in Islam 
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In this chapter, we shall discuss the ten components (2x5) of religious commitment 
that were derived in relation to an elite and popular distinction on Glock’s (1962) five 
dimensions. In the first section of this chapter (3.1), I indicate how elite and popular 
divisions affect research in the social scientific study of religion. Then, I will try to 
conceptualize ten components of religious commitment by comparing to other 
measurements in the field (3.1). Subsequently, I offer a comparison of Allport’s 
religious orientation approach of religion with Glock’s Multi-Dimensional Approach 
of religion (3.1.2). In addition, some suggestions are given regarding the scale that has 
been developed for this study.  
The second part of this chapter is dedicated to understanding elite and popular 
religiosity from the point of view of Muslim religious experience. Building on the 
general conceptual foundations laid in chapter 2, I shall try to evaluate elite and popular 
religion in the context of Muslim sociology (3.2). I then outline the possible content 
of ten components of religiosity (3.3). This part of the study will provide us with a set 
of hypotheses that will be tested in chapter 5. 
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3.1. Elite and Popular Religiosity in Social Scientific Study of Religion 
Islamic history has been a history of interaction 
between realities and ideas. 
Jørgen S. Nielsen (2008) 
Too often, studies on religion have focused on intellectual history as a substitute for 
social history. In religious studies, theoretical and prescriptive religion has taken 
priority over the living content of everyday religion (McGuire, 2008, pp. 3-19). The 
field has preferred to recognise religion as internalized “faith”, built upon a systematic 
acquaintance with sacred texts, theological doctrines, and legal debates (Grehan, 2014; 
Keskin, 2011; Wiktor-Mach, 2012; Ağilkaya-Şahin, 2012). It did not investigate 
properly whether piety and prayer have their own particular history. Metaphorically 
speaking, “looking upward to the sky rather than downward to earthly matters” 
(Berger, 2006, p. 338). As a result, the field has often lapsed into various forms of 
historical anachronism. 
Rather than influencing daily social behaviour, religious norms and teachings 
continued ideals that most individuals did not fully understand. Until recent times, the 
vast majority of people, be they Muslim, Christian or Jewish, would not have fully 
recognized or understood the religious culture that is attributed to them today. 
However, it is not difficult to find the remnants of a mental universe that was very 
different from the casual assumptions that so many researchers project onto the 
religion of the past (Grehan, 2014). 
Historians of pre-modern societies have long been aware that many elements of 
religious life do not seem to fit with prescribed doctrine or ritual.  To address this 
problem, scholars have proposed theoretical conceptions such as official/unofficial 
religion and elite/popular religion. Initially, ‘popular religion’ referred mainly to 
religious practices that were denounced by religious authorities and other observers 
speaking on behalf of orthodoxy. In these cases, religion is almost automatically 
defined in terms of institutions (Ter Borg, 1999). Because the term ‘popular religion’ 
is therefore severely tainted by such pejorative connotations, some scholars have 
recommended to discard the concept altogether (Grehan, 2014). Robert Orsi (2002, p. 
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16) has claimed that concepts like ‘popular religion’ are deeply and directly involved
in the history of Western racism and colonialism, and in three centuries of divisive,
bitter, and destructive Christian conflict. McGuire (2008, p. 46) assumes that in the
long term scholars will find the concept so ambiguous and unhelpful that they will
abandon it. In line with this critical reassessment, the present study wants to de-centre
the issue of religion from its supposed Western origins, in which true religion was
regarded as set against localised religions or “mere tradition” (Picard, 2011). The latter
has often been associated with superstition and backwardness - not only in Europe, but
also in the cultural politics of many post-colonial Asian countries of the 20th century
(Endres & Lauser, 2012, p. 2). Therefore, we search for new ways to conceptualize
elite and popular religion as a cultural process that is linked to contemporary values
and market and power relations.
Over the past few decades, historians and sociologists have worked hard to break 
free from this judgmental language. Instead of taking sides in theological disputes, 
they have sought inspiration in anthropological models, which were more concerned 
with identifying patterns of behaviour than determining the correctness of beliefs 
(Berlinerblau, 2001; Bilgin, 2003; Geertz, 1973). A shift from theory to practice would 
allow popular religion to garner more attention, instead of being referred to the margins 
along with “superstition” and other forms of pejoratively labelled religiosity. Such 
labels betray dogmatic assumptions that are not acceptable in an ideologically neutral 
form of religious studies (Antes, 2004, p. 63). 
Since the 1990s, many sociologists who investigate religious phenomena have been 
turning to quantitative research methods. Examples include national surveys such as 
the American General Social Surveys (GSS), the National Election Studies (NES) and 
Eurobarometer, and global studies such as the World Values Survey (WVS) and the 
“Forum on Religion and Public Life” of the Pew Research Center. According to 
Wiktor-March, such a strategy usually does not take the influence of cultural, political, 
economic, and social contexts on people’s theological ideas into consideration. Nor 
does it usually consider the impact of such contexts on the variety of meanings that 
people attach to religious concepts. Consequently, the images and diagnoses of 
religious communities that emerge out of these studies turn out to be inconsistent or, 




According to Yapıcı’s study on fieldwork (2004, pp. 85-118), most MA and PhD 
students in Turkey seem to be reluctant to develop their own scales and to analyse the 
data generated by such newly developed scales. They often prefer to employ the 
already existing scales. According to Yapıcı, this methodology causes the situation 
that “the scales form the facts rather than the facts form the scales” (2004, p. 112). 
This recent wave of research shows signs of sensitivity to methodological problems. 
There is a growing awareness that, in addition to progress in theoretical thinking and 
data analysis, more attention should be paid to the way religion is conceptualized and 
operationalized (Finke et al., 2010; Yapıcı, 2004).  
The most important problems arise from the fact that little attention has been paid 
to non-Christian religious experience. Hill and Hood (1999) aggregated and analysed 
126 different psychological measurements for religiosity. However, Grace (2000) 
noted that researchers who wanted to find measurements applicable to non-Western 
religions and spirituality could not find them in Hill and Hood’s work. Scholars have 
pointed out that the content dimension of Muslim religiosity varies considerably from 
that of the Christian religious tradition (Krauss et al., 2005; Shamsuddin, 1992; 
Wiktor-Mach, 2012). According to Küçükcan (2000, p. 468) 
One should bear in mind that almost all of the theoretical frameworks were 
developed after studying predominantly Christian believers and manifestations of 
Christian religious experience. It is therefore questionable whether these 
methodological approaches can explain non-Christian religious experience... 
Hill and Hood (1999) have echoed this sentiment by admitting that, since relevant 
scales for non-Christian religions are virtually non-existent, measures of ‘religion’ are 
likely to reflect Christian religious conceptions, even when they do not explicitly 
identify as measurements of the Christian religion (Heelas, 1985; Ağilkaya-Şahin, 
2015). Scholars also add that the need to study other religious traditions empirically is 
obvious. The study of religion and spirituality needs to be informed about the content 
of particular faith traditions in order to develop meaningful and appropriate empirical 
instruments (Gorsuch, 2008; Hood, 1992; Porpora, 2006; Wiktor-Mach, 2012; 
Ağilkaya-Şahin, 2012). Methodological approaches for the measurement of religiosity 
should correlate with the theological and cultural framework to which the specific 
religion or religiosity belongs.  
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For example, Glock and Stark’s model of religiosity, which has been predominantly 
employed in different fields - wholly or partly -, has been adapted to the Islamic 
religion (see Appendix five: Measurements in Turkish Sociology and Psychology of 
Religion). Serajzadeh (1998), in his study on Iranian Muslim youth and crime, 
developed an adapted measurement for religiosity based on Glock and Stark’s model. 
The leading assumption for using the model was that “since the three monotheistic 
religions (namely Judaism, Christianity and Islam) seem to share similar elements in 
their structural tenets, some items developed by researchers for Christianity and 
Judaism seem to be applicable to Islam too” (Serajzadeh, pp. 138-139). For each of 
the five dimensions of Glock and Stark, Serajzadeh included or applied aspects of the 
Islamic faith. For the ideological dimension, for example, the Islamic ‘articles of faith’ 
or the ‘six pillars of faith’ were used. For the ‘ritualistic’ dimension, Serajzadeh 
included daily prayer (ṣalāt) and fasting (ṣawm) during the month of Ramadan - as 
part of the ‘pillars of Islam’ -, in addition to reading the Holy Book (the Qurʾān), 
attending public prayer (both every day of the week and during Friday prayer), 
participating in ceremonies held on holy days in mosques, and other rituals. While 
such an adaptation of Glock and Stark’s model to the Islamic religious context is more 
comprehensive than most of the other multi-dimensional models measuring the 
religiosity of the Muslim population, there are important shortcomings that need to be 
highlighted. Before we get to that, however, we need to look at two-dimensional 
approaches of religiosity. 
3.1.1. Two - Dimensional Approaches of Religiosity 
Attempts to define and measure religiosity initially started with one-dimensional 
approaches such as church attendance (frequency). As a result, the scope and 
boundaries of religiosity were quite narrowly defined in these measurements. These 
surveys only embraced one set of factors. Summur’s questionnaire on religiosity can 
be classified in this category, because he focused mainly on religious faith (Meadow 
& Kahoe, 1984, p. 301). Thurstone and Chave (1929) developed similar questionnaires 
to measure attitudes towards the church (Wulff, 1991, p. 206). 
American psychologists and sociologists of religion such as Stanley Hall (1891), 
James Leuba (1912), Edwin Starbuck (1899) and William James (1902) initially 
studied religion by employing similar one-dimensional approaches, with a particular 
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focus on religious emotions (Wulff, 1991, p. 200). Subsequently, researchers such as 
Thouless (1985), Popleton and Pilkington (1963), and Vernon and Lindzey (1960) also 
investigated religiosity on a one-dimensional scale (Meadow & Kahoe, 1984, p. 301). 
These surveys on religion have often been criticized because they tend to measure 
individual religiosity as a belief in the normative doctrines of particular religious 
traditions (Hood, Spilka, Hunsberger & Gorsuch, 1996).  
All attempts to operationalize the concept of religiosity which we have mentioned 
here, have in common that they each rely on a single measurement, for example 
combining frequency of church attendance with frequency of communion attendance, 
or frequency of personal prayer with the degree of involvement in the overall 
organizational life of the congregation. Such measurements of religiosity have 
revealed significant differences between people. At the beginning of the Civil Rights 
Movement in the 1960s, for example, it was discovered that among white southern 
college students, those who attended church were somewhat more biased against 
blacks than those who never attended. There were, however, equally strong indications 
that among churchgoers, those who attended more frequently were less prejudiced than 
irregular churchgoers (Johnstone, 2015). The reason for such differences seems to be 
that religiosity is not a one-dimensional phenomenon: not everyone is religious in the 
same way. A person may rank high in religiosity on one dimension or measurement, 
but low on another - or several others. So, if a certain behaviour is correlated with a 
high score on one scale of religiosity, but with a low score on another, very different 
conclusions can be drawn about the impact of religiosity on that behaviour, depending 
on which measurement of religiosity is used. Assumptions about the impact of 
people’s religiosity on their behaviour and commitment can therefore be inaccurate 
and misleading (Johnstone, 2015, pp. 103-104). 
Prominent thinkers soon discarded the idea that it was possible to simply locate 
people in a single dimension, with popular sentiments on one end of the spectrum and 
elite views on the other end. The various ways in which people approach religion have 
been collectively termed “religious orientation” (Krauss & Hood, 2013, pp. 23-48). 
Religious orientation refers to the sub-dimensions of religion or, in other words, to the 
intra-dimensional aspects of religion. These proved to include many new sets of 
dimensions - some covering a broad range, some narrower in their focus - which began 
to be mentioned in the research literature under different names such as “first-hand” 
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and “second-hand religious life”, “authoritarian” and “humanistic religion”, 
“committed religion” and “consensual religion”, “intrinsic” and “extrinsic religiosity”, 
“mythological” and “literal religion”, “end” and “means religion”, “high-
involvement” and “low-involvement religion”, “elite” and “popular religion”. 
Although these are by no means the same distinctions under different names, it is clear 
that social scientists felt the need to broaden the scope of their instruments. The 
following table tries to show the main characteristics of these divisions, together with 
their theorists. 
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Table 1 - Characteristics of two-dimensional conceptualizations 
Dimensions  Theorists 
James (1978) 
Religious geniuses Religion exists not as a dull habit, but as an acute fever rather (p. 6). 
Second-hand religious life 
Believer follows the conventional observances. Such religion has been 
made for him by others, communicated to him by tradition, 
determined to fixed forms by imitation and retained by habit (p. 6). 
Fromm (1950) 
Humanistic religion This type of religion is centred around man and his strength... virtue is self-realization, not obedience” (p.37). 
Authoritarian religion The main virtue of this type of religion is obedience, its cardinal sin is disobedience” (p.35). 
Allen and Spilka (1967) 
Committed religion 
Utilizes an abstract philosophical perspective: multiplex religious 
ideas    are relatively clear in meaning and an open and flexible 
framework of commitment relates religion to daily activities” (p.205). 
Consensual religion 
Vague, non-differentiated, bifurcated, neutralized (p.205). 
A cognitively simplified and personally convenient faith. 
Allport (1967) 
Intrinsic religiosity 
It is mature religiousness, a longing for and a commitment to “an ideal 
unification of one’s life” under the guidance of “a unifying conception 
of the nature of all existence” (p. 151). 
Extrinsic religiosity 
It is something people use, not something they live. It is a “dull habit” 
or a “tribal investment” used for “occasional ceremony, family 
convenience, and personal comfort” (p. 148). 
Hunt  (1972) 
Mythological religion A reinterpretation of religious statements to seek their deeper symbolic meanings. 
Literal religion Taking at face value any religious statement without in any way questioning it” (p.43). 
Beit-Hallahmi  (1989) 
High-involvement religion Often religion of converts, who learned it outside their family of origin   and invest much more emotional energy in it” (p. 100). 
Low-involvement religion Learned within the family of origin and having little emotional significance (p. 100). 
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When we look at these schemes that have been proposed, we see that there is a great 
deal of overlap between the various proposals. They sometimes give the impression of 
being the same idea phrased in different words by various social scientists. In other 
words, scholars commonly use the term ‘religious orientation’ to describe why an 
individual engages in religious behaviour (motivation), how they think about religion 
(cognitive style), and what an individual believes (content) (Krauss & Hood, 2013, p. 
24). Although these proposals have different origins, purposes and methodologies, 
nearly all of them try to express a common phenomenon observed in the study of 
religion. There is one point on which all are in agreement: even though there is a single 
word for ‘religion’, there might be numerous possible ways in which one can be 
‘religious’ (Spilka, 1967, p. 33). 
Scholars generally have not studied three elements of religious orientation in 
isolation from each another, namely motivation, cognitive style, and content. Their 
systems of religious orientation tend to reflect this omission by including combinations 
of these three elements. In this study we combine these three elements of religious 
orientation as well, in order to differentiate different ways of ‘being religious’ (see 
section 3.3). So, it would be appropriate to elaborate on these three elements a bit more 
in detail here. The study of motivation, for example, is basically the study of why 
behaviour occurs, and includes research into the frequency and timing of behaviour. 
Therefore, systems of religious orientation contain the element ‘motivation’ if they 
scrutinize the importance, centrality, frequency, or purpose of religious behaviour. The 
study of cognitive style is the study of the amount of complexity, reflectiveness and 
questioning that beliefs and belief systems undergo and accumulate, and includes 
research into the way beliefs are thought through and held. The study of content refers 
to the substance of beliefs which are held by the individual. The element ‘content’ is 
included in systems of religious orientation to the extent that they specify the types of 
beliefs that individuals with specific religious orientations hold (Krauss & Hood, 2013, 
p. 25).
Of these definitions, Allport’s extrinsic and intrinsic concept has become one of the
most popular tools employed in the scientific study of religion. We can plainly see that 
Allport, in his turn, made use of these three elements in his studies. Allport’s most 
extensive discussion of the concepts ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ can be found in his 
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articles “The Religious Context of Prejudice” (Allport, 1966) and “Personal Religious 
Orientation and Prejudice” (Allport & Ross, 1967).17 Hunt and King (1971) identified 
11 characteristics that they believed Allport used to distinguish intrinsic from extrinsic 
religion. These characteristics are as follows: reflective versus uncritical, associational 
versus communal, universal versus parochial (closed-minded), ultimate versus 
instrumental, differentiated versus undifferentiated, personal versus institutional, 
unselfish versus selfish, relevance for all life, salient versus un-salient, humility versus 
dogmatism, and regular versus irregular church attendance (see Table 2).18 
17 The psychological tie between the intrinsic orientation and tolerance, and between the 
extrinsic orientation and prejudice, has been discussed in a series of papers by Allport (1959, 
1963a, 1963b, 1968). 
18 However, Hunt and King (1971) only credited Allport (1950) with the first five of these 
distinctions, of which only one, i.e., differentiated versus undifferentiated religion, clearly 
corresponded to one of the six distinguishing characteristics that Allport used to differentiate 
mature from immature religion. (See: Krauss, & Hood, 2013). 
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Table 2 - Components of intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity 
Intrinsic Extrinsic 
I Reflective vs Uncritical 
reflective (1950) unreflective, uncritical (1950) 
II Differentiated vs Undifferentiated 
highly differentiated (1950) undifferentiated (1950) 
III Personal vs Institutional 
interiorized (1954, 1960), vital, deeper level 
(1967), devout, internalized (1967) 
institutional (1950, p. 54), institutionalized 
(1954), external (1954) 
IV Universal vs Parochial 
infused with the character of ethics 
(1954), creed, ideals of brotherhood (1954, 
p. 66), conditioned to love one’s neighbour
(1960), compassion (1967)
exclusionist (1950, p. 59), ethnocentric, 
exclusive, in-group (1954), at expense of 
out-groups (1960), favours provincialism 
(1966) 
V Unselfish vs Selfish 
not self-centred (1959), strives to transcend 
self-centred needs (1966) 
self-centred (1950), self-interest (1959), 
self-serving, protective (1960), useful to 
self (1966) uses for own ends (1967) 
VI Relevance for all of Life 
distilled into thought and conduct 
(1954), floods whole life with motivation 
and meaning (1959, p. 66), not limited to 
single segments, (1966), other needs brought 
into harmony with religious beliefs and 
prescriptions 
(1967), follows creed fully (1967) 
single segment (1959), not integrated into 
their way of life (1966), favours 
compartmentalization (1966) 
VII Salience 
faith really matters (1954), sincerely 
believing (1954), accepts total creed (1960), 
without reservations (1960), follows creed 
fully (1967) 
full creed and teaching not adopted (1959), 
faith, beliefs lightly held (1967) 
VIII Ultimate vs. Instrumental 
an end in itself (1954, p. 66), intrinsic (1959, 
pp. 60, 66, 67), intent on serving his religion 
(1960), a final good (1966), faith is supreme 
value; the master motive (1967), ultimate 
significance (1967) 
utilitarian, means to ends (1954), extrinsic 
(1959, pp. 60, 66, 67), not master motive 
(1959), instrumental (1959, pp. 66, 67), 
supports and serves non-religious ends 
(1966), uses religion (1967), serves other 
than ultimate interests (1967) 
IX Associational vs Communal 
associational (1966; 1967), seeking deeper 
values (1967), involved for religious 
fellowship (1967) 
political and social aspects (1954), 
communal (1966; 1967), sociocultural, 
affiliates for communal identification, need 
to belong (1966), no true association with 
the religious function of the church (1966), 
involved for sociability and status (1967) 
X Humility vs Dogmatism 
humility (1959, p. 67) dogmatic (1959, p. 66) 
XI Regularity of Church Attendance 
constant (1967) casual and peripheral churchgoers, feel no 
need to attend regularly (1966)  
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Even this older, well-established scheme of Allport’s ‘intrinsic-extrinsic’ 
distinction is being increasingly distrusted. Kirkpatrick and Hood (1990) have given a 
variety of theoretical and methodological criticisms of intrinsic-extrinsic research. 
 Theoretical problems include lack of conceptual clarity in the definitions of I and E; 
confusion regarding what I and E are supposed to measure (namely, intrinsic-
extrinsic what?); the value-laden ‘good-religion-versus-bad-religion’ distinction 
underlying the framework; the problems inherent in defining and studying religiosity 
independently of belief content; and the thorny issue of how I and E are conceptually 
interrelated (namely, Allport’s original bipolar continuum versus the modern two-
factor theory). Criticisms of the measurement of I and E concern the factorial 
structure, reliability, and construct validity of the I and E scales, as well as the 
empirical relationship between the scales (Kirkpatrick and Hood, 1990, p. 442). 
Despite challenges to the validity of these ideas, multi-dimensional constructions 
of religion are likely to remain and become more subtle and refined. This kind of 
terminology implies ‘pure types’, and although these idealized images make for 
interesting discussion, in real life they are vanishingly rare. Still, both as scientists and 
as human beings, we like the appearance of unchallengeable certainty that 
classifications offer us (Spilka, 1967, p. 10). So, in the coming sections, this study also 
provides some characteristics of elite and popular religiosity in Islam by taking 
advantage of the analyses offered by previous scholars in the scientific study of 
religion, to grasp complex and distinctive characteristics of Turkish religiosity. 
3.1.2. Comparative Analysis of Allport’s Religious Orientation Approach and 
the Multi-Dimensional Approach of Glock and Stark 
Glock and Stark (1965, pp. 19-20) argue that in all religions of the world - despite their 
great variation in details - there are general areas in which religiosity manifests itself. 
These areas, which Glock and Stark consider to be the core dimensions of religiosity, 
are the ‘ideological’, the ‘ritualistic’, the ‘experiential’, the ‘intellectual’ and the 
‘consequential’ dimensions. According to their definitions: 
The ‘Ideological’ or religious belief dimension encompasses beliefs that are 
expected to be held by followers.  
The ‘Ritualistic’ or religious practice dimension includes the specific religious 
practices, such as worship, prayer, participation in special sacraments, fasting, and so 
on, which are expected to be performed by believers.  
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The ‘Experiential’ or religious feeling dimension refers to having feelings, 
perceptions and sensations of established communication with a divine essence (i.e. 
with God), ultimate reality or transcendental authority.  
The ‘Intellectual’ or religious knowledge dimension encompasses the basic 
information and knowledge about the tenets of faith and the sacred scriptures that the 
believers are expected to possess.  
The ‘Consequential’ or religious effects dimension includes the effects of religious 
belief, practice, experience, and knowledge on the daily life of the believer (1965, pp. 
20-21).
In the discussion on the multi-dimensional structure of religion, a minor shift can
be observed from Glock (1962) to Stark and Glock (1968). Glock (1962) discussed the 
intellectual, ideological, experiential, ritualistic, and consequential dimensions as 
basic expressions of religion. Stark and Glock (I968) changed two aspects of this 
multi-dimensional structure of religion. First, they excluded the consequential 
dimension from their reflection on the inner structure of religiosity. Secondly, they 
divided the former ideological and ritualistic dimensions into several components. 
In 1968, Glock specified two types of research that could be enabled by such a 
scheme. One type of research puts the specification of the components within each 
dimension in the foreground. Glock proposed a number of tentative components within 
the various dimensions, but emphasized that there was still a great deal of work to be 
done in terms of intra-dimensional differentiation (1965). The other type of research 
focuses on the matter of inter-dimensional independence. Glock anticipated that his 
multi-dimensional scheme would stimulate research into the extent to which people 
might be religious in some dimensions, but not in others. The idea that these various 
dimensions exist independently of each other led to the suggestion that individuals 
might score high on one dimension, but low on another one, and to the view that classes 
might differ in the form in which they display their religiosity. For instance, it was 
suggested that the working class might score high on belief but low on ritual practice, 
while the middle class might score high on ritual practice and low on belief. 
Concerning the relationships between these two types of research, they state that: 
A first and obvious requirement if religious commitment is to be comprehensively 




With some few exceptions, past research has curiously avoided this fundamental 
question. Investigators have tended to focus upon one or another of the diverse 
manifestations of religiosity and to ignore all others (p. 19). 
Glock’s exploration in collaboration with Rodney Stark progressed according to 
this principle. Concerning the intra-dimensional differentiation, which is highly 
relevant to the present study, Glock and Stark (1968) indicated that a “person will hold 
a certain theological outlook, that he will acknowledge the truth of the tenets of the 
religion. Every religion maintains some set of beliefs which adherents are expected to 
ratify. However, the content and scope of beliefs will vary not only between religions, 
but often within the same religious tradition” (p. 14). In their explorative research, for 
example, ‘orthodoxy’, ‘religious particularism’ and ‘ethicalism’ were used as 
indicators for measuring religious belief (pp. 57-80). 
According to Glock and Stark (1968), religious practices fall into two important 
classes: ritual and devotion.  
Ritual refers to the set of rites, formal religious acts, and sacred practices which all 
religions expect their adherents to perform. In Christianity some of these formal 
ritual expectations are attendance at worship services, taking communion, baptism, 
weddings, and the like. Devotion on the other hand, is somewhat akin to, but 
importantly different from ritual. While the ritual aspect of commitment is highly 
formalized and typically public, all known religions also value personal acts of 
worship and contemplation which are relatively spontaneous, informal, and typically 
private. Devotionalism among Christians is manifested through private prayer, Bible 
reading, and perhaps even by impromptu hymn singing (p. 15). 
In our opinion, the criteria used by Glock and Stark to describe intra-dimensional 
differentiation within religious practice are closely related to Allport’s characterization 
of ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ religiosity. Glock and Stark also clearly admitted that 
Allport’s types crosscut through the criteria of religious commitment they had 
previously developed in their important work American Piety: The Nature of Religious 
Commitment (1968, p. 18). In relation to the above example about religious practice, 
Allport (1967, 1968) also used the private character of ritual to measure intrinsic 
aspects of religious practice: 
- 9. It is important to me to spend periods of time in private religious thought 
and meditation (1968, p. 268) (intrinsic). 
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In order to measure extrinsic aspects of rituals, he used communal aspects of the 
ritual: 
- 2. One reason for my being a church member is that such membership helps to
establish a person in the community (1968, p. 265) (extrinsic).
Although Glock and Stark did not directly use Allport’s conceptualization of 
‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ religiosity, they emphasised the importance of this 
conceptualization for exploring intra-dimensional differentiation after summarizing 
the general ideas of Allport’s religious orientation theory. They stated that “it is very 
probably the case that people who adhere to a faith out of a need for psychic security 
will act upon their faith differently compared to people whose commitment to their 
faith is based on high moral purpose”. They also admitted that these expectations 
provide a major theoretical basis for volumes two (sources of religious commitment) 
and three (consequences of religious commitment) of their publication American Piety 
(1968).19 
Conversely, most other researchers who used Glock’s scheme adopted a very 
different approach (Cardwell, 1971; Clayton, 1968; Faulkner, 1969; Lehman, 1968; 
Serajzadeh, 1998) (in Turkey: Altınlı, 2011; Atalay, 2005; Ayten, 2009; Kafalı, 2005; 
Şahin, 2001; Yapıcı, 2004; Yıldız, 2006). Contrary to what Glock advocated in his 
original article, the majority of these researchers assumed that it is possible to construct 
a single measurement for each dimension.  
The following questions therefore arise: is it correct to consider these five 
dimensions as empirical wholes, as many researchers have assumed, or do they 
encompass unrelated or even negatively related phenomena, as Stark and Glock have 
reported? The answer to this question will in turn help us to evaluate the validity of 
assumptions made with regard to the relationships between the various dimensions, 
which were claimed in earlier studies. 
19 In this study, they addressed the question whether there are patterns in American piety. In 
their work, they have focused on many issues, but three fundamental questions dominated one 
phase of their research: 1. What is the nature of religious commitment? 2. What are the 
sociological and psychological sources of religious commitment? 3. What are the sociological 
and psychological consequences of religious commitment? 
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In order to make meaningful distinctions within the five dimensions, this study will 
initially focus on the intra-dimensional differentiation within the various dimensions 
of Glock’s five-dimensional scale, and launch the proposal to apply the elite - popular 
religiosity distinction to it, in relation to Allport’s (1967) distinction between 
‘extrinsic’ and ‘intrinsic’ approaches to religion. We therefore propose to specify two 
components within each of these five dimensions, in order to address the different 
beliefs and behaviours discussed in the literature about socio-cultural stratification and 
religious orientation. Moreover, we exclude the consequential dimension from other 
dimensions of religiosity, just as Stark and Glock did, and consider it a dependent 
variable (1968, p. 16). 
Our main suggestion, in addition to applying the elite - popular religiosity 
distinction to Glock’s scheme, is to respectively include: Weber’s (1963) distinction 
between ‘other-worldly’ and ‘this-worldly’ orientations, Allport’s (1967) distinction 
between ‘extrinsic’ and ‘intrinsic’ approaches to religion, and Allen and Spilka’s 
(1967) categorization of ‘committed’ and ‘consensual’ religious orientations. 
Although the conceptualizations suggested by Weber, Allport, and Allen and Spilka 
contain one or more components that differentiate each other, together they suggest 
two general religious orientations. One orientation emphasizes the internalized, 
intrinsic, and committed outlooks. This orientation reflects a personal, critical type of 
commitment, which is most often associated with elite religiosity, practiced mostly by 
socially and economically privileged strata, i.e., the spiritual elites (khawāṣṣ). The 
other orientation emphasizes the conventional, extrinsic, and consensual outlooks. 
This latter orientation reflects the social, unquestioning and community-oriented type 
of commitment, which is most often associated with popular religion, practiced by the 
socially and economically non-privileged strata, i.e., the masses (ʿawāmm).  
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When these elite and popular religious orientations are applied to Glock’s model of 
religious commitment, they suggest two components within each of their five 
dimensions. This conceptual orientation suggests the following table: 
The proposed scale of elite and popular orientation shows that individuals can 
occupy three main locations based on these ten components. The group of respondents 
who scored high on the elite religiosity scale and low on the popular scale was defined 
as representing ‘elite religiosity’. The group of respondents who scored high on the 
popular religiosity scale and low on the elite scale was defined as representing ‘popular 
religiosity’. Finally, those who scored high on some of the components of the elite 
religiosity scale, and high on other components of the popular scale, or vice versa, 
were defined as representing ‘mixed religiosity’. 
Obviously, there is one final location that an individual can also occupy: this would 
be to score low on the elite and popular religiosity scale. This can be called low 
religiosity. These individuals are excluded from our main analysis. For this purpose, 
this study uses a general religiosity scale (GRS), which is included in the questionnaire 
before the elite and popular religiosity scale.  
The GRS was developed using the older versions of Glock’s five-dimensional 
religiosity scale (1962). The intra-dimensional aspects of the ideological, ritualistic, 
Table 3 - Conceptual model of E&PR in relation with 
Glock’s scheme 
Components Elite Religiosity Popular Religiosity 
Ideological Elite beliefs Popular beliefs 
Ritualistic Elite rituals Popular rituals 
Experiential Elite experiences Popular experiences 
Intellectual Elite knowledge Popular knowledge 
Dependent variable 
Consequential Elite consequences Popular consequences 
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intellectual and experiential dimensions are not considered in this initial study - this is 
the most common approach adopted by Turkish sociologists. The present study uses 
this only to measure those who are high in religiosity and low in religiosity.20 We also 
use this scale to evaluate the pros and cons of this tool in relation to elite and popular 
religiosity. Further information about the measurement tools can be found in chapter 
4. 
So far in this study we have tried to point out equivalent intra-dimensionality in 
religion and more particularly in Islamic religion. Within Turkish Islam, the religion 
that is the subject of our present research, we will later have the opportunity to 
distinguish various intra-dimensional aspects of religious beliefs, practices, 
experiences, knowledge and consequences that we assume are related with social and 
cultural differentiation in society. 
3.2. The Concepts of Elite and Popular Religiosity in Islam 
One of the most popular and prized ḥadīths among Muslims is the one known as the 
“Ḥadīth of Gabriel”. Standing in front of his companions, the prophet Muḥammad 
was asked by the angel Gabriel about Islām, īmān (‘faith’) and iḥsān (‘perfection’). 
The Prophet states the five pillars of Islam as an answer to what is Islam is. Then 
the prophet lists the six pillars of faith as an answer to what Īmān is. With regard to 
the second question, what iḥsān is, the prophet states, “It is to worship Allah as though 
you can see Him, for although you cannot see Him, He indeed, sees you”. So, the 
Prophet does not add a new dimension but addresses intra-dimensional aspects of Īmān 
and Islām. In other words, these terms mean to become excellent in the pillars of faith 
and those of Islam (al Bukhari, book 2, ḥadith 43). 
The term spirituality is used as an English equivalent for the Arabic term iḥsān 
(Renard, 2005, p. 226). The root of this term is ḥ-s-n which means beauty, to be or to 
become beautiful (Badawi & Haleem, 2008; Lane, 1863, vol. 2, p. 570). It is an 
especially important concept in Sufi thought, representing a high level of spiritual 
progress.  





According to an overwhelming majority of Sunni Muslim scholars, this ḥadīth 
presents a condensed form of Islam in general. According to us, this ḥadīth embraces 
both popular and elite religiosity in Islam and suggests that the concept of iḥsān 
corresponds with the concept of ‘great culture’ or ‘great tradition’ in the terminology 
of the social anthropology of Islam. These concepts are discussed below. 
3.2.1. Intra-Religious Pluralism: Islam or Islams? 
What the concepts of great and little traditions mean in the historical context has been 
discussed in chapter two. Redfield suggested that all world religions and some local 
religions could be separated into a ‘great tradition’ and ‘little tradition’. From this point 
on, I will try to show how these terms are applicable to the case of Islam. 
Every theory of ‘original’, ‘normal’ or ‘essential’ Islam creates a polemic against 
Islam as it is found in the world (Ahmed, 2016). Some scholars suggest that the term 
Islam should be replaced by ‘Islams’. The existence of this view was already noted in 
1968 by W. Montgomery Watt: “Some occidental observers have gone so far as to say 
that there is not one Islam but many – a different religion in each country or region” 
(Watt, 1979, p. 153). Abdul Hamid el-Zein emphasizes the multiplicity of Islamic 
expressions as well – the Islams of the elites and non-elites, theologians and peasants, 
literates and illiterates – and sees them as equally valid expressions of fundamental, 
“unconscious” Islamic principles. Muslim fundamentalists who regard their 
interpretations of Islam as definitive, ironically and unintentionally provide a 
conceptual end product which reduces the Islamic tradition to a single, essentialist set 
of principles (1977, p. 174). According to Dale Eickelman, the theory of ‘original’ 
Islam also disregards the fact that most Muslims hold quite consciously that their 
religion possesses central, normative tenets and that these tenets are essential for an 
understanding of Islamic belief and practice (1982, p. 1). 
Some orientalist researchers who took these criticisms into consideration, used a 
dual conceptualisation in their sociological and anthropological studies of Islamic 
societies. Let us look at some examples of how these scholars treated the multiplicity 
of Islamic expressions, before moving on to Turkish sociologists. Gellner (1981) was 
certainly the most Weberian of the sociologists and anthropologists who devoted their 
studies to Muslim societies. Together with Geertz, he affected, and still largely 
influences sociological and anthropological studies of Islam that use comparable 
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twofold differentiations (Marranci, 2010, p. 368). In his book Muslim Society (1983) 
and in other writings (1992; 1994), Gellner identified unvarying features of Muslim 
societies that make them susceptible to sociological analysis. Building on the work of 
Ibn Khaldūn, he suggested a dialectic between city and tribe, each with its own form 
of religion. According to him, the central and perhaps most significant characteristic 
of Islam is that it is internally divided into the high Islam of the elite and the popular 
(low) Islam of the people. High Islam is primarily urban, and folk Islam is primarily 
tribal and rural. Although the boundaries between the two are not sharp but gradual 
and ambiguous, they each project a distinctive tradition nevertheless. 
High Islam, according to Gellner, is “carried by urban elites recruited largely from 
the trading bourgeois classes and reflecting the tastes and values of urban middle 
classes. Those values include order, rule observance, sobriety, and learning. They 
contain an aversion to hysteria and emotional excess, and to the excessive use of the 
audio-visual aids of religion. This high Islam stresses the severely monotheistic and 
nomocratic nature of Islam, it is mindful of the prohibition of claims to mediation 
between God and man, and it is generally oriented towards puritanism and 
scripturalism” (Gellner, 1992, p. 11). 
Popular Islam, however, is in the majority of the cases associated with “the pre-
urban stages or nonurban, nonliterate/illiterate levels of society and is produced by the 
village or the common people. If it knows literacy, it does so mainly in the use of 
writing for magical purposes, rather than as a tool of scholarship. It stresses magic 
more than learning, ecstasy more than rule-observance. Far from avoiding mediation, 
this form of Islam is centred on it: its most characteristic institution is the saint cult, 
where the saint is more often than not a living rather than dead personage” (Gellner, 
1992, p. 11). 
Gellner was familiar with the work of the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz, 
but his work barely reflects this. Geertz focused on Muslim societies as well, and tried 
to show how Islam differs in Morocco and Indonesia (Geertz, 1971). In a study of 
Javanese religion, he brings out the contrast between peasant and specialist religion. 
He calls the peasant pattern abangan. The Prijaji, the Javanese warrior-gentry, 
opposes abangan by striving for spiritual excellence. “Abangan religion represents the 
peasant synthesis of urban imports and tribal inheritances, a syncretism of old bits and 
pieces from a dozen sources”, “the abangans are Java’s peasantry, the prijajis its elite. 
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Prijajis are constituted of bureaucrats, clerks and teachers of the Javanese society, who 
dwell in cities. As opposed to abangan, which is concrete, prijaji is mystical. Abangan 
is interested only in first-order representation, while prijaji deals with higher-order 
symbolism. Abangan focuses on the household, prijaji on the individual. Abangan 
involves a concrete polytheism, prijaji an abstract and speculative pantheism” (1976, 
pp. 228-34).  
Despite the terminological differences between Gellner and Geertz, their 
approaches to Islam and Muslim societies are, in fact, remarkably similar. The 
conceptions and approach they used are broadly criticised, which will be reflected to 
some extent at the end of this section, in conjunction with the discussion of criticism 
of the approach used by the Turkish sociologist in general. Here we will discuss a 
number of particular criticisms of Gellner and Geertz’s studies on Muslim societies. 
For example, Kamali (2001) strongly criticized Gellner’s interpretation of Muslim 
society. He noticed that “[Gellner] mixes the religious notion of umma, which is the 
concept of a religious community in relation to its Messenger, namely the Prophet, 
with the peoples residing in different Muslim countries... This use of the notion of 
umma as a homogeneous phenomenon referring to the entire ‘Muslim world’ neglects 
the reality of different cultural and institutional arrangements in the various ‘Muslim’ 
societies. He fails to take into account in his discussion the sociocultural and even 
economic diversity of different Muslim countries” (p. 464). In relation to this criticism, 
Bruinessen and Howell (2003) noticed that “Geertz and Gellner declared Sufism 
moribund, but what they meant by Sufism was only its popular, rural, ecstatic and 
illiterate variant. They appeared unaware of the existence, all over the Muslim world, 
of learned urban Sufis, whose following included members of the traditional elites” (p. 
8). Asad reflects the same criticism of Geertz by saying that “[his approach] ignores 
the varying social conditions for the production of knowledge” (Asad, 1983, p. 237). 
We do not have the necessary space here to discuss the work of Gellner and Geertz 
in depth. We will not provide any new critique or defence of their studies. In addition 
to these criticisms, however, we must stress that they made an innovative and 
interesting sociological and anthropological attempt to explain inner-Islamic 
differences, and that their work had an impact on many scholars in the scientific study 
of religion. 
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3.2.2. Turkish Islam(s) 
In the writings of Şerif Mardin, who is considered the Max Weber of Turkish sociology 
(Filiz & Uluç, 2006, p. 32), we find an innovative sociological attempt to explain the 
religious diversity observed in Turkish society. Mardin uses two concepts for this: 
kitâbî İslam, which means Islam based on a book or text, and halk İslamı, which refers 
to popular Islam (Şeker, 2007). He also uses central (Merkez) and periphery (çevre) to 
explain religious differentiation (1963, 1973, 1995, 2005, 2006). Mardin (1973) argues 
that this social dichotomy was primarily a cultural dichotomy that differentiated the 
elites of the “centre” from the non-elite (teba, subjects of the Ottoman Empire) of the 
“periphery”. The cultural division has remained deep, despite urbanization and the 
fairly recent opening of Turkish society through the adoption of market-driven 
economic policies, which in fact meant that the country became subject to the 
consequences of globalizing trends. However, he also indicates that neither the centre 
nor the periphery has its pure and monolithic representatives. 
Ali Yaşar Sarıbay called this phenomenon “elitist Islam” and “populist Islam” and 
traced it through Islamic history (1985, 1993, 1995). Sarıbay argued that Islamic 
movements rose and developed in a populist way by using democracy and the media 
as a tool in the Islamic world. He stated that populist Islam motivates ordinary people 
by referring to the imagination of a “mystical past and utopic future” (1993). Sarıbay’s 
work is largely based on Gellner’s conceptualization and describes elitist Islam as 
religiosity created by ulamā, the guardians, transmitters and interpreters of religious 
knowledge, of Islamic doctrine and law, living in the city. Sarıbay emphasizes that the 
common characteristics of these ulamā exhibit the values and tastes of the middle 
class.21 These values are shaped by systematic methodologies, jurisprudence, 
moderation and the sacred text. On the other hand, populist Islam is not systematic, 
but very emotional. Moreover, he states, popular Islam does not pay attention to the 
text (al kitāb), and places a strong emphasis on belonging to the dervish lodge (tekke) 
and the order of the dervish (tarika) (Çelik, 1995, p. 11).  
These religious differentiations which have been explored by Turkish sociologists 
and especially by Şarif Mardin, have also been the subject of harsh criticism from 
21 Here, the term ‘middle class’ refers to a social group consisting of well-educated people, 
such as doctors, lawyers, and teachers. 
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contemporary Islamic historians. The main point of these criticisms is Mardin’s 
inability to elaborate the sociological aspect of religion in relation to the theoretical 
aspect. This inadequacy manifests itself in the analysis of the Naqshibandi order. 
Mehmet F. Şeker accurately states that Mardin’s interpretation of the Naqshibandi 
order ignores the sufic/mystical elements with the effect that it is portrayed as an 
organized political organization. He points out that Mardin approached the history of 
the traditional Naqshibandi on the economic, social and political levels, as many other 
“orientalists” did (Şeker, 2007, p 212). If we inspect Mardin’s center-periphery 
theoretical framework, we see that these conceptualizations do not sufficiently address 
the inner-Islamic plurality in a theoretical sense, and that his framework is primarily 
used to understand the dichotomies in Ottoman and Turkish political life. In many of 
his books, Mardin refers to the centre-periphery scheme for  understanding Turkish 
elections (Sayar, 2002, p. 3). 
The other prominent Turkish scholar who has investigated intra-religious diversity 
in Islam is Ahmet Karamustafa. He is one of the contemporary scholars who have 
shown alternative ways to theorize inner-Islamic difference in relation to sociological 
factors, doing so specifically in his work on Anatolian Islam. Unlike Şerif Mardin and 
Yaşar Sarıbay, Karamustafa pays considerable attention to the theoretical side of 
Muslim religious experience (1994, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2010, 2013). He conceptualized 
inner-Islamic differences without using binaries such as popular Islam - high Islam 
and other “pejorative devices” such as “heterodoxy”. Instead, he offered terms such as 
“deviance”, “new renunciation,” and “dervish piety” (Karamustafa, 1994, 2005). 
According to Karamustafa, these terms do not carry the historical and normative 
baggage of ‘elite’ and ‘popular’. Recently he used the term “vernacular Islam” as an 
indicator for local characteristics of Islamic traditions (Karamustafa, 2013). 
3.2.3. Some Critics and Their Suggestions 
In the section above, we listed scholars who suggested a plurality of conceptualizations 
to describe religious diversity in Turkish sociology, such as: literate and non-literate 
groups, elitist Islam and populist Islam, town-dwellers and village-dwellers, centre and 
periphery. We have pointed out, among other things, the criticism that some 
researchers have received on their twofold conceptualizations. In this section, we 
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continue to criticize these conceptualizations within a more general framework and 
will make a number of suggestions. 
The notion of ‘great’ and ‘little’ traditions and other dichotomies oversimplified the 
complexity of each of these traditions, and overstressed their separation. This 
dichotomy slips too easily into other dubious dichotomies advocated by writers in the 
Middle East: ‘great’ stands to ‘little’ as ‘literate elite’ stands to ‘illiterate masses’, as 
‘urban’ stands to ‘rural’, ‘intellectual’ to ‘emotional’, ‘public’ to ‘private’, and so on 
(Eickelman, 1981; Stirrat, 1984). These connotations are misleading and often false, 
but have been accepted by a large majority of researchers as a master narrative and 
continue to influence scholarly and public discourse on the history and religion of 
Muslim societies. In section 2.2.3 we have given a few examples of these applications 
in religious studies. Here I give an example of this tendency in the historiography of 
Turkish Islam as set out in the influential writings of Fuat Köprülü, discussed in 
Markus Dressler’s recent book on Turkish Alevi Islam (2013). Dressler criticized 
Köprülü for his elitist, hierarchical, and modernist approach to Islam. 
Köprülü widely followed the classical approach of Islamic cultural elites as well as 
Western Orientalists, who tended to look down on forms of popular religious culture, 
measuring the latter against the standards of what they considered to be properly 
Islamic. For Köprülü these standards were since his earliest work defined by 
Sunnism. We can see that when he uses apologetic Islamic terms in his description 
of inner-Islamic difference: for example, when, in a discussion of the Bektashis, he 
refers to them as ghulāt, that is, “exaggerating/extreme (ifratçı) Shiite-bâtınî 
currents”; when he argues that the flexibility of the Bektashis in matters of dogma 
and practice made them attractive and successful “among the ignorant Muslim and 
Christian masses”; and when he asserts that through the continuing adaptation of 
elements originally not part of it, the Bektashiye became more and more syncretistic 
(Köprülü, 1970 [1949], p. 462); when he claims that “the Babai incident has to be 
seen as an important starting point for the heretical and schismatic (rafz ve i ͗tizal) 
movements in opposition to the Sunni doctrine... leading to the formation of sects 
(tâife) such as Kızılbashism and Bektashism” (Köprülü, 1966 [1919], p. 178); or 
when he qualifies belief in metempsychosis (tenasüh) and the circle of reincarnations 
(devir), which could be found among certain Alevi groups, as “corrupted dogmas” 
(bozuk akide) (Köprülü, 1935, p. 31) (Dressler, 2013, p. 198). 
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Such a narrative normalizes certain religious formations, while refusing to ascribe 
originality and authenticity to those socio-religious movements that do not comply 
with its own theological norms. In Köprülü’s case, “properly Islamic” points to 
mainstream Sunni Islam. 
Diyanet, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, is another critical example of the 
growing influence of Sunni Islam and an illustration of the governance of religion by 
the state, which I outline in chapter 6. Ali Bardakoğlu, the president of Diyanet 
between 2003 and 2010, has explained the role of Diyanet as a state institution in terms 
of maintaining social order in Turkey by promoting a moderate Islam based on 
rationality and ‘sound knowledge’, and not on ‘superstition’ and ‘sentimental 
religiosity’ (Turner & Arslan, 2013b). 
The (implicit) model with which Köprülü and Diyanet work can be regarded as an 
elitist approach that is very normative in a specific religious or political sense. This 
model is criticized for presenting popular religion as a deviation from a ‘higher 
religion’, a ‘pure’ Islam that is assumed to be represented in the actions and statements 
of theologians and Diyanet leaders. 
A similar approach can occasionally even be found in the anthropology of Islam. 
John Gulick, for example, suggested the ‘Five Pillars’ of Islam as the foundations of 
great Islam (1976, p164). According to Yel, however, the Islamic great tradition 
consists of four elements: the Qurʾān, Sunnah, consensus and analogy22 (1993, p. 107). 
The problem with these proposals is that these are the sources consulted both by the 
elites and by the masses. Supporters of these approaches confront the Islamic great 
tradition with the little one as if they have clear-cut differences. This structuralist 
definition of the great Islam may be regarded as too narrow, because it excludes people 
for whom the little tradition is a second identity.23 It may also be regarded as too broad; 
speaking of the ‘little tradition’ in the singular suggests that it is relatively 
homogeneous. Following Lynch (2007), we must resist the temptation to restrict 
22These four principal proofs called adillah Sharʾiyyah are accepted as main sources of the 
Islamic law (Sharīʾah). 
23Practitioners of elite and popular religiosity could co-exist amicably. The adherents of the 
popular form could even revere the elite form and recognize its authority, whilst continuing to 
tolerate and practice the popular variant (see also: 6.2.2. Multi-voiced-ness of Religious 
Identity). 
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popular culture to the environment, practices, and resources of everyday life of 
‘ordinary people’ in a society, because we cannot decide who is ‘ordinary’ and who is 
not. We are all part of some popular culture (Lyden, 2015, p. 15). In other words, it 
cannot be claimed that there is a pure popular religion, characterized by the masses, 
which is completely independent of the great Islam, represented by the religious elite. 
What is neglected here is the strict interrelation that exists between great Islam and 
popular Islam. 
Markus Dressler suggests a number of criteria that concepts for the description of 
inner-Islamic difference and plurality should ideally fulfil. In order to avoid theoretical 
and methodological pitfalls, such concepts, in his view, “should not be normative in a 
specific religious or political sense. They should not be intermingled in apologetic 
discourses and not participate in theologico-political rationalizations of power...; 
should not cater to a concept of religion that privileges boundaries over fluidity, and 
static over dynamic, as well as essentializing over historicizing perspectives; should 
be formulated in an inductive rather than deductive manner; should be guided by 
attention to the work that a particular concept is able to accomplish…” (Dressler, 2013, 
p. 270). As Arkoun states, most studies on these subjects are written in accordance
with a vision dominated by doctrinal Islam, or since the birth of new nations, with an
official, ideological standpoint. According to him, much remains to be done to
establish a sociological and anthropological approach (2003, p. 344).
We are certainly not suggesting that the existing conceptualizations of Islam are 
completely wrong or entirely useless: on the contrary, many of these 
conceptualizations are partly correct in important ways. Many of these arguments 
contain valuable and profound insights. 
However, in light of this criticism, our conception of a great and a little tradition 
should differ from the deductive and static approaches mentioned above. Instead, 
inspired by Ahmet (2016), we will argue that the historical phenomenon of Islam is a 
field of meaning in which truth is not formed, ordered, and lived in terms of categories 
constituted by mutual exclusion, but rather in terms of categories of mutual interaction 
(p. 116). Categorically distinguishing between elite and popular, or between great and 
little, seeks first of all to organize and understand phenomena in a sociological sense. 




understood as an interaction between social groups that interpret their practices using 
common formulas (in this case, Sharīʿa).  
Towards an Islamic Religious Market 
The following argument by Turner makes room for an understanding of elite and 
popular religiosity through use of cultural differentiation (such as great, little), and by 
pointing to the emergence of spiritual market places. 
Popular religion is historically not just a vulgarization of the Islamic 
mysticism since elite mysticism and popular religion have always stood side-
by-side oriented to different clientele with different social and religious 
interests. It is more accurate to regard popular and elite religion as a form of 
differentiation and specialization of religious services relevant to different lay 
markets than to treat ‘mass religiosity’ as the contaminated offspring of pure 
religious consciousness (1985, p. 56). 
These different religious markets are for branded religious goods and services 
premised on the differentiation of cultural identities, based on the possession of 
positional goods: things whose value is wholly culturally defined by who owns them 
(Calhoun, Rojek, & Turner, 2005, p. 506). Islamic communities, for example, are 
leading competitors in an Islamic religious market in Europe. They produce, represent, 
and supply a variety of Islamic interpretations to both believers and non-believers. This 
inner diversity allows Muslims to compare and contrast these various Islamic 
institutions as suppliers of various interpretations, fatwa (legal opinions), and socio-
religious services (Yükleyen & White, 2007, p. 36).  
We can then open our eyes to patterns of worship and belief that can be characterized 
as pertaining to the elite religious market and the popular religious market, based on 
the synthesis approach. According to this approach, which is derived from Weber’s 
writings, as we pointed out earlier in this study, ‘popular religiosity’ is constituted by 
specific types of religious praxis and belief exercised by strata that are generally 
socially and economically non-privileged. ‘Elite religiosity’, on the other hand, is 
constituted by specific types of religious praxis and belief that are proclaimed and 
exercised by strata that are generally socially and economically privileged. Based on 
this approach, let us formulate some more precise qualifications. When the present 
study uses the concept of elite religiosity, we do not necessarily mean to refer to 
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religious officials assigned by religious organizations such as muftis or imams, or 
religious leaders of communities such as dervishes, sheikhs or hodjas. Hence, elite 
religiosity is not a subjective notion, but an analytical category as often used by 
psychological and sociological observers of religion. Such a category defines elite 
religiosity as follows: elite religiosity differs from popular religiosity by the emphasis 
placed on the spiritual, internalized, intrinsic, and committed outlooks of ‘ordinary’ 
people. Consequently, when we use the term ‘elite religiosity’, we focus on all ordinary 
individuals who strongly experience the spiritual and elite forms - and motivations - 
of religiosity. In contrast, the term ‘popular religiosity’ refers to all ordinary 
individuals who strongly experience the popular forms - and motivations - of 
religiosity. 
More precisely, ‘elite religiosity’ is understood here as referring to the internalized, 
intrinsic, and committed outlooks that are highlighted by sociologists and 
psychologists of religion in exploring the religious cultural systems that have been 
generally produced by spiritual elites - primarily for their own religious life and 
tradition.24  These traditions are also proclaimed and conveyed to society by means of 
books, sermons, teachings, and even face-to-face relationships.25 These are likely to 
include representations of beliefs, practices, religious knowledge, and religious 
experiences that accord with the norms of the spiritual elites. Consequently, if someone 
from any level of society practices this particular kind of religious beliefs and practices 
in their life, we call them ‘spiritual elite’, because they are motivated by elite forms of 
24The great tradition is not just something that has been agreed upon by scholars, but always 
something that has been agreed upon by specific scholars in a specific place, and at a specific 
time (Eickelman, 1982; 12). Therefore, it would probably be better to speak of various great 
traditions than just the great tradition. 
25 Elite forms of religiosity do not stand isolated in society, but are rather part of an active 
circulation of norms that move through society-at- large. This interaction occurs “by way of 
active projects of circulation, such as the epitomizing of fundamental Sufi philosophical ideas 
in vernacular primers, as well as, and most importantly, the translation, configuration and 
dramatization of these ideas into poetical and narrative fiction, which served as the primary 
medium for their oral circulation” (see: Ahmed, 2016, p. 85). Shahrani mentions a number of 
examples of textual materials by which Islamic elite knowledge becomes local knowledge and 
is acquired by the masses: the Dīvāns of Ḥāfiẓ, Saʿdī, and love epics such as Laylā va Majnūn 
(of Niẓāmī), Yūsuf va Zulaykhā (of Jāmī), Farhad va Shīrīn, as well as books of proverbs 
(ẓarb- ul- misāl), and narrative fiction (afsānah, ḥikāyah, qiṣṣah) (1991, p. 167). 
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religiosity. Therefore, unless specified otherwise, we use the term ‘elite religion or 
religiosity’ in this study to refer to those who experience elite forms of religiosity.  
In this study, ‘popular religiosity’ is understood to refer to the conventional, extrinsic, 
and consensual elements that are highlighted by sociologists and psychologists of 
religion in exploring the religious cultural systems that have been generally produced 
by religious non-elites - for their own religious life. These are likely to include beliefs, 
practices, religious knowledge and religious experiences. 
Popular religiosity may be defined in two ways. First, popular religion as the 
interpretations and adaptations of non-elite religious groups in accordance with their 
local and community concerns. Second, popular religion created by the religious elite 
for religious non-elite in accordance with their local and community concerns, based 
upon the very same religious texts. In the first case, the masses create a culture while 
living their religious lives spontaneously. In the second case, however, the masses are 
inevitably passive. Religious elites make deliberate decisions about the religious life 
of the masses. This is called ‘official religion’ by scholars (Waardenburg, 1978). Non-
elites are inevitably a passive factor in this process. They are dependent on the religious 
elites (here ‘religious elite’ refers to religious officials) for the demarcation of their 
religious lives (Subaşı, 1995). Accordingly, the little tradition can be understood not 
only as the culture most experienced by the masses, but also as the culture made 
available for the masses.26 
The definition of popular religion thus includes, to a certain extent, both the 
meaning of the official religion made available by the religious elite for the religious 
non-elite, and elements that are considered to fall beyond the official religion, which 
are created by the religious non-elite. 
26 It has been said that “Do what the imām says, but do not follow his example.” This sentence 
is usually understood to mean that “imams do not adhere to their own rulings” and refers to 
the misrepresentation of imams in modern Turkey. This semantic shift cannot be rejected as 
falling under the very popular ottoman that indicates that “the mumpsimus is by far the proper 
use of the word” (galat-ı meşhur lügât-i fasihden evlâdır). However, the original intention 
behind this sentence was different. The use of this sentence means that imams must give the 
easiest fatwā (legal ruling) for the solving of community concerns, but that they must follow 
rules that are in accordance with his own spiritual development, and therefore cannot adhere 
to his own fatwā. When ordinary people try to live up to what imams do, it will become 




These conceptual formulations allow us to picture possible divergences between an 
elite Islam which is promoted by the spiritual elite; a normative (or official) Islam 
(sharīʿa) which is allowed or tolerated by the official religious elite (Imāms, Muftīs); 
and a popular Islam which includes all the religious components that are believed in 
by groups which can be generally defined as the religious masses. 
These definitions require the definition of popular Islam in two forms. This 
typology of popular Islam is defined by its proximity to normative religion. These are 
the ‘similar’ or identical, and the contrarian types to normative religion (Arslan, 2008, 
p. 81). According to this definition, popular Islam is made up of beliefs and practices 
that are both allowed and not allowed by the religious elites. In that respect, our 
definition of popular religion embraces, to a certain extent, the definition of normative 
religion.   
3.2.4. Intra-Dimensional Aspects of Islam in the Works of Al-Ghazālī 
The works of Al-Ghazālī’ provide a fertile ground for a variety of motivations, 
cognitive styles and contents of Islamic beliefs and practices, and also form an 
important example to explain intra-dimensional aspects of Islam. Furthermore, we 
believe that Al-Ghazālī’s analysis of individual religiosity shows some striking 
similarities with the analysis of the psychologist Allport. We will try to illustrate these 
below. Al-Ghazālī is also considered to be one of the pioneers of sociology of religion 
in the Muslim world (Akyüz & Çapçıoğlu, 2012). As a theologian and as one of the 
earliest Muslim sociologists of Islam, we will examine Al-Ghazālī’s work in this study 
because of the authority he holds in Islamic history in general, and his enormous 
influence on Turkish religiosity in particular.27  
Al-Ghazālī confined and restricted the scope of several of his books in order to 
reserve them for the elite, and to withhold them from the masses (see Ghazālī, 1996). 
For example, he openly declared that books like al-Maḍnūn bihī Alā Ghayri Ahlihī 
(“The Book to Be Withheld from Those for Whom It Is Not Written”) and al-Maḍnūn 
al-ṣaghīr (“To Be Withheld”) were strictly meant for the elite only (see Ghazālī, 1996). 
And in his other important book entitled Iljām al ʿavāmm an ʿilm al-kalām 
                                                 
27 For more information on Al-Ghazālī’s influence on Turkish history and society, see: 
Arpaguş, (2001). 
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(“Restraining the Ordinary People from the Science of Kalām”) he warned against 
indulgence in the ‘doctrinal absurdities’ of the common people. 
In Jawāhir al-Qur’ān, Al-Ghazālī described some of the cognitive styles of the elite 
(khawāṣṣ) and the masses (ʿawāmm): 
Because their intellect was confined to the study of the shapes of things and their 
imaginative forms, their consideration was not directed to the spirit and the real 
meaning of things, and they did not understand the parallelism (muwāzana) between 
the visible world and the invisible... Neither did they understand anything of the 
spiritual world through experience (dhawq) as becomes possible for the elite 
(khawāṣṣ) through understanding, nor did they believe in the unseen as becomes 
possible for the masses (ʿawāmm) through belief. In this way, their intelligence 
destroyed them (Ghazālī, 1352, p. 37; tr. 63). 
However, the use of the term ‘elite’ in the studies of Al-Ghazālī’ is not homogenous. 
While Al-Ghazālī’s other books, such as Revival of the Religious Sciences (Ihyā’ ʿ ulūm 
ad-dīn, further referred to as “The Revival”) and The Alchemy of Happiness (Kīmyā-
yi Saʿādat), which are very popular in Muslim society, are addressed to ordinary 
people, they still employ the elite (khawāṣṣ) - ordinary people (ʿawāmm) division.28 
Different elements of religious orientation, namely motivation, cognitive style, and 
content pertaining to either elite religion or popular religion stand side by side, pointing 
to different groups of people with different social and religious interests and needs. 
These terms should not only be understood in a sociological sense; they do not 
necessarily correlate with the level of prominence that individuals or groups have in a 
society. It is entirely possible that a king is one of the ʿawāmm, and a simple shepherd 
is one of the khawāṣṣ.  
The method that Al-Ghazālī followed in “The Revival” is to discuss a given matter 
first from the point of view of fiqh (islamic jurisprudence), and then from the point of 
view of Sufism. When, for example, he discusses prayer, Al-Ghazālī first establishes 
why prayer is necessary and what the necessary conditions are for the validity of prayer 
28 All Sufi traditions generally classify the whole of humanity into three ranks: the common 
folk or general mankind (ʿawāmm); the elect or elite (khawāṣṣ); and the super-elect (khawāṣṣ 
al- khawāṣṣ). The ordinary level of religious experience refers to the ʿawāmm while elite 
religious experience refers to the khawāṣṣ. For detailed information about ʿawāmm / khawāṣṣ 
divisions see the following articles: Uludağ (1988), Avam; Uludağ (2014), Havas; Curcānī 
(2014), awāmm; Qashani (1991), khawāṣṣ. 
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in terms of fiqh. Then he goes on to determine the inner dimensions of prayer.29 This 
method is closely linked to the inner aspects of the ritualistic dimension. Al-Ghazālī’s 
criteria to describe intra-dimensional differentiation in the ritualistic dimension are 
closely related to Allport’s components of ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ religiosity and 
Glock and Stark’s characterization of ‘ritual’ and ‘devotion’ (1968, p. 18). For 
example, Allport (1967, 1968) used the private and communal character of ritual to 
measure different motivational aspects of religious practice. Hunt and King (1971) 
labelled this differentiation as ‘associational vs communal’. ‘Associational’ refers to 
searching for deeper values (Allport, 1967), while communal refers to sociocultural 
and communal identification, the need to belong (Allport, 1966), and the need for 
involvement for sociability and status (Allport, 1967). 
Let us inspect how Al-Ghazālī discussed rituals such as fasting (ṣawm) in “The 
Revival”. In the book, he distinguished three levels: the fasting of the common people, 
which means that one abstains on the physical level; the fasting of the elite, which 
means that one abstains from sinful thoughts, speech, etc.; and the fasting of ‘the elite 
of the elite’30, which means that one abstains from thinking about something other than 
God and the Last Day (Ghazālī, 1938, book 6, trans. 1992). Hence, there are two 
(sometimes three) levels of spiritual capacity and attainment, in accordance with which 
29 There are many classical Sufi texts that follow the same line as Al-Ghazālī’s book, such as: 
Al-Qushayrī's (1956) “Epistle on Sufism” (al-risāla al-qushayriyya fiʿilm al-tasawwuf); 
Hujwīrī's (1999 [1911]) “Revelation of the Mystery” (kashf al-mahjūb); Al-Shadilī’s (1938) 
“Illumination in Islamic Mysticism” (qawānin hikam al-Ishrāq); Sarrāj's (1914) Kitāb al-
luma; Suhrawardī's (2001) Awārif-ul-maārif; Al-Ghazālī’s “Alchemy of Happiness” (Kimiya’ 
al-Sa’ādah); Ibn Arabī’s “Revelations of Makkah” (ʿal-Futuḥāt al-Makkīyah) (Revelations of 
Makkah), are some examples.  
30 Al-Ghazālī sometimes used the term ‘elite of the elite’ (khawāṣṣ’ul khawāṣṣ) to refer mainly 
to the philosophical or theological elites and sometimes to the mystical elites.  As explained 
in chapter 2, in this study, when we use the term ‘elite’, we mean the social elite, which is 
connected to the societal level rather than to the individual level. According to the present 
study, ‘elite religiosity’ consists of specific types of religious praxis and belief that are 
proclaimed and exercised by strata generally socially and economically privileged in society. 
Although in this study we do not exclude as elites those who are recognized as exemplifying 
the highest values of the religion, and those who occupy the highest positions of formal 
authority in religious organizations or institutions, we primarily conceptualize elites as those 
in society who adhere to specific kinds of beliefs and practices that are generally laid down by 
the spiritual elites. According to our definition, the elite is not necessarily the intellectual elite 
trained in particular disciplines, such as philosophers, theologians and mystics. This last 




prayer takes on a different level or different aspects. The same twofold (sometimes 
threefold) principle is applied by Al-Ghazālī to all forms of ritual worship, whether it 
be taḥāra (purity) (1938, book 3; trans. 2017c), ṣalāt (prayer) (1938, book 4; trans. 
2017b), zakāt (charity) (1938, book 5; trans. 2017a) or ḥajj (pilgrimage) (1938, book 
7; trans. 1975). 
In that period, the sciences were pursued in an academic fashion that was out of 
touch with the needs of the ordinary people. Al-Ghazālī therefore tried to rescue the 
sciences from this circumstance. What he actually did in the first part of “The Revival” 
is to show that the prescriptions of the Sharīʿa, taken in considerable detail, can be 
made the foundation of a meaningful life (Watt, 1971). Therefore, Sufism is important 
to Al-Ghazālī as a moral force, both for producing moral character and for deepening 
the understanding of the Sharīʿa.31 According to Al-Ghazālī it is sufficient for most 
people to follow the tradition. For those with the need and ability, properly practiced 
Sufism is the way. This involves an esotericism in which there is often a single doctrine 
for the common people, and a plurality of other teachings for the elite.32 Here lies the 
key to his ‘reconciliation’ of Sharīʿa-mindedness and Sufism, and to his integration of 
other aspects of the Islamic tradition that existed in his time. Different things are 
suitable for different people, and if this is recognized the different currents in Islam 
can live in harmony.33 
Characteristic of Al-Ghazālī’s work is that he links the details of the Sharīʿa to the 
insights of the Sufis. In the past, much of the texture of social life was determined by 
                                                 
31 As Berger points out that “Sharīa, or Islamic law, is a term that evokes strong emotions. For 
some scholars, it is a medieval system that imposes a harsh code of conduct, sanctioned by 
draconic punishments. For others, on the other hand, it is a system that encourages goodness 
and justice.” In order to understand both the emotional value and the facts of Sharīa, Berger 
proposes to distinguish three meanings; Sharia as an ideology, Sharia as a legal science and 
Sharia in contemporary times (see Berger, 2006). 
32 It has been said that the Qurʾān has four features: ʿibāra (a literal or clear articulation of the 
meaning of a verse); ishāra (its allegorical allusion); latāʾif (its subtle and symbolic sides) and 
ḥaqāʾiq (its spiritual truths). Each level of meaning accordingly has its own addressees: the 
ordinary believers (al-ʿawāmm), the spiritual elite (al-khawāṣṣ), God’s close friends (al-
awliyāʾ), and the prophets (al-anbiyāʾ). See: Knysh, 2006 and Nasr, 2003. 
33 In his autobiography, al-Munqidh min al Ḍalāl (1980), Al-Ghazali narrates the stages of his 
intellectual and spiritual evolution. His goal is clearly to promote taṣawwuf (the inward 
dimension of Islam), and in fact he has been credited with making Sufism ‘respectable’ in the 
Islamic milieu of his time and beyond.  
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a stabilized Sharīʿa, and once political life became largely determined by an autocratic 
caliph and his court, ordinary people needed to have such a religious aim set out before 
them. Watt indicated that the failure of the official representatives of religious truth in 
these societies was their inability to see this, whereas the fresh insight of the Sufis 
provided precisely for this need (Watt, 1971, p. 164).  
Another prominent feature of Al-Ghazali’s thinking in this respect is the model of 
the complementarity between exoteric (zāhir) and esoteric (bātin) interpretations of 
the Qur’ān and of reality in general. These are different cognitive styles that lead to 
different religious orientations. They are likened to general knowledge of an object vs 
detailed knowledge of an object, in so far as the latter is gained through ‘verification 
and experience’ (tahqīq wa’l-dhawq). General knowledge can be likened to acquiring 
the husk of a grain (qishr) while detailed knowledge can be likened to acquiring the 
germ (lubāb), terms found frequently in Jawāhir al-Qur’ān (Whittingham, 2007, p. 
59). As pointed out below, these two types of knowledge have a lot to do with the 
intellectual dimension of religiosity. The exoteric (zāhir) and esoteric (bātin) 
interpretations are also very significantly related to Allport’s definition of ‘intrinsic’ 
and ‘extrinsic’ religiosity, and the characteristic distinction between elite believers (al-
khawāṣṣ) and ordinary believers (al-ʿawāmm). 
Al-Ghazālī also speaks about two kinds of religious obligations, namely objective 
and subjective obligations. We believe that these concepts are also highly relevant for 
justification of the key concepts of intra-dimensionality, and that they are closely 
linked to Allport’s differentiation of ‘personal vs institutional’ motivations. Objective 
obligations are the rules laid down in relation to the needs of the people (Günay, 2002; 
Okumuş, 2006). Religious law (Sharīʿa) consist of these objective rules. In “The 
Revival”, Al-Ghazālī defines four degrees of observance. The first degree of 
observance refers to objective obligations, which is “(a) simple observance of all that 
issues from the Islamic profession of faith, sc. abstinence from what is clearly 
forbidden (ḥarām)” (1938, book 1, bab 2; trans. 2015). These rules contain 
institutionalized fragments of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) that are strongly related to 
‘institutional’ (Allport, 1950, p. 54), ‘institutionalized’ (Allport, 1954) or ‘external’ 
(Allport, 1954) aspects of religion. 
The subsequent degrees of observance can be categorized as subjective religious 
obligations, or as personal observances in the terminology of Allport. We think that 
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these can be categorized under ‘elite religion’ which emphasizes ‘interiorized’ 
(Allport, 1954, 1960), ‘vital, deeper level’ (Allport, 1967), ‘devout’ and ‘internalized’ 
(Allport, 1967) aspects of religiosity. These are “(b) the scrupulosity of the ṣāliḥūn, 
abstinence from everything which is dubious; (c) that of the muttaqūn, sc. abstention 
from all that is licit in itself but which might lead to what is forbidden; and (d) that of 
the ṣiddīqūn, which is ‘turning away from everything which is other than God through 
fear of wasting an hour of one’s life on things which do not increase one’s nearness to 
God’” (1938, book 1 , bab 2; trans. 2015). 
Criticism of Al-Ghazālī 
The views of Al-Ghazālī’ were criticized by many, including Ibn Rushd (Averroes), 
who wrote a refutation of them called Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, “The Refutation of The 
Refutation” (1930). According to Ibn Rushd, the common people should rely only on 
the explicit, transparent teachings of the Sharīʿa and adhere strictly to the religious 
obligations and duties they impose, as this remains the only way for them to receive 
guidance. The law is twofold: exoteric and esoteric. The duty of the common people 
is to follow exoteric law, while the duty of learned men is to follow esoteric law; 
likewise the duty of the common people is to follow the meaning of the law in the 
literal sense, leaving aside any kind of interpretation (Arnaldez, 1971; Gharipour, 
2012; Rushd, 2001).  
In the Faṣl al-Maqāl, Ibn Rushd commented on the esoteric interpretations of 
Qurʾanic texts and the actions of those who reveal such interpretations to individuals 
who are only ready to grasp the outer meaning of the texts. “Anyone of the interpretive 
class who discloses such (an interpretation) to him invites him to unbelief, and he who 
invites to unbelief is an unbeliever”. Similarly, in the Faṣl al-Maqāl, Ibn Rushd 
accused Al-Ghazālī of revealing philosophical interpretations to those who were not 
equipped to handle them (Rusd & Hourani, 1961, p. 61). In his article, “Ibn Rushd, 
Faṣl al-Maqāl and the Theory of Double Truth”, Terkan states  that one could say that 
Al-Ghazālī introduced a foretaste of the philosophical approach to the public, but that 
this does not make the work philosophical (2006, p. 111). According to us, Al-Ghazālī 
proposed a dynamic rather than a static religious language by thinking in terms of two 
different aspects (objective - subjective) and two different groups of believers, i.e., the 
ordinary believers (al-ʿawāmm) and the spiritual elite (al-khawāṣṣ). Although he did 
not draw ordinary people into doctrinal discussions, he did not limit their interests to 
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the outer meaning of the Sharīʿa either. Despite differences in emphasis and 
presentation, both exoteric and esoteric interpretations are essential, and esoteric 
interpretations complement and build upon exoteric exegesis rather than replacing it 
(Whittingham, 2007). By using concepts such as ‘the secrets of prayer’, ‘the secrets of 
zakāt’ and ‘the secrets of fasting’, Al-Ghazālī indicated the inner meaning of these 
religious notions. But in these works, he did not discuss any philosophical and 
theological subtleties, because they ought to be reserved for the intellectual elites 
(philosophers, theologians). His methodology can be presented as follows:  
Figure 3 - Al-Ghazālī’s methodology 
These conceptualizations that correspond to different motivations and cognitive 
styles which are used by Al-Ghazālī, are usually underestimated by Turkish 
sociologists and psychologists of religion. In our opinion, however, these 
characteristics are crucial for understanding the intra-dimensional aspects of 
religiosity, and consequently, for understanding the nature of religiosity in relation to 
social and economic factors.  
3.3. Dimensions of Religiosity in Islam 
Up to this point, we listed some characteristics of elite and popular religion. However, 
we must not forget that nearly all of the theoretical frameworks that have been 
proposed were developed with Christian believers and manifestations of Christian 
Haqiqah (Inner Truth that 
can only be grasped by 







religious experience in mind. The exact content and meaning of these dimensions 
should not be understood as a set of unchanging essences; instead, religiosity and 
spirituality should be discovered, described and analysed in specific contexts 
(Karamustafa, 2007, p. vii). Any attempt to measure such concepts requires that the 
concept be specified in measurable terms. Such an ‘operational definition’ is 
particularly important when applied to religiosity and spirituality, since, as we have 
seen in earlier sections, there are considerable differences in the way elite and popular 
religiosity are conceptualized. In this section of our study we will arrive at a relevant 
operational definition of elite and popular religiosity, by taking Muslim religious 
experience into account.  
This study will utilize the religiosity scale developed by Glock and Stark. However, 
it is important to stress that Glock and Stark’s scale does not wholly apply to the 
distinctive religious elements of the Islamic worldview. Their model does not reflect 
certain poles of distinctive religious elements, such as: the different categories of 
knowledge that comprise this religious worldview, e.g., worldly and other-worldly 
dimensions of knowledge; the extrinsic and intrinsic motives of Islamic religiosity; 
and neither does it accommodate other polarities, such as dynamism versus stability, 
critical versus uncritical, differentiated versus undifferentiated. We also try to address 
the inability of Turkish sociologists to elaborate the sociological aspect of religion in 
relation to these theoretical aspects. Consequently, in order to make meaningful 
distinctions within the five dimensions, the present study focuses on the intra-
dimensional aspects of the five dimensions and proposes to use Allport’s conceptual 
schemes in particular, which have been used in previous studies to distinguish different 
motivational and cognitive elements within religious orientation. In sum, our study 
develops an elite and popular religiosity scale in relation to these various 
conceptualizations which have been proposed by psychologists and sociologists. 
This conceptual orientation suggests two poles within each of the 5 components of 
Glock and Stark’s model. These are: 5 components of elite religiosity, and 5 
components of popular religiosity. 
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These are: 
elite beliefs popular beliefs 
elite ritual  popular ritual 
elite experiences  popular experiences 
elite knowledge  popular knowledge 
elite consequences popular consequences 
In what follows, I outline the content of these components of religious commitment 
as applied to the Islamic religious experience. 
Field research into the Dutch-Turkish Muslim community in the Netherlands 
provides the examples in our analysis of elite and popular religion. The emphasis here 
is on the motivations and cognitive styles of elite religiosity and popular religiosity. 
The following section presents various characteristics that, in our opinion, describe 
elite and popular religiosity. These characteristics are presented in the light of 
extensive readings of Islamic sources and observation of Muslim religious experience 
- in Turkey and in the Netherlands in particular, specifically in relation to Allport’s
two-dimensional scale.
Some Characteristics of Elite and Popular Religion in Islam 
This section proposes an understanding of elite and popular religious orientation that 
includes diverse motivations, cognitive styles, and contents, and which is based on an 
examination of the Dutch-Turkish Muslim context.  
The first source of inspiration for our conceptualization can therefore be found in 
religious behaviour ‘on the ground’ - that is, in the experience of ordinary people. I 
will make use of data resulting from field research carried out by adopting the roles of 
‘complete participant’ and ‘participant-as-observer’. 
A second source of inspiration can be found in the Qur’ān and other religious texts. 
These include works by scholars, mystics and jurists who directly or indirectly 
influence Turkish Islam and function as important seeds of Turkish religiosity. I refer 
to these texts in order to show in what way and in what context religion has been 
theorized and prescribed. In other words, in terms of religious market theory (see 
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2.2.2) our focus will be on the question in which ways and in which contexts religiosity 
is produced and consumed. Instead of taking sides in theological disputes, I have 
sought inspiration in sociological models - such as Weber’s interpretive sociology - to 
understand the meaning of religious action. We are concerned with identifying patterns 
of behaviour, not with determining the correctness of beliefs.  
This approach makes it impossible and undesirable to comment on the validity (i.e., 
truth or error) of the Turkish religious experience under study. As pointed out earlier, 
this study accepts, on the basis of a Durkheimian approach, that religion responds to 
the specific social, intellectual and material conditions of a community, and that 
therefore no manifestation of religion should be seen as fake or false (Durkheim, 2001, 
p. 4).
3.3.1. The Ideological Dimension (faith - īmān) 
Within the ideological dimension, at least two forms of religious belief seem to be 
manifesting. Spiritual elites (khawāṣṣ) tend to emphasize verification (taḥqīq) of 
beliefs, which includes doubt (irtiyāb) and questioning (tafakkur) (Kasapoğlu, 2005; 
Kayıklık, 2005). Cognitive needs theories explain this type of religious commitment 
to a large extent. The cognitive problems that can be met by religion are a pressing 
matter in the life of this kind of believer. Intellectual problems like ‘How did the world 
begin?’, ‘What is the purpose of life?’, etc., to which science or common sense does 
not immediately provide an obvious answer, are important to this believer (Argyle, 
1975; Batson, 2004). The cognitive styles of spiritual elites include complexity, 
reflectiveness, and the questioning of beliefs and belief systems. Practitioners of this 
type of religiosity are called investigators (muḥaqqiq). In contrast, people who 
experience popular religiosity (ʿawāmm) tend to emphasize imitation (taqlīd)34, 
through trust in tradition (Özervarlı, 2014). This profile is highly relevant in 
34 The validity of this type of Islamic faith has been widely discussed in Islamic theology. In 
general, the imitation (taqlīd) of someone considered to be a higher religious authority (such 
as a qualified scholar or ālim) is deemed acceptable in the area of the details of the religious 
law (Sharīʿa), e.g., such as in matters of worship and personal affairs, but not in the area of 
the fundamentals of ‘metaphysical’ belief, e.g. such as regarding the belief in the existence of 
God (Allah). For more information on taqlid, see: Calder, 2000. 
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connection with Allport’s descriptions of reflective and uncritical religiosity (see Table 
2). 
Those who experience popular religiosity, experience fewer doubts than the 
spiritual elites, because they have no feelings of uncertainty about believing that 
something is true (or false), and they do not doubt themselves. They see no other option 
than to believe that something is true or false (Rosenthal, 2007, p. 304). They also 
believe ‘doubt’ to be wrong (Madge, Hemming & Stenson, 2014, p. 74). This type of 
believer, also called ‘imitator’ (muqallid) sometimes, is chiefly motivated by social 
learning (Yücedoğru, 2005). From this perspective, children often acquire the same 
beliefs as their parents, especially if they like them and continue to live at home. The 
same holds for attitudes towards political issues and regarding other matters. Religious 
attitudes and beliefs are modified by membership of educational and other social 
groups (Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 1975). For the ‘investigator’ type, on the other hand, 
social learning plays an effective rather than a determining role. Thus, it can be said 
that elite religiosity stimulates the reflective and dynamic processes of faith 
development, while popular religion stimulates adherents to acquire uncritical and 
stable stereotypical beliefs. 
3.3.2. The Ritualistic Dimension (ʿamal) 
These popular (ʿawāmm) and elite (khawāṣṣ) types of commitment suggest a 
distinction between aspects of quantity and quality within the ritualistic dimension. 
While spiritual elites emphasize the intrinsic value of the ritual (i.e., its quality), such 
as the secrets (meanings) of prayer and secrets of fasting, popular believers emphasize 
the extrinsic value of the ritual (i.e., its quantity), which can also be seen as an 
expression of a calculating attitude. 
Popular religious behaviour is the place where ‘magic’ and religion meet. For 
example, the ritual of reciting a certain number of prayers (duā) and formulas for a 
specific time, including verses from the Qurʾān, is considered by practitioners of 
religion and magic as an important resource for curing diseases (O’Connor, 2006; 
Kırbaşoğlu, 2002). Use of amulets (muska) in the belief that they possess beneficial 
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magical qualities35 (Çelebi, 2014; Dessing, 2001; Hamès, 2007) and the use of  prayer 
beads (similar to the rosary in Catholic Christianity) to count the number of repetitions 
of formulas to glorify God (for example, by repeating the Arabic sentence ‘Subḥān 
Allāh’, often translated as ‘Glorious is God’), are forms of popular religious 
behaviour.36 
The other aspect of the ritualistic dimension is the motivation behind the 
performance of rituals. Spiritual elites engage in (or refrain from) religious practices 
largely without direct material expectations. This is referred to in the Islamic tradition 
as ʿubudiyyāt (Bilmen, 2007; Çağrıcı, 2014; Kaşani, 2004; Pazarlı, 1980; Uludağ, 
2014a). In this case, the practices are not instrumentalized. Such motivations can be 
explained by a framework of obedience and glorification (Scarlett, 2006; Scarlett & 
Perriello, 1991). An example of this is the following statement by Said Nursi about 
elite motivations behind worship. He says, “Worship is not the introduction to 
additional rewards, but the result of previous bounties” (2008, p. 369). Those who 
experience popular religiosity engage in (or refrain from) religious practices to obtain 
material rewards in heaven such as ‘gardens’, ‘rivers’, ‘drink’, ‘water’, ‘wine’, etc. 
This is generally referred to as ʿibādat, which can also be regarded as a calculating 
attitude (Bilmen, 2007, p. 83; Çağrıcı, 1989, p. 78; Kınalızâde, 1974, p. 8; Nesefi, 
2009, p. 233). No doubt these material motivations are considered authentic and valid 
in most interpretations of Islam.  
This profile is also highly relevant in connection with Allport’s descriptions of 
intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity (see Table 2). For example, those who experience 
elite religiosity engage in their practices as an end in itself (Allport, 1954, p. 66) 
(Allport, 1959, pp. 60, 66, 67), while those who experience popular religiosity engage 
in their practices as a means to an end (Allport, 1954; 1959, pp. 60, 66, 67; 1966, 
1967). Rational choice theories explain these popular types of religious behaviour to a 
large extent. This approach, proposed by Rodney Stark, assumes that people are goal-
driven, and that when choosing a path to a desired goal, they weigh up the costs they 
35 During the history of Islam, amulets did not only appeal to the common people. Some 
religious scholars sought the help of these methods as well (see Anadol, 1991, pp. 54-81, 97-
104, 116-125, 189-190). 
36 Today, the classic rosary (tasbiha) has been traded in for a digital type of rosary (called zikir 
matik in Turkish), which is much easier to use.  
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have to pay to achieve it. Such costs might include restrictions on dress, diet, ability to 
associate with others, etc. They will even make a rational assessment of the costs and 
benefits of martyrdom. With the help of a set of rational ‘propositions’, Stark and 
Bainbridge seek to explain many seemingly irrational religious beliefs and behaviours 
by showing their roots in cost-benefit calculations (Stark & Bainbridge, 1989). 
Another aspect of the ritualistic dimension are the public and private motivations 
for doing rituals. Popular religiosity is more publicly motivated, deliberately 
occurring, formalized and socialized, while elite religiosity is more privately 
motivated, spontaneously occurring, and exists independently of formal institutions 
(Young & Koopsen, 2010, p. 91). This is also related to Allport’s differentiation 
between associational and communal (see Table 2). For example, people who 
experience elite religiosity will look for the deeper values behind religious practices 
(cf. Allport, 1967), while people who experience popular religiosity will look for 
communal, sociocultural identification, based on their need to belong (cf. Allport, 
1966). 
In conclusion, it can be said that elite religiosity provides intrinsic, ultimate and 
personal motivations for doing rituals, while popular religiosity provides its adherents 
with extrinsic, instrumental and institutional motivations for doing rituals. 
3.3.3. The Intellectual Dimension (ʿilm / maʿrifah) 
The intellectual dimension can also be divided into two main cognitive components: 
esoteric religious knowledge (bātin) (Uludağ, 1996, 2014c) and exoteric religious 
knowledge (zāhir).37 Spiritual elites tend to be knowledgeable both about the literal, 
37 The term ‘esoteric’ has a very specific meaning in the Islamic tradition. The Qurʾān, as well 
as other fundamental religious texts, emphasize the difference between what is ‘apparent’ and 
‘outward’ (zāhir) and what is ‘hidden’ and ‘inward’ (bātin). Zāhir is everything that is 
immediately apparent in our perceptions and thoughts (an empirical phenomenon, the meaning 
of a text), the presence of which cannot be doubted.  Bātin is what is not expressed outwardly 
(feelings for instance), what is hidden in natural phenomena, or concealed in speech. However, 
the ‘hidden’ is no less real than the ‘apparent’. The very etymology of these terms is significant 
in this respect. Zāhir refers to zahr, the back, while bātin refers to batn, the belly. The image 
is clear: what immediately manifests itself in human life is actually only the backside of reality; 
the less interesting part of it. The ‘belly’ of reality, the organism that gives life to it, is hidden 
from perception and common sense. This opposition between apparent and hidden can be 
applied to the whole universe. It reflects the structure of God’s manifestation in his creation: 
“He is the First and the Last, the Outward (al-Zāhir) and the Inward (al-Bātin)”. (See: Lory, 
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outward (zāhir) and metaphorical, inward meanings (bātin) of sacred scriptures and 
the historical roots of their faith. Practitioners of popular religion, on the other hand, 
are more inclined to engage with the outward and formal truth (zāhir) of their religion 
(Bar-Asher, 2002; Ghazālī, 1993; Sarrāj & Nicholson, 1914, p. 14; Uludağ, 2014b). 
The other aspect of this dimension is the perception (tasawwur) on the nature of 
knowledge. Spiritual elites tend to build up their religious knowledge through critical 
investigation. They are never entirely sure of the accuracy of their knowledge. For 
them, the questioning and criticising of knowledge is something crucial.38 According 
to this perception on knowledge, knowledge is a process of ‘obtaining’ (d-r-k, ḥ-ṣ-l), 
‘comprehending’ (f-h-m), and thus of enabling individuals to change their thoughts in 
the process of time. Another perception on knowledge is ‘knowledge as belief’. 
According to this approach, the practitioner of popular religion will hold that 
knowledge is believing a thing (to be) as it is, and this constitutes certainty (tayaqqun) 
as well as the removal of any doubts about the nature of the thing in question. This 
state of knowledge is constituted by definitive and firm (thābit) belief that conforms 
to reality (al-muṭābiq li-l-wâqī) (Rosenthal, 2007, pp. 63-65). An unchanging and 
static worldview and a total absence of the idea of development are characteristic for 
this popular acquisition of knowledge (Watt, 1988, pp. 3-8).39 Moreover, people who 
experience popular religiosity tend to acquire their religious knowledge orally through 
their parents, family elders and especially in a quick fashion through the internet40 and 
TV. Criticism of this kind of knowledge acquisition is unusual in this type of 
religiosity. This type of oral knowledge transmission shows similarities with the 
process through which prejudice is transferred. Preconceived views are often based on 
hearsay rather than on direct evidence, and are resistant to change, even in the face of 
new information (Çelebi, 1980 p. 74; Giddens, 2006, p. 490).  
2010, p. 49) The opposition between zāhir and bātin has been masterfully explained in the 
works of Henry Corbin (2014), especially in A History of Islamic Philosophy. For a concise 
summary of his thoughts, see Cheetham, The World Turned Inside Out, chapter 4 (Cheetham, 
2003). 
38 For information on attitudes towards doubt, see the following books: Rosenthal, 2007; 
Treiger, 2012. 
39 For Watt, these features of the Islamic worldview and the accompanying self-image form  
the basis of Islamic fundamentalism (see Watt, 1988). 
40In this context, Google became the most prominent sheikh for those who experience popular 




In conclusion, it can be said that elite religiosity is constituted by esoteric and 
differentiated religious knowledge, while popular religiosity is constituted by exoteric 
and undifferentiated religious knowledge. 
3.3.4. The Experiential Dimension (ilhām - maʿūnat) 
Religious experiences at the societal level are called maʿūnat (Curcānī, 2014; 
Özervarlı, 1997; Uludağ, 2014g). In this context we mean any religious experience 
that an individual interprets as contact with a transcendent reality, an encounter or 
union with the divine. Spiritual elites (khawāṣṣ) and practitioners of popular religiosity 
(ʿawāmm) are likely to differ on two aspects of the experiential dimension, while both 
categories of believers indeed have religious experiences. One aspect of this dimension 
is experiential desirability. Practitioners of popular religiosity are more likely to see 
religious experiences as appropriate and necessary elements of religious commitment. 
Spiritual elites, on the other hand, may regard mystic or miraculous experience as 
superfluous (Konuk, 2012, p. 133). Sufis, for example, often teach that spiritual elites 
should not pursue, or even actively distrust, this gift of mystical experience, and that 
becoming attached to it creates a serious obstacle on the road to union with God 
(Gardet, 1997; Uludağ, 2014f, 2014h, 2014d). 
The other aspect of this dimension concerns the expression of private religious 
experiences (such as telling someone that you had a private dream about the prophet). 
Those who experience popular religiosity are more inclined to report that they ever 
had such experiences (Uludağ, 2014g). The spiritual elite is more inclined to keep 
silent about this. Likewise, for the Sufis, such notions as “protection of the secret” (ḥifẓ 
al-sirr) or “hiding the real nature of the particular interior state” (ikhfāʾ al-ḥāl) describe 
practices and disciplines which are particularly valued (Amir-Moezzi & Ali, 2004). 
3.3.5. The Consequential Dimension (natījah) 
The consequential dimension is interpreted here as the effects of religious belief, 
practice, experience, and knowledge on the daily lives of individuals. Stark and Glock 
(1968) noted that the consequential dimension consists of the secular effects of the 
other four dimensions. It is not, therefore, a completely independent dimension. 
Rather, this is a dimension that is strongly dependent on the other four dimensions.  
118 
Scholars distinguish two types of consequences that religious commitment can have 
(Ardelt, 2003; Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; Barrett, 2010; Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle, 
1997; Nelson, 2009). In general, it has been said that, for those who experience popular 
religiosity, religion could have numerous positive aspects that are useful in various 
ways: providing security and solace, sociability and distraction, status and self-
determination (Allport & Ross, 1967). At the same time, popular forms of religiosity 
have been found to be related to racial and ethnic prejudice and a host of other socially 
divisive characteristics. In contrast, elite forms of religiosity have been found to be 
unrelated or negatively related to intolerance and racial and ethnic prejudice, and to be 
positively related to a wide variety of socially integrative characteristics (see section 
6.2.4 for the elaboration of this aspect of religiosity). 
In order to measure these various non-religious characteristics, several attitude 
scales have been formulated in this study (see Appendix one: Table 39). These are: 
(Hostile) attitudes towards other religions (Christianity) 
(Subordinate) attitudes towards women 
(Prejudiced) attitudes towards race 
(Hostile) attitudes towards others  
(Harmonious) attitudes towards modernism 
(Conservative) in-group attitudes 
3.3.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, some structural characteristics of a new scale of Muslim religiosity 
have been presented, ranging from popular religiosity on one end of the continuum to 
elite religiosity on the other. These two extremes reflect the classification of the sub-
dimensions, which include belief (īmān), practice (ʿamal), knowledge (ʿilm/maʿrifah), 
experience (maʿūnat/ilhām) and consequences (natījah). Under these sub-dimensions, 
we have identified several motivational and cognitive characteristics and contents, 
which according to us distinguish elite religiosity from popular religiosity. These 
characteristics are: dynamism versus stability, critical versus uncritical, without 
material expectations versus with material expectations, differentiated versus 
undifferentiated, experiential inessentiality and privacy versus experiential desirability 
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and shareability, tolerant versus intolerant, unprejudiced versus prejudiced. 
Definitions and measuring instruments are not correct or incorrect, but only more or 
less suitable for a specific purpose (King & Hunt, 1972, p. 5). These are ideal types, 
that this list of dichotomies refers to (theoretical) extremes, and that this is a tool to 
represent the reality of people’s (expression) of religiosity – which is always more 
diversified and complex – by locating it on an (artificial) scale. 
In the next chapter, chapter 4 of this study, we will explain the general lines of our 
research methodology. In this chapter, we will discuss our measuring instruments in 
detail which merely have been introduced here. Then, in chapter 5, we will try to show 
to what extent the concept of elite and popular religiosity reflects the empirical sphere 
of religious expressions.   
Table 4 indicates how these general characteristics of these two forms of religiosity 
- as they are listed above - can be represented. Characteristics in brackets show the
relevant connection to Allport’s components (see: Table 2).
Table 4 - Components of elite and popular religiosity 
D Characteristics of ER Sample Item 
Characteristics 









My recent religious beliefs and 




A major factor in my religious 
development has been the 
importance of religion for my 
parents. 
Doubt 
I think that there are many more 
things in my faith that I have not 
perceived yet. 
Sureness, uncritical I completely understand what it means to be a believer (Mu’min). 
Dynamism 
(Differentiated) 
My religious beliefs are not the 




My religious beliefs are pretty much 













My reason to pray is to be 
rewarded in heaven and to be 





The purpose of prayer is to secure a 
happy and peaceful life. 





When I pray, I mostly try to 
understand the meaning of 
chapters and prayers. 





When I recall my experiences with 
religion I most readily remember the 











If I experience the presence of 
the Divine (i.e., guidance of God 
or Prophet) I prefer to keep it to 
myself. 
Tendency to share 
private religious 
experience 
I think that it is important to tell 
about special gifts from God, i.e., 
peace, mercy, or prosperity, to 




I feel upset if I am not receiving 
any special divine gifts from God 
in exchange for prayers. (R) 
Experiential 
desirability is central 
It is essential for religious spiritual 











For me, doubting the validity of 
my current religious knowledge 
is an important part of what it 
means to be religious. 
Certainty of current 
religious knowledge 
I completely understand what Allah 
wants by requesting the profession 




My religious knowledge provides 
me with satisfying answers at this 
stage of my development, but I 
am prepared to readjust them as 
new information becomes 
available. 
Closedness to change 
(Unreflective) 
If I find answers to my religious 
questions through imams, I never 
doubt their correctness. 







For the identification of a theoretical framework and for the analysis of the data, this 
study takes the general principles of a structural-functionalist approach into 
consideration, which is one of the dominant paradigms of social theory. As the name 
suggests, structural functionalists are interested in the ‘functional’ analysis of social 
structures. In other words, they are interested in analysing the consequences of certain 
social structures for other social structures, as well as in analysing the consequences 
of such structures for the wider  society (Ritzer, 2007). 
In this model, religion has reciprocal relations with other elements of the social 
structure, and therefore a change in the structural elements of society will be reflected 
in that society’s religion and religious phenomena, or vice versa, a change in the 
position of religion may cause certain changes in that society. According to this 
approach, religion has functions in every social layer of a society and corresponds with 
various social functions and roles within these different layers (Cunningham, 1999, p. 
42). 
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In addition, this study uses Weber’s interpretive sociology to gain an understanding 
of the meaning of the religious action of Muslims in a changing context. Such an 
interpretation of meaning is essential for the compilation of a social phenomenology. 
This approach therefore prevents us from hastily making generalizations. We also 
fundamentally avoid commenting on the truth or falsehood of the Turkish religious 
experience under investigation. This is a general principle of the scientific study of 
religion, rooted in Durkheim’s thesis that religion is likely to transform in parallel with 
changes in society (2001, p. 326). In various parts of his book The Elementary Forms 
of Religious Life, Durkheim discusses that religion responds to the specific social and 
intellectual circumstances of a community, and makes the point that, correspondingly, 
no manifestation of religion should be seen as fake or false (2001, p. 4). This is 
important to keep in mind, as the majority of empirical social scientific research into 
religion is vulnerable to criticism regarding hidden normativity in the construction of 
measuring instruments. 
In line with these general principles in the study of religion, we seek to capture the 
role of elite and popular religiosity in the lives of Dutch-Turkish Muslims. So, by 
adhering to these approaches, I will try to reconstruct Weber’s conception of ‘elite and 
popular religion’ by considering Muslim religious experience.  
This study is designed on the basis of deductive reasoning, which tends to move 
from the general to the specific. The validity of deductions depends on the validity of 
a premise or premises (prior statements, findings or conditions). In the theoretical 
chapter, we therefore began with a study of the concepts of high and popular culture 
in relation to the societal foundation of socio-cultural differentiation and religiosity. 
We then examined interpretations of elite and popular religiosity and of their general 
characteristics in the scientific study of religion. Finally, we discussed how these 
concepts can be understood in the case of Muslim societies, by considering Turkish 
Muslim religious experience and its foundations in authoritative theological Muslim 
texts.  
The design of our study is characterized by a ‘mixed-methods’ approach, which 
fuses quantitative and qualitative methods into a single research project. Within a four-
year period (2010 - 2013), the project started with qualitative research, so that the 
results of this qualitative research could inform aspects of the quantitative approach. 
The qualitative data collection included participant observation, informal interviews 
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and specially designed questionnaires. The application of the questionnaire started in 
November 2012 and lasted until April 2013. Although filling in the questionnaires took 
5 months of research, my extensive fieldwork lasted at least 4 years. 
Based on the theoretical framework and the participant observation processes, 
several hypotheses were developed. Factor analysis was then applied to measure 
whether elite and popular religiosity and their sub-components had reached statistical 
significance. In accordance with this, the categories of elite and popular religiosity in 
this study have been based not only on theoretical foundations, but also on statistical 
foundations. Data collected from the fieldwork were tested against the hypothesis 
developed in this study, and compared to the theoretical framework, in order to reach 
solid conclusions.  
In the following part, I will present the research questions, the research design, the 
methodology and the data collection process. 
4.2. Objectives, Research questions and Hypothesis 
I now present the objectives of my study, my research questions and my hypothesis 
regarding the subject matters of this research.  
4.2.1. Objective 
To contribute to the body of knowledge about the characteristics of elite and popular 
religiosity among Dutch-Turkish Muslims who live in the Dutch plural society. 
4.2.2. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
RQ1: What forms and motivations characterize elite and popular religiosity, what 
are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity, and how 
does this relate to the socio-economic status of Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in 
the Netherlands? 
It is necessary to explore the following sub-questions in order to be in a position to 
answer our main research question:  
RQ1a: How can the relationship between religion and culture be characterized, and 
how do we understand popular and elite religiosity in our research setting? 
(Chapter 2, ‘Theoretical Background’) 
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RQ1b: What are the characteristics of elite and popular religiosity in the context of 
Turkish - and possibly also Dutch - society, and how do these characteristics relate 
to the socio-economic status of (Dutch-) Turkish Muslims? (Chapter 3, 
‘Theoretical and Socio-psychological Foundations’) 
The exploration of these two sub-questions is described in chapters 2 and 3. As a 
result of our literature review, we have added additional research questions in order to 
achieve an even more articulated response to our main research question. 
The following sub-questions and hypothesis were explored by way of a survey, and 
by means of an analysis of the data collected: 
RQ1c: What are the characteristics of elite and popular religiosity among Dutch-
Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands? (Chapter 5)  
RQ1d: What are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular 
religiosity? 
H1: Elite and popular forms of religiosity are negatively correlated with each 
another. 
RQ1e: How are elite and popular religiosity recognizable in the Dutch-Turkish 
research population, and how is this phenomenon socially located? (Chapters 5 - 
6) 
H2: Turkish Muslim minorities living in the Netherlands predominantly 
experience popular religiosity.  
H3: First-generation respondents experience popular religiosity to a larger 
degree than second-generation respondents. 
H4: High level of elite religiosity significantly increases with education. High 
level of popular religiosity significantly decreases with education. 
H5: High level of elite religiosity significantly increases with economic status. 
High level of popular religiosity significantly decreases with economic status. 
In our research, we have formulated a number of expectations with regard to these 
research questions. Because of the exploratory nature of our research, we explicitly 
describe them as expectations rather than hypotheses. These are: 
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E1: The experience level of popular religiosity is higher among Muslim women 
than among Muslim men. 
E2: Respondents who are middle-aged (36-55) or older (56 and above) experience 
popular religiosity to a larger degree than young respondents (18-35). 
E3: Respondents who identify themselves as ‘more religious than most’ 
predominantly experience popular religiosity. 
E4: Respondents who state that they acquire much of their religious knowledge 
through television programmes, experience a high level of popular religiosity. 
E5: Respondents who state that they acquire much of their religious knowledge 
through their family experience a high level of popular religiosity. 
In light of our literature review, we expect a relationship between socio-
psychological attitudes and religiosity, and for this reason we formulate the following 
secondary research question and hypotheses: 
RQ2: What are the socio-psychological differences in behaviour and attitudes 
among Dutch-Turkish Muslims who experience elite and popular religiosity, 
respectively? 
H6: Respondents motivated by elite religiosity are more open to interaction 
with Christians than respondents motivated by popular religiosity. 
H7: Men motivated by popular religiosity tend to have more negative 
attitudes towards women and more traditional ideas about gender, than men 
motivated by elite religiosity. 
H8: Respondents motivated by popular religiosity have a more prejudiced 
attitude towards other nations than respondents motivated by elite religiosity. 
H9: Respondents motivated by popular religiosity have a more hostile attitude 
towards others41 than respondents motivated by elite religiosity. 
H10: Respondents motivated by elite religiosity feel more comfortable with 
modernity than respondents motivated by popular religiosity. 
41 “Others” was conceptualised as any person other than the respondent. See items 87, 88, 89 
in Table 39 in the Appendices, which were designed to test this hypothesis. 
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H11: Respondents motivated by elite religiosity exhibit less conservative in-
group42 attitudes than respondents motivated by popular religiosity. 
The hypotheses and expectations listed above will be tested statistically in the next 
chapter. I now turn to the clarification of the design of the questionnaire. 
4.3. Design and Procedure of the Research: Mixed Methods Approach 
The mixed-methods approach has become a very popular methodological approach in 
a variety of disciplines and fields, particularly in the social and behavioural sciences 
(Teddlie, & Tashakkori (2003). A basic premise of mixed-methods approaches is that 
the use of both quantitative and qualitative approaches can emphasise the strengths 
and diminish the weaknesses of these single approaches within a study (Andrew & 
Halcomb, 2006). A commonly used definition of the mixed-methods approach states 
that: 
Mixed methods research is a research design with philosophical assumptions as well 
as methods of inquiry. As a methodology, it involves philosophical assumptions that 
guide the direction of the collection and analysis of data and the mixture of 
qualitative and quantitative data in a single study or series of studies. Its central 
premise is that the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches in combination 
provides a better understanding of research problems than either approach alone 
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007, p. 5). 
Several reasons have been adduced to support the use of a mixed-methods 
approach. For example, Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003) claim that a mixed-methods 
design offers the opportunity to present a greater diversity of views. Given the complex 
nature of the issues explored within our cross-cultural context, a mixed-methods 
approach was chosen since it would allow a deeper penetration into issues when 
language and communication barriers might hamper the research process. As defined 
by Greene et al (1989), we use the rationale of  complementarity for using a mixed-
methods approach. This rationale allows us to explore distinct aspects of a religious 
phenomenon. We believe that a mixed-methods approach draws upon the strengths of 
quantitative approaches (i.e., large sample size, prediction, and generalizability) and 
qualitative approaches (i.e., description, depth, and contextual findings), while 
minimizing the weaknesses inherent in single-method paradigms. The data drawn from 
42 Here, ‘in-group’ means a group to which a person belongs, and which is felt to be an integral 
part of his/her personal identity. 
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the qualitative interviews can, we claim, elaborate, enhance, and ultimately even help 
explain the correlations demonstrated in the quantitative study. This means that the 
methods are complementary and, when mixed, produce a more comprehensive picture 
than one of the two methods could provide on its own. 
Scholars have identified various possible forms of mixed-methods design and have 
even devised a classification based on a basic typology in the field of evaluation 
(Greene et al., 1989). In this study, we have based our method on the first and second 
types. (1) complementarity seeks to use the results of one method to elaborate on the 
results of another method; (2) development seeks to use the results of one method to 
help develop or inform another method.43 This design is the sequential exploratory 
design in which the collection of qualitative data is followed by a second stage of 
quantitative data collection (see Figure 1). This design is typically used to develop 
quantitative instruments when the variables are not known (Swanson & Holton, 2005, 
p. 320). In the following section we will provide more detailed information on how the
qualitative side of this study was informed by the development of the quantitative part.
4.3.1. Qualitative Data Collection: Participant Observation 
The use of a mixed-methods design resulted in an approach that initially included 
qualitative instruments and strategies.  In the introductory chapter, I discussed the 
insider position that I took on for this part of the research, and the possible advantages 
and disadvantages of this positionality. Here I will continue to outline the ways in 
which I collected qualitative data.  
One problem that I faced during field work was the problem of hindrances to the 
observation of Muslim women, being a male participant observer. Other male scholars 
who conducted research in Muslim communities have reported similar difficulties, 
because the female sphere is often separated from the male sphere. This makes it 
difficult to participate in events for Muslim women and to gather information on the 
use of concepts by insiders and the meanings attributed to the practices. In order to 
collect the necessary data relevant to women’s lives, I received the support of my wife 
who took on the role of a female assistant, willing to act as observer and take notes in 
the field. She carefully gathered observations in the field and we compared and 
43 For a brief sketch of the other two types, see section 1.7. ‘Methodology of the Thesis’. 
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discussed our observations on a regular basis. These discussions were very useful for 
setting up the theoretical framework of this study, and for developing hypotheses and 
items during the development of the research questionnaire. Simultaneously, her work 
in the field provided an important contribution to the interpretation that will be 
presented in the discussion section, in which the research results will be evaluated. 
During the research phase, we took on several volunteer tasks in various Turkish 
organizations and institutions, such as SEVA (Sociaal Educatief Kunst- en 
Volksacademie) and Diyanet. These volunteer tasks made it possible for us to collect 
data while we were working in the community. In general, we were expected to teach 
the basic values of Turkish culture, and the concepts of Islamic faith. By taking on this 
teaching role, we were able to meet parents and have fruitful discussions about cultural 
and religious issues, and their expectations of these institutions.  
One of the volunteer tasks I took on in 2012 concerned Qurʾān weekend schools in 
Ahi Evran, one of the four Diyanet mosques in The Hague. The ages of the students 
who took part in the Qurʾān classes ranged from 13 to 18. There was no fixed time in 
the year to organize Qurʾān lessons, which caused the educational level of the students 
to vary considerably. There was no school class system and children of different ages 
sat together in a single room. The instruction during the lessons consisted first and 
foremost in the memorization of the Arabic alphabet using elifbâ cüzü, followed by 
reading qur’anic sections of Amme cüzü, i.e., from Surah 78 to the end of the Qurʾān. 
These were the popular Diyanet teaching tools. The main goal of these lessons was to 
teach the pupils to read the Qurʾān aloud fluently in Arabic, and to instruct them in the 
memorization of short sections of the Qurʾān, without pondering on the meaning of 
the passages (ayah) or sections (surah). Thus, the focus of attention was on the exoteric 
knowledge of Islam. When I questioned this method and the curriculum, wanting to 
concentrate more on the meaning of the verses, both the administrators and the parents 
of the students responded negatively. The administrators feared that the institution 
would lose students. And many of the parent’s main expectations revolved around 
teaching the children to memorize the surahs as soon as possible, and instructing them 
in reading the Qurʾān fluently in Arabic. So, I didn’t have much time to teach the 
meaning of the Qurʾān, and the intrinsic side of religious practices.  
In addition, the books we read in that short period were books on ablution (i.e., 
books that instruct students on how to perform the requirements for prayer such as the 
132 
ghusl [the full-body ritual purification] and the wudu [washing parts of the body]). 
This literature was therefore mainly focused on the legal (fıqh) aspects of praying. 
Many of these publications were produced by the Dutch Islamic Foundation 
(Islamitische Stichting Nederland; this is the Dutch branch of Diyanet), clearly with a 
view to children growing up in Turkey. It was almost impossible to find a Dutch source 
that was more relevant to the pupils in our class and that would point them towards the 
spirit of Islam.  
In addition to these classes, my wife and I conducted weekly conversations with 
members of the Turkish community. During these conversations we spoke with Dutch-
Turkish Muslims about the problems of Muslim communities in the Netherlands. The 
most important questions during these meetings were how a Muslim community can 
practise its religion and culture and make a contribution to Dutch society. These 
conversations provided valuable insights that were used in the course of the research 
to improve the elite and popular religiosity scale and to analyse the Turkish Muslim 
society in the Netherlands. 
A relevant illustration concerns the weekly meetings I had with young people (18-
25 years old) at SEVA (Social-Educational Art and Folk Academy, The Hague) in 
2011. These meetings lasted almost a year. The majority of these young people had no 
basic religious knowledge. Their expectations and most of their questions revolved 
around the general rules of worship. Similar attitudes were observed by my wife in the 
women’s meetings. In the month of Ramadan, Muslim men and women aspire to read 
the complete Qurʾān (a practice called hatim indirmek). The month of Ramadan 
consists of 30 days and during this period a qāri (reader of the Quran) reads 20 pages 
of the Qurʾān aloud every day, with the audience following the reader. My wife guided 
one of these Qurʾān readings for women. At the very least, she wanted to expand on 
the lectures by offering an explanation of the literal meaning of the passages, whereas 
usually these lectures consisted only of reading the Qurʾān aloud in Arabic. The 
reading of the Arabic already took 45 minutes, while it took at least half an hour to 
sketch the literal meaning of what had been read. Although the majority of women 
were opposed to this novel approach, my assistant (my spouse) insisted that this 
teaching method be tested. After a few days, many of the women began to excuse 
themselves and left immediately after the Arabic reading. Those who left were mostly 
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older women, and usually housewives. However, many of the younger women stayed 
on to attend the lessons.  
I had regular discussions with my wife, in her role as a female assistant, on how the 
women’s meetings were going. When we grouped the questions asked by the men and 
women, we could see that they were all particularly interested in the material and 
extrinsic aspects of religiosity. The themes related to popular religiosity were therefore 
dominant, both among the men and women. These observations were incorporated in 
the questionnaire with the following item: 
54. When I pray, I mostly try to understand the meaning of chapters and prayers.
(In this example, ‘Agree’ or ‘Completely agree’ would represent elite religiosity).
One of the important topics that came up during the women’s meetings was the 
sharing and expressing of religious experiences. Most women felt free to tell others 
about divine signs they had seen in their dreams. This was also true for the men. It was 
completely acceptable that someone would publicly say that he had seen the prophet 
Muḥammad in his dream, and that the prophet had pointed out something to him. In 
spiritual forms of the Islamic tradition, it has often been claimed that such religious 
experiences are private and should be concealed. Although some were aware of this 
tradition and tried to keep such religious experiences hidden, many frequently referred 
to their religious experiences in order to explain the reasons for their actions. Inspired 
by these observations, we tried to measure this aspect of religiosity by formulating 
items 59, 62, 63 relating to elite and popular Islamic religious experience: 
59. If I experience the presence of the Divine (i.e., guidance of God or the
Prophet) I prefer to keep it to myself.
62. I think that it is important to tell about special gifts from God (i.e., peace,
mercy, or prosperity) to family or friends.
63. If I feel the guidance of the Prophet in my dreams I prefer to share it with my
family or friends.
One of the most significant religious experiences we had was a 3-week ʿ umrah visit 
with a group of Dutch-Turkish Muslims in early 2013. This gave us the opportunity to 
collect information as a ‘complete participant’. The ʿumrah visit is like a rehearsal for 
the ḥajj, one of the five pillars of Islam.44 Many of the rituals performed during ʿ umrah 
44 In the terminology of Islam, ʿumrah means a visit to the Kaʿbah. It differs from hajj in two 
respects. In the first place, ḥajj can only be performed at a fixed time, whereas ʿumrah may be 
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are exactly the same as those for the ḥajj. On this journey, a female research assistant 
accompanied the women while I accompanied the men. Because we were both 
competent in Islamic studies, the ʿumrah visitors regularly asked us questions and 
shared their experiences with us. During this visit we had the opportunity to observe 
some differences between private (individual) and communal worship. These 
observations were also incorporated in the questionnaire with the following items 52, 
56, 58:  
52. It is more important to me to spend periods of time in public religious ritual
than in private religious thought and meditation.
56. The prayers I say when I am alone don’t carry the same meaning and personal
emotion as the prayers I say during services.
58. When I recall my experiences with religion I most readily remember the
impressive formal rites and rituals (circumambulation of the Kaʿbah – ṣalāt al-
ʽīd).
Furthermore, I tried to attend Friday prayers and sermons in different mosques as 
much as possible, observing the practices of the communities during this prayer. When 
I attended a public meeting, I noted how many people were present, with an estimate 
of age and gender distribution, etc. When listening to the khutbah (Friday sermon) in 
the mosques, I noted down which verses were referred to and which issues were 
addressed.  
In this way, we had many opportunities to observe various forms and motives that 
are characteristic of elite and popular religiosity, and to establish how such religiosity 
relates to the socio-economic status of Dutch-Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands. 
These observations were very useful for determining the theoretical framework of this 
study, and for developing hypotheses such as ‘Turkish Muslim minorities living in the 
Netherlands predominantly experience popular religiosity’ and ‘first-generation 
respondents experience popular religiosity to a larger degree than second-generation 
respondents’. These observations were equally useful for formulating many items 
included in the research questionnaire, and they simultaneously provided important 
contributions to the interpretation that will be presented in the discussion section. 
carried out at any time. Secondly, going to ʿarafāt and gathering there is omitted in the case 
of ʿumrah, while it is an essential part of ḥajj. 
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4.3.2. Quantitative Data Collection: Questionnaires 
Data were collected in two ways: by means of a paper survey and by means of a 
modern web-based approach 
4.3.2.1. Paper-based Survey 
Paper-based surveys have been the traditional method of gathering responses for many 
decades. In recent years, this method has given way to web-based approaches. 
However, for people without access to information technology, paper continues to be 
the most feasible alternative, as paper surveys require little to no special technological 
skill and can be completed by hand. For this reason, we used paper-based surveys 
mainly to reach older respondents who had less familiarity with the Internet.  500 
questionnaires were distributed, mainly at three locations (Amsterdam, Rotterdam and 
The Hague), of which 435 were returned. The questionnaires were distributed in 
various Turkish Islamic centres, mosques, Islamic schools, Islamic organizations and 
secular societies such as coffeehouses, sports clubs, and a number of other cultural 
organizations. A few were also given to friends and acquaintances. Some of the 
collected forms were not included in the statistical analysis because only a few 
questions had been answered. The quantitative analysis therefore comprises 388 
questionnaires, of which 219 were filled in by male respondents and 169 by female 
respondents. 40 percent of the statistical data was collected through the paper-based 
survey, compared to 60 percent through the online survey (see Appendix three: Paper-
based questionnaire).  
4.3.2.2. Internet-Mediated Research (IMR) 
Since 2011, web 2.0 systems are clearly becoming dominant. Examples include Survey 
Monkey, Google Docs, Survey Tool and Free Online Surveys. These are similar in 
that they all provide users with the ability to create, send, and analyse online survey 
results on-demand. These online software packages offer the possibility to quickly 
create a questionnaire and gather data, to present the results in a graphical format, and 
to easily import the data into a statistical analysis package. Moreover, researchers can 
create a variety of question types including multiple choice, Likert scale, short answers 
and open responses (Cheruvallil & Shakkour, 2015; Knezek & Christensen, 2013).  
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Early studies yielded promising results, indicating that the quality of IMR data was 
at least comparable to that of data collected offline. Such research also showed that 
IMR samples are in many ways more diverse than traditional offline samples (see 
Arnett, 2008). Other recent studies have reached parallel conclusions. For example, 
Hewson and Charlton (2005) managed the Multidimensional Health Locus of Control 
(MHLC) Scale (Wallston & Wallston, 1981), both in web-based and pen-and-paper 
modes; the internet data was found to be at least as good as the offline data, taking into 
account scale reliabilities and factor structures. Other studies have provided similar 
support for IMR questionnaires (e.g. Brock, Barry & Lawrence, 2012) and 
experiments (e.g. Linnman, Carlbring & Ahman, 2006). Only a few studies have 
reported a lack of equivalence (e.g. Barbeite & Weiss, 2004), and in these cases it is 
often uncertain whether the online or offline data is superior. 
In this study, the larger part of the data (60 %) was collected using one of these 
modern web-based approaches, Google Docs (see Appendix four: Web-based 
questionnaire). The survey designed with Google Docs was embedded in an email and 
sent to addresses randomly collected from social networks such as Facebook, LinkedIn 
and Twitter. Some websites that are mainly used by Turkish citizens embedded the 
survey link in their forum page at our request.45 We also sent thousands of messages 
to the collected Facebook addresses on a random basis. Facebook offers the possibility 
to send sixty messages per day. I used my own and my wife’s Facebook account for 
three months, so I sent about a hundred messages per day. I asked respondents to share 
the survey link with their environment as well.  
In addition, some Facebook groups with hundreds of members shared the survey 
link at our request. For example, the Europe Islamic University of Applied Sciences46 
shared our survey link on the main page of their website, allowing us to reach nearly 
5000 members simultaneously. At the end of that day, we received more than fifty 
newly filled-in questionnaires. It is also worth mentioning that the questionnaire was 




46 The website of the Europe Islamic University of Applied Sciences can be found via this 
link: https://eiu-edu.nl/ 
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4.3.2.3. Problems Encountered 
One of the problems we encountered with regard to the quantitative data collection 
was the language of the questionnaire. Initially, the questionnaire was meant to be 
designed in two languages: Turkish and Dutch. The reason for this was that some 
second-generation Muslims understand Dutch better than Turkish. Prior to the 
finalization of the questionnaires, a pilot study was carried out with an early version 
of the questionnaire. Forty respondents participated in this pilot to determine whether 
the questions were well understood. Twenty-two respondents completed the 
questionnaire in Turkish and eighteen in Dutch. The data from the pilot study proved 
to be inconsistent. In other words, when translated to Dutch, it effectively became a 
different questionnaire which yielded very different results, thus making it inoperable. 
The pilot also showed that the questionnaire contained too many questions and that 
completing it took more time than expected. Therefore, some questions had to be 
replaced by more relevant ones. 
After discussing this problematic issue, we decided not to use a questionnaire in 
two separate languages. Instead, we designed a semi-translated questionnaire to solve 
the problem. Turkish was chosen as the main language and Dutch was made the 
secondary language. In addition, during the course of the pilot study, respondents were 
encouraged to communicate their views on the clarity and relevance of the items. In 
light of conversations with respondents, some questions were modified or rephrased 
to give respondents a better understanding of the questions. I tried to make the Turkish 
wording as plain and as a clear as possible. Moreover, I added some explanations in 
Dutch. Some words and phrases were also translated in Dutch (in parentheses). For 
example: 
7. Medeni Haliniz? (Burgerlijke staat?): Hiç evlenmemiş (nooit getrouwd), Evli
(getrouwd), Boşanmış (gescheiden), Nişanlı (verloofd), Evli değilim Birlikte
yaşıyorum samenwonend).47
Regarding experiential dimension: 
27. Mucizevi (wonderbaarlijk) olaylarla karşılaşma.48
In order to make the questionnaire shorter because of the time efficiency issue, I 
had to exclude two scales related to the consequential dimension. These scales 
47 In English: 7. Marital status? : never married, married, divorced, engaged, cohabiting. 




measured the respondent’s attitudes towards Turkish people and Dutch people. As a 
result, the number of items was reduced from 133 to 99. Following these changes, we 
carried out a second pilot to evaluate the reliability of the new questionnaire. The data 
coming from this pilot showed that the new, semi-translated questionnaire became 
operable.   
4.4. Quantitative Research Instruments 
Measuring instruments were developed by operationalisation of the concepts we 
identified in our study of elite and popular religiosity (see previous chapters). 
Theoretical concepts cannot be applied directly to empirical reality and must therefore 
be operationalised, i.e., converted into empirical items and variables (Van der Ven, 
1993, 2005). For this study, specific measuring instruments were built by considering 
previous studies in the field. The items were generally selected from previous studies. 
Compatibility with previously published scales of religious orientation was a criterion 
guiding item selection. Items were translated from English to Turkish and partly to 
Dutch. These were then checked49 for equivalence of meaning and subsequently 
transformed to adapt the measuring instrument to our research context and conceptual 
framework.  
In this section, we discuss our measuring instruments according to four groups: (1) 
population characteristics (1), general religiosity (2), elite and popular religiosity (3) 
and measurements for the consequential dimension (4). We indicate the sources of 
these instruments and refer to the appendices at the end of this dissertation, where these 
sources can be consulted in detail. 
4.4.1. Demographic Inquiry 
The first section of the questionnaire contains 12 items that relate to population 
characteristics: gender, age, educational level, income, residence, language and group 
affiliations.  
                                                 
49 I am very grateful to Ahmet Kaya and Muslim Aydın (who is an official translator from 
Turkish to Dutch) for helping me with this conversion. Ahmet Kaya is currently a PhD Student 





4.4.2. General Religiosity Scale (GRS) 
The second part of the questionnaire was designed to provide information under the 
five dimensions of religion as conceptualized by Glock (1962). These are the 
ideological, ritualistic, experiential, intellectual, and consequential dimensions. These 
concepts are considered horizontal dimensions because they indicate inter-
dimensional aspects of religiosity (Hökelekli, 2005). The scale used for this part of the 
questionnaire does not address the intra-dimensional aspects of the five dimensions, 
as is customary in most studies that have been completed on Christianity (Cardwell, 
1971; Clayton, 1968; Faulkner, 1969; Lehman, 1968) and Islam (Altınlı, 2011; Atalay, 
2005; Ayten, 2009; Kafalı, 2005; Köktaş, 1993; Serajzadeh, 1998; Şahin, 2001; 
Yapıcı, 2004; Yıldız, 2006). In other words, it does not measure the difference between 
elite and popular religiosity, but between high and low religiosity. This general 
religiosity scale (GRS) was developed using older versions of Glock’s scale (1962). 
The result of this part of the survey was used, first of all, to exclude respondents who 
experience low level religiosity, because they are unable to assist us in our search for 
the forms and motives of different aspects of high religiosity. Clearly, elite and popular 
forms, as well as elite and popular motives, are all manifestations of a strong religious 
affiliation. Therefore, it is pointless for our analysis to include respondents who score 
low on religious affiliation. For example, with the elite and popular religiosity scale 
we want to measure motives that lie behind certain religious practices. If the 
respondents are not performing any religious rituals then it would be pointless to ask 
them about the motivation lying behind them. Likewise, with the elite and popular 
religiosity scale we want to measure certain forms of religious experience. If the 
respondents are not reporting any forms of religious experience in the experiential 
dimension, such as experiences of angels or guiding spirits for instance, then it would 
be meaningless to measure the form of their religious experience. Secondly, using this 
adapted older version of Glock and Stark’s scale gives us the opportunity to evaluate 
whether it is a sufficient tool to understand complex characteristics of the religiosity 
of individuals. In this way, there are possibilities to make some comparisons between 
the conclusions drawn about Turkish religiosity based on the application of our newly 
developed elite and popular religiosity scale, and the conclusions drawn based on the 
continued use of the older version of Glock and Stark’s scale in Turkish sociology of 
religion, without taking into account intra-dimensional aspects of variables. 
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I refer to this part of the questionnaire as the general religiosity scale (GRS). Sample 
items are: 
14. ‘The Oneness of God’ in the ideological dimension.
19. ‘Observance of the five daily prayers’ in the ritualistic dimension.
25. ‘Experience of angels or guiding spirits’ in the experiential dimension.
33. ‘Which of the following rules is not one of the pillars of faith (īmān)?’ in the
intellectual dimension.
38. ‘Religion is something I have never personally felt compelled to consider’ in
the consequential dimension.
Scoring of the GRS 
This scale consists of 25 items. The respondents were asked to answer on 5-point 
Likert scales and multiple-choice scales. 
With regard to the ideological dimension, respondents were asked about their 
degree of faith. 1 referred to ‘non-believing’ and 5 referred to ‘very believing’. 
With regard to the ritualistic dimension, respondents were asked about the 
frequency of their prayers. 1 referred to ‘never’ and 5 referred to ‘very often’. 
With regard to the experiential dimension, respondents were asked about their 
experience level of certain religious experiences. 1 referred to ‘never’ and 5 referred 
to ‘very often’. 
With regard to the intellectual dimension, respondents were asked to fill in a 
multiple-choice scale consisting of 5 questions. Among the various options was the 
correct answer. 1 referred to ‘incorrect answer’ and 5 referred to ‘correct answer’ 
(other answers were ‘not sure’ and ‘no idea’, recoded as 1). 
Finally, with regard to the consequential dimension, respondents were asked to 
mark the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with several statements in order to 
measure the degree of influence of religion on their daily lives. In these questions, 1 
referred to ‘minimum impact’ and 5 referred to ‘maximum impact’. 
The method used to distinguish between participants with high and low experiences 
of religiosity was as follows: to divide the variable into two categories - an upper and 
a lower half - we used the median of its frequency distribution. The lower half 
represents low religiosity and the upper half represents high religiosity. 
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4.4.3. The Elite and Popular Religiosity Scales (E&PRS) 
The third part of the questionnaire are the Elite and Popular Religiosity Scales 
(E&PRS), which were specially developed with a view to surveying Turkish Muslim 
communities in this study. This section sets the present study apart from most others. 
These scales were designed to highlight the intra-dimensional aspects of various 
variables: not the difference between high and low religiosity, but the difference 
between elite and popular religiosity. One of the reasons for using the general 
religiosity scale, as explained above, was to identify respondents who experience high 
religiosity and to eliminate respondents who experience low religiosity from our 
analysis. Since the Elite and Popular Religiosity Scales were designed to measure the 
forms and motives of religious belief, practices, experiences and knowledge, they can 
only be relevantly applied to respondents with high religiosity. In other words, these 
scales, given their characteristics, can only function if a certain degree of religiosity is 
experienced.  
Our initial method, consisting of participant observation and literature study, was 
generally useful for the design of this new questionnaire, to the extent that it enabled 
us to obtain a quantitative picture of Muslim religiosity and its sociological 
manifestations. We discuss the two scales separately. In chapter 3 some explanation 
has already been given about the development of these elite and popular religiosity 
scales. The following table presents the proposed characteristics of elite and popular 
religiosity determined on the basis of participant observation and literature review.  
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Scoring of E&PRS 
The Elite and Popular Religiosity Scale contains two separate scales designed to 
measure two distinct religious orientations: 11 items aim to measure elite religiosity, 
while another 11 aims to measure popular religiosity. The respondents were asked to 
answer on a 5-point Likert scale (5 referred to ‘strongly agree’; 1 to ‘strongly disagree’; 
and 3 to ‘no idea’). 3 items were worded reversely, 3 items negatively, and 16 
positively. The purpose of wording items positively, negatively and reversely within 
the same scale is to avoid an acquiescence, affirmation, or agreement bias. These 
interchangeable terms refer to a respondent’s tendency to agree with items regardless 
of their content (DeVellis, 2016). Reversely worded items were reversely scored 
before the measurements on the full scale and the two subscales were computed.   
Another scoring issue related to validity concerns how - and whether - individuals 
should be assigned religious orientation type labels, based on their elite religiosity and 
popular religiosity scores. In order to make meaningful distinctions, this study 
temporarily excluded individuals who tended towards agreement on both scales - both 
the elite and popular religiosity scales - and those who tended towards disagreement 
Table 5 - Characteristics of elite and popular religiosity 
Components 
Characteristics of Elite (Spiritual)
Religiosity 
Characteristics of Popular 
Religiosity 
Ideological 
Reflective and dynamic process
of faith 
Uncritical and stable 
stereotypical beliefs 
Ritualistic 
Intrinsic, ultimate and personal 
motivations for performance of 
rituals 
Extrinsic, instrumental and 
institutional characteristics 
of rituals 







Experiential desirability and 
shareability 
Consequential Tolerant and unprejudiced Intolerant and prejudiced 
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on both scales. So, this study generally took those individuals into account who tended 
towards agreement on only one of the scales (Elite or Popular). However, the groups 
that showed agreement, respectively disagreement, on both scales cannot be ignored 
if we are to understand the complex interrelationships between elite and popular 
religiosity, and they will therefore be addressed in the discussion section (see 6.2.2. 
Multi-voiced-ness of Religious Identity). 
4.4.4. Scales to Measure the Consequential Dimension 
The consequential dimension is conceptualized here as the impact of religious belief, 
practice, experience, and knowledge on the daily lives of individuals. The 
consequential dimension was designed to cover a wide range of life issues, including 
gender issues, sectarian issues, and attitudes towards modernity and Christianity. This 
study benefited from previous studies developed for the surveying of Christian 
believers. For this research project, these previously developed scales were translated 
into Turkish and then adapted for Muslim religious experience. Attitudes towards other 
religions (i.e., Christianity) were measured by means of a set of 5 items, selected from 
Seyfarth et al. (1984). The instrument measuring attitudes towards women contained 
4 items, selected from Postovoit (1990). Attitudes towards race were measured by 
means of 4 items, and were investigated using the inventory developed by Hadlock 
(1988), Jackson (1994) and Massey (1998). The instrument measuring attitudes 
towards others contained 3 items, selected from Wichern (1984). Attitudes towards 
modernity were measured by means of 3 items, and in-group attitudes by means of 4 
items, in both cases using McCullough & Worthington (1995). 
The following table presents these tools and their reliability results: 
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Scoring of the Consequential Dimension 
These tools consist of 23 items. The respondents were asked to answer on a 5-point 
Likert scale (5 referred to ‘completely agree’ and 1 to ‘completely disagree’). 8 items 
were phased negatively and 15 were phased positively. Positively phased items were 
scored as 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 and negatively phased items were reversely scored as 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5.  
4.4.5. General Overview 
In summary, the E&PRS was not designed to distinguish between individuals high in 
religiosity and individuals low in religiosity. Our concept of elite and popular religion 
provides a very different construct. The elite and popular religiosity scale is primarily 
designed to distinguish different ways of being religious among those who, by some 
other criteria, may be described as religious. Or, to put it in another way, this scale is 
intended to distinguish between the different characteristics of those who are, in one 
sense or another, religious. 
Based on our qualitative observation, adherents of both types of religiosity (elite 
and popular) show a strong religious commitment. The different types of religious 
Table 6 - Reliability analysis (attitude scales) 
Attitude Scales Reliability Items n Selected from 
Attitudes towards other 
religions (Christianity) 
α = .87 5 893 Attitudes Towards EvangelismScale (Seyfarth et al., 1984) 
Attitudes towards women α = .71 4 893 Attitudes Towards ChristianWomen Scale (Postovoit, 1990) 
Attitudes towards race α = .77 4 893 
Religious Status Inventory  
(Hadlock, 1988; Jackson, 1994; 
Massey, 1998) 
Attitudes towards others α = .76 3 893 Spiritual Leadership QualitiesInventory (Wichern, 1984) 
Attitudes towards modernity α = .86 3 893 
Religious Values Scale 
(McCullough & Worthington, 
1995) 
In-group attitudes α = .81 4 561 
Religious Values Scale 
(McCullough & Worthington, 
1995) 
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belief, rituals, experience, knowledge and consequences may occur due to the variety 
in socio-economic and cultural differentiation. Elite and popular religion could be seen 
as a form of differentiation and specialization of religious services relevant to different 
lay markets. However, based on our previous observations in the field, we expect to 
find more than two types of attitudes towards religious beliefs. In addition to distinctly 
elite and popular attitudes, an ambivalent attitude is obviously possible. This would 
mean: experiencing elite religiosity on one dimension and popular religiosity on 
another dimension. There could be another important aspect that needs to be further 
explored. This is the simultaneity of elite and popular religiosity, which means that the 
two types of religiosity are experienced at the same time.  
All these scales therefore try to measure the following categories of religiosity: 





















4.5. Reliability Analysis 
The GRS, the E&PRS, and the scales for measuring the consequential dimension 
appear to be sufficiently reliable for research purposes. 
Two-week test-retest reliabilities show that internal consistencies for the GRS are 
excellent (α = .96). Internal consistencies for the ERS are invariably lower, with 
Cronbach’s alphas most typically in the middle (α = .74) Internal consistencies for the 
PRS are invariably higher, with Cronbach’s alphas most typically in the low (α = .81) 
(N = 40).   
Internal consistency estimates of reliability were calculated by using a sample of 
more than 1165 Dutch- Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands. The coefficient 
alphas for the General Religiosity Scale (GRS) equal (α = .94) (n of items 25) (N = 
1165). The coefficient alphas for the Elite Religiosity Scale (ERS) equal (α = .77) (n 
of items = 14) (N = 893). An item analysis indicated that three items were not 
performing well within the measurement (i.e., were decreasing the overall alpha 
coefficient). After exclusion of these three items (numbers 40, 55, and 66), Cronbach’s 
Table 7 - Reliability analysis - (religiosity scales) 
Religiosity Scale Reliability Items n Based on 
General Religiosity 
Scale (GRS) 
α = .94 25 1165 Glock and Stark (1969) 
Elite Religiosity Scale 
(ERS) 
α = .82 11 893 
Age Universal I5-E Scale (Gorsuch & 
Venable, 1983); Committed 
Consensual Measures (Spilka & Allen, 
1967); Quest Scale (Batson & Ventis, 
1982); Religious Orientation Scale 
(Allport & Ross, 1967) 
Popular Religiosity 
Scale (PRS) 
α = .84 11 893 
Age Universal I-E Scale (Gorsuch & 
Venable, 1983); Committed 
Consensual Measures (Spilka & Allen, 
1967); Quest Scale (Batson & Ventis, 
1982); Religious Orientation Scale 
(Allport & Ross, 1967) 
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alpha increased to level (α = .82) (n of items = 11). The coefficient alphas for the 
Popular Religiosity Scale (PRS) equal (α = .79) (n of items = 14) (N = 893). An item 
analysis indicated that three items were not performing well within the measurement. 
After exclusion of these three items (numbers 39, 43, and 68), Cronbach’s alpha 
increased to level (α = .84) (n of items = 11). 
4.6. Method of Data Analysis 
The data from the completed questionnaires were entered and analysed in the program 
SPSS 23.0 (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences). A variety of statistical research 
techniques were utilized in the estimation of the data. The primary statistical methods 
were tabulation of frequencies and percentages, and computation of mean, median, 
standard deviation and range. The findings of the General Religiosity Scale were 
presented based on these basic techniques. 
In addition, we performed the following types of analysis: factor analysis, an 
analysis of Variance = ANOVA, correlation analysis, and T tests. Factor analysis 
(more properly called exploratory factor analysis) is concerned with whether the 
covariances or correlations between a set of observed variables can be explained in 
terms of a smaller number of unobservable constructs, known as latent variables or 
common factors. ‘Explanation’ here means that the correlation between each pair of 
measured (manifest) variables arises because of their mutual association with the 
common factors (Çokluk, Şekercioğlu & Büyüköztürk, 2010; Landau & Everitt, 2004). 
Factor analysis was performed on the General Religiosity Scale (GRS), the Elite 
Religiosity Scale (ERS), the Popular Religiosity Scale (PRS), and the scales for the 
consequential dimension. We always started with a free factor solution (Eigenvalue ≥ 
1.00) and moved on to a forced factor solution for statistical reasons if the 
interpretability of the outcome of the free factor solution required this. For admission 
to a factor an item had to meet the following criteria: factor loading ≥ .30; the item 
clearly had to belong to one factor, the criterion being a factor loading of ≥ .15 
compared to its loading on other factors. The factor analyses are included in an 
appendix to this study, but the factor loadings between –.30 and .30 are not shown in 
the table (see: Appendix one: Factor Analysis). Once the number of factors had been 
determined, we needed to label them. The choice of label concerns the indicator 
variables; i.e., the variables within the factor that have the highest loadings. The 
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common features of variables loading onto that factor, which are based on the personal 
judgement of this study’s researcher, were also taken into account. The method of 
identification was based on the perceived interpretability and meaningfulness of the 
factors. Factor analyses were used to explore the following subquestions, which are 
part of our first research question, ‘RQ1c: What are the characteristics of elite and 
popular religiosity among Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands?’ and 
‘RQ1d: What are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular 
religiosity?’. 
The correlations between elite and popular religiosity, ‘RQ1d: What are the patterns 
in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity?’, and the social location of 
both types of religiosity, ‘RQ1e: How are elite and popular religiosity recognizable in 
the Dutch-Turkish research population, and how is this phenomenon socially located?’ 
were investigated by calculating the Pearson’s correlation coefficient and by means of 
variance analysis (ANOVA). These are research topics that range under our first 
research question. Pearson correlation is used to measure the strength of the linear 
relationship between two variables. The value of the correlation provides information 
both about the nature and the strength of the relationship. Pearson correlation ranges 
between -1.0 and 1.0. The closer the value of the correlation is to 1, the stronger the 
relationship between the two variables. A one-way ANOVA, on the other hand, is the 
analysis of the variance of values (of a dependent variable) by comparing them against 
another set of values (the independent variable). It is a test of the hypothesis that the 
mean of the tested variable is equal to that of the factor (Griffith, 2010, p. 234).  
An independent samples t-test, also called a between-subjects t-test, is used when a 
researcher wants to determine if the mean value on a given target variable for one 
group differs from the mean value on the target variable for a different group. A 
significant t-test specifies that the two groups have different means. An independent 
samples t-test was used to test our second research question ‘RQ2: What are the socio-
psychological differences in behaviour and attitudes among Dutch-Turkish Muslims 
who experience elite and popular religiosity, respectively?’, for the comparison of 




5. Data Analysis and Findings
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In this chapter, I first present the demographic characteristics of the sample as drawn 
from the 2013 Census information, and secondly the results of an analysis of the data 
from the general religiosity scale. This part of the study enables us to exclude 
respondents with a low religious affiliation from the follow-up analysis. Thirdly, 
during most of my thesis, in order to answer the research questions, I focus on 
respondents who have strong religious affiliations in the context of elite and popular 
religiosity. It is here that the main research question is addressed: ‘What forms and 
motivations characterize elite and popular religiosity, what are the patterns in the 
relationship between elite and popular religiosity, and how does this relate to the socio-
economic status of Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands?’ Finally, by 
posing the second research question ‘What are the socio-psychological differences in 
behaviour and attitudes among Dutch-Turkish Muslims who experience elite and 
popular religiosity respectively’, I will present the attitudes of those motivated by elite 
and popular religiosity. 
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5.1. A Profile of the Demographic Characteristics of the Sample Surveyed in 
the Netherlands 
Table 8 - Demographic variables 1 
Variables n % 
1 - Gender 
Male 649 55,7 
Female 516 44,3 
2 - Age Group 
Between 18 - 25 368 31,6 
Between 26 - 35 355 30,4 
Between 36 - 45 209 17,9 
Between 46 - 55 132 11,4 
56 and older 101 8,7 
3 - Marital Status 
Single 398 34,2 
Married 654 56,1 
Widowed 38 3,3 
Divorced 68 5,8 
Living together with partner 7 0,6 
4 - Yearly Income 
Below € 10,000 75 6,4 
Between € 10,000 - €30,000 510 43,0 
Between € 30,000 - € 60,000 432 37,1 
Between € 60,000 - € 100,000 117 10 
Above € 100,000 31 2,7 
5 - Residence 
Amsterdam 293 25,2 
Den Haag 367 31,5 
Rotterdam 257 22,1 
Other 248 21,3 





This part of the study provides a comparison between the Dutch-Turkish (Muslim) 
sample and the 2013 Census information. Most comparisons with the Census data are 
taken from the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (‘Statistics Netherlands’, CBS).50 
Table 8 shows information regarding gender, age groups, marital status, yearly 
income and residence. 
There were 649 male and 516 female participants. The participants ranged in age 
between 18 - 68 years. There were 368 (31,6 %) participants between 18-25 years, 354 
(30,4 %) between 26-35 years, 209 (17,9 %) between 36-45 years, 133 (11,4 %) 
between 46-55 years, and 101 participants (8,7 %) older than 56 years. The majority 
of participants were married or remarried: 656 (56,3 %). 395 (33,9 %) participants 
were single, 39 (3,3 %) were widowed, 68 (9,2 %) were divorced, and only 7 (0,6 %) 
were living with a partner. The estimated annual income was fairly represented among 
the participants: 75 (6,4 %) had an annual income below €10.000; 510 (43,8 %) 
between €10.000 - €30,000; 432 (37,1 %) between €30.000 - €60.000; 117 (10,0 %) 
between €60.000 - €100.000; and 31 (2,7 %) had an annual income over €100.000. 
The largest group of participants lived in Den Haag: 367 (31,5 %). 293 (25,2 %) 
participants lived in Amsterdam and 257 (22,1 %) in Rotterdam. The remaining 248 
(21,3 %) participants lived in other locations. 
517 (44,3 %) of the participants belonged to the second generation and were over 
18 years old. 648 (55,7 %) of the participants belonged to the first generation.51 
907 (77,9 %) of the participants obtained their highest level of education in the 
Netherlands, while 258 (22,1 %) obtained their highest level of education in Turkey. 
Graduates from the Netherlands were distributed as follows: for 19 participants (1,6 
%) the highest educational level was primary education, for 186 participants (16,0 %) 
secondary education, for 541 participants (46,4 %) undergraduate education, and 161 
                                                 
50 http://www.cbs.nl 
51To determine if a person is first or second generation, Statistics Netherlands looks whether 
the individual was born in the Netherlands (second generation) or abroad (first generation). 
For a comparison with the census data concerning generations, see the following article: 
FORUM, 2011. In addition, see the article: “Turkish Population by Generation”, CBS, 2018. 
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participants (13,8 %) completed postgraduate education.52 Graduates from Turkey 
were distributed as follows: for 103 participants (8,8 %) the highest educational level 
was primary education, for 103 participants (8,8 %) secondary education, for 51 
participants (4,3 %) undergraduate education, and only 1 participant (0,09 %) 
completed postgraduate education.53 
When compared to the 2013 Census data, it can be said that the sample of Dutch-
Turkish citizens is in most respects very similar to the general Dutch population. There 
are no major differences with the demographic profiles of the sample as determined 
for the general population of the Netherlands on the basis of the census.54 In summary, 
the participants varied in age from 18 to 68 years. The majority of the participants were 
married or remarried. The estimated annual income was fairly represented among the 
participants. There is a clear educational gap between the first and second-generation 
Muslims: while the first generation received little education, the second generation is 
gradually entering higher education.  
52Groups distributed taking into account the following definition of the Dutch education 
system: 
http://www.cbs.nl/en-GB/menu/methoden/toelichtingen/alfabet/l/level+of+education+1.htm 




54See also the following article: Alders, 2001. 
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Table 9 - Demographic variables 2 
Additional Tendencies 
The eighth item of the questionnaire was the question ‘What do you think about 
returning to Turkey?’. Of the participants, 198 (17,0 %) answered ‘I hope (or plan) to 
Variables n % 
6 - When did you come to the Netherlands? 
Second (or Third) Generation 
Born in the Netherlands 
First Generation 
517 44,3 
Less than 5 years ago 69 5,9 
Between 6 - 10 34 2,9 
Between 11 - 20 160 13,7 
Between 21 - 30 176 15,1 
More than 31 years ago 209 17,9 
7- In which country did  you obtain your diploma?
The Netherlands 907 77,9 
Turkey 258 22,1 
Graduation in the Netherlands, 
What is your highest level of education? 
Primary education 19 1,6 
Secondary education 186 16,0 
Undergraduate 541 46,4 
Postgraduate 161 13,8 
Graduation in Turkey, 
What is your highest level of education? 
Primary education 103 8,8 
Secondary education 103 8,8 
Undergraduate 51 4,3 
Postgraduate 1 0,09 
8 - What do you think about returning to Turkey? 
I hope (or plan) to return soon 198 17,0 
I plan/hope to return after 10 years 389 33,4 
Unfortunately, I cannot return 167 14,8 
I do not want to return 372 31,9 
Others 3,3 
Note: Total n = 1165. 
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return soon’, 389 (33,3 %) replied ‘I plan/hope to return after 10 years’, 167 (14,8 %) 
replied ‘Unfortunately, I cannot return’, and 372 (31,9 %) participants answered ‘I do 
not want to return.’ Finally, 3,3 % of the participants gave several other answers. 
Table 10 - Demographic variables 3 
The ninth item of the questionnaire was the question ‘Of which foundation are you 
an official or voluntary member?’ Answering this question was optional. 238 (20,4 %) 
participants answered this question with the ‘Turkish Diyanet Foundation’, 129 (11,1 
%) responded with the ‘Nur Movement’, 115 (9,9 %) with the ‘Milli Görüş 
Movement’, 42 (3,6 %) with ‘the Süleymancı Community’, 370 (31,8 %) replied 
‘none’, 96 participants (8,2 %) indicated that they were part of another community or 
movement, and 175 (15,0 %) left this question unanswered. 
Variables n   % 
9 - Foundation of which  you are an official or voluntary member. (Optional) 
Diyanet 238 20,4 
Nur Community 129 11,1 
Milli Görüş Movement 115 9,9 
Süleyman Efendi Community 42 3,6 
None 370 31,8 
Others 96 8,2 
Blank 175 15,0 
10 - Annual charity to Islamic foundations.(Optional) 
Never make a donation 202 17,3 
Less than €1000 762 65,4 
Between €1000 - €5000 158 13,6 
Between €5000 - €10 000 22 1,9 
More than €10 000 20 1,7 
11 - Commonly spoken language at home. 
Turkish 980 84,2 
Dutch 170 14,6 
Kurdish 14 1,2 
12 - I consider myself to be more religious than other people 
Right 414 35,5 
Wrong 498 42,7 
No Opinion 253 21,7 
Note: Total n = 1165. 
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A reply to the tenth item of the questionnaire was also optional. This question was 
intended to measure the annual charity donated to Islamic foundations. 202 (17,3) 
participants answered this question with ‘I never make a donation’, 762 participants 
(65,4 %) responded ‘less than €1000’, 158 (13,6 %) responded with ‘between €1000 - 
€5000’, 22 (1,9 %) responded with ‘between €5000 - €10,000’, and 20 participants 
(1,7 %) replied ‘more than €10 000’. 
The eleventh item sought to measure the language commonly spoken at home. 980 
(84,2) participants noted ‘Turkish’, 170 (14,6 %) noted ‘Dutch’ while only 14 
participants (1,2 %) noted ‘Kurdish’. 
The twelfth item of the questionnaire was ‘I consider myself to be more religious 
than other people’. 414 (35,5 %) participants responded with ‘right’, 498 (42,7 %) 
responded with ‘wrong’, and 253 (21,7 %) indicated ‘no opinion’. 
In summary, the general characteristics of our sample consist of the following 
features: 
 Our participants varied in age from 18 to 68 years. The majority were married or 
remarried. The estimated annual income was fairly represented among the population 
sample. There is a clear educational gap between the first and second-generation 
Muslims: while the first generation received little education, the second generation is 
gradually entering higher education. Almost half of the participants were born in the 
Netherlands. More than half of them intend to return to Turkey sooner or later. Nearly 
half of them are official or voluntary members of an Islamic community. The majority 
of these Dutch-Turkish Muslims makes annual donations to Islamic foundations. A 
majority among them speaks Dutch at home. 
5.2. Findings Concerning General Religiosity 
As explained earlier in this study, an analysis of religiosity can be approached from at 
least two distinct angles. First, an analysis of religiosity can focus on distinguishing 
individuals in terms of the intensity or frequency of the beliefs, practices, experience 
and knowledge with which they engage in religious activities. 
Secondly, an analysis of religiosity can focus on the intra-dimensional aspects, the 
forms of religious activities and the motivations behind their performance for the 
individuals who engage in them. For the time being, the analysis presented in this study 
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has been primarily concerned with the first perspective. In our terminology we refer to 
this first perspective as the study of general religiosity, taking inspiration from Glock’s 
(1962) initial work. However, the core of this study seeks to reveal the intra-
dimensional aspects of the five dimensions. In other words, the actual research 
objective of this study is to uncover the various forms of Muslim religious behaviour, 
the motivations behind their performance, and their consequences in society. 
The tables in this section will provide only limited information about religiosity and 
will not point to different motivations, cognitive styles, and contents of religious 
beliefs and practices. One of our goals with the analysis we present here is to show 
that Glock’s old scheme has only a limited capacity to measure the complex nature of 
religiosity, and to show how important and crucial the elite and popular 
conceptualization is to understand the inner aspects of religiosity. 
5.2.1. Ideological Dimension 
Traditionally, Muslims affirm several articles of faith. Among the most widely known 
are: there is only one God; God has sent many messengers, with Muhammad as His 
last Prophet; God has revealed Sacred Scriptures, including the Qurʾān; God’s angels 
exist even if humans cannot see them; there will be a Day of Judgment, when God will 
determine whether individuals are sent to heaven or to hell; and God’s will and 
knowledge are absolute, which means that humans are subject to fate or 
predestination.55 
In the following table, light gray (1) refers to minimum belief and dark gray (5) to 
maximum belief. 
55 The lists and translations of the articles of faith vary. Most of them are derived from the 
“Ḥadīth of Gabriel”. See for example Sahih al-Bukhari 2:47 and Sahih al-Muslim 1:1. 
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Table 11 – Belief in basic tenets of Islamic faith 
The survey, in which 1165 Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands participated, 
revealed the ubiquitous conviction among the participants that there is only one God 
and that Muhammad is His last prophet, with high percentages of Muslims who ascribe 
to other articles of faith, including the belief in sacred scriptures, reward and 
punishment, and the resurrection of the dead. In addition to the belief in the oneness 
of God, there are some low religious affiliations visible in the other domains. The 
participants were asked to indicate the intensity of their religious belief with a number 
ranging from 1 to 5. At least one in ten participants selected the number ‘1’, which 
indicates minimum affiliation. And at least one in ten selected number ‘2’ and ‘3’ to 
describe their religious belief, which indicates low and average affiliation. 
5.2.2. Ritualistic Dimension 
Together with the core beliefs discussed above, Islam is defined by ‘Five Pillars’ – 
basic rituals that are obligatory for all the members of the Islamic community who are 
physically able to perform them. The Five Pillars are: the profession of faith 
(shahādah), daily prayer (ṣalāt), fasting during the holy month of Ramadan (ṣawm), 
annual almsgiving to help the poor or needy (zakāt); and performing the annual 
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Table 12 – Level of practice of the pillars of Islam 
 
Among these Five Pillars, the Ṣalāt, or daily prayer, is the most frequent practice 
by which Muslims profess their faith in one God and His prophet Muhammad. 
According to tradition, Muslims have to perform the prayer five times a day, typically 
at dawn, noon, mid- afternoon, sunset and night. 
The survey finds that daily prayer is comparatively less central in the life of the 
majority of Dutch-Turkish Muslims. The participants who say they pray ‘always’ or 
‘usually’ constitute three out of ten. Also, three out of ten say they never observe the 
five daily prayers. 
Fasting during the month of Ramadan, which according to Islamic tradition is 
required of all healthy, adult Muslims, is part of an annual rite in which individuals 
place renewed emphasis on the teachings of the Qurʾān. The survey finds that more 
than half of the Muslims surveyed say that they ‘usually’ or ‘always’ observe the 
daytime fast during Ramadan. Three out of ten say that they fast ‘less often’ or 
‘sometimes’. Less than one in ten says they never observe the daytime fast during 
Ramadan.  
Friday Prayer is also widely observed when we exclude the female participants, as it 
is traditionally compulsory for men but preferable for women. In the Turkish 
community, women generally do not perform this prayer communally. More than two 
out of ten participants say they ‘always’ observe Friday prayer, while less than two out 
of ten say they ‘usually’ observe it. 
Praying to God is thus one of the most extensively observed rituals of the respondents. 
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participants say they ‘usually’ pray. 
Annual almsgiving (zakāt), which by custom is supposed to equal 2.5% or more of 
a person’s total wealth, is widely observed. Four out of ten Muslims say they ‘always’ 
observe almsgiving, while two out of ten say they ‘usually’ observe it. 
5.2.3. Experiential Dimension 
The ritualistic dimension is one of the most observable dimensions of religion, while 
the experiential dimension is one of the least observable. This dimension encompasses 
all feelings, perceptions and sensations, whether they are felt by an individual or a 
religious group, that relate to some type of postulated communication with God or a 
transcendental being. 
Table 13 - Religious experience (n = 1165) 
 
In this table, 1 refers to ‘no experience’ while 5 refers to ‘a high level of experience’. 
Three out of ten participants say they have no experience with ‘sensing a spiritual 
teacher’ and ‘experiencing a miraculous event’. When we look at other variables, more 
than eight out of ten participants say they experience ‘angels’, ‘inner peace’, and 
‘closeness to God’ to some degree. 
5.2.4. Intellectual Dimension 
The intellectual dimension refers to the expectation that Muslims will possess some 
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Table 14 - Religious knowledge (n = 1165) 
Initially, respondents were asked: ‘Which of the following answers provide lists 
that correctly sort successive chapters from the Qurʾān?’. More than three out of ten 
respondents answered this question correctly, while nearly three out of ten gave the 
wrong answer. Nearly four out of ten respondents said they were ‘not sure’ or had ‘no 
idea’. 
The other questions for the intellectual dimension were: ‘Which of the following 
holy days occur during Ramadan?’, ‘Which of the following rules is not considered 
one of the obligatory rules (farẓ) for prayer (ṣalāh)?’, ‘What is the meaning of 
Maqrūh?’, and ‘Which of the following rules is not one of the pillars of faith (īmān)?’. 
On average, seven out of ten respondents answered these questions correctly.  
5.2.5. Consequential Dimension 
The consequential dimension encompasses the effects of religious belief, practice, 
experience and knowledge on the daily life of the believer. It includes all those 
religious prescriptions that specify what people ought to do and the attitudes they are 
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Table 15 - Consequential dimensions (n = 1165) 
Respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed or disagreed with 
the following statements:  
34. It would not bother my conscience to use alcohol.
35. I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life.
(reversed)
36. A woman should be able to have an abortion for any reason.
37. Premarital sexual relations between a boy and a girl who are in love is not
immoral.
38. Religion is something I have never felt personally compelled to consider.
On average, seven out of ten respondents indicated that they ‘disagree’ or ‘totally 
disagree’ with these statements.56 
5.2.6. Factor Analysis 
A principle factor analysis was performed on the data set of the general religiosity 
scale. An examination of the item correlations revealed the predominance of a single 
factor (see Appendix one: Table 36). Our findings suggest that this 5-dimensional 
construction may merely be the components of a single dimensional phenomenon, i.e. 
religiosity, and that it is possible that it does not represent a multidimensional 
phenomenon, i.e., it may not represent separate and distinct dimensions of Muslim 
56 Item 35 was formulated positively, contrary to the other statements. More than seven out of 
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religiosity. In other words, the data for Factor I suggest that the 5-dimensional scale 
may refer only to different aspects of a single dimension rather than to separate 




Table 16 shows the mean distributions of general religiosity for the overall sample. 
Based on this table, we can conclude that eight out of ten Dutch-Turkish respondents 
experience high religiosity while two out of ten respondents experience low religiosity. 
Table 17 - Correlation matrix of five aspects of general religiosity 
The interrelations were tested by computing correlation coefficients among the five 
aspects of religiosity. For all respondents, the correlation coefficients ranged from a 
high of .78 between the ideological and consequential aspects to a low of .55 between 
the experiential and ideological aspects. All the correlations were positive and 
statistically significant. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Means SD n 
(1) Ideological . 4,46 ,99 1165 
(2) Ritualistic ,73** . 3,74 1,03 1165 
(3) Experiential ,67** ,55** . 3,53 1,15 1165 
(4) Intellectual ,65** ,59** ,56** . 4,23 1,10 1165 
(5) Consequential ,78** ,65** ,64** ,64** . 4,41 ,90 1165 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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5.2.7. Conclusion 
Glock indicated two types of research that could be conducted utilizing his scheme. 
The first type of research to which Glock referred focuses on the question of inter-
dimensional independence. The second type of research focuses on the intra-
dimensional aspect. The idea of the first approach is that the various dimensions could 
be independent of each other, making it possible for individuals to score high on one 
dimension but low on another, and for social classes to differ in the form in which their 
religiosity is displayed. For example, Glock suggested that the working class might 
score high on belief but low on ritual practice, while the middle class might score high 
on ritual practice and low on belief. Regarding the matter of inter-dimensional 
independence, we found that 24 items of the general religiosity scale loaded on one 
general dimension (see Appendix one: Table 36). 
Although Glock and Stark identified these 5 dimensions as core dimensions - 
dimensions which are both autonomous and independent - some specific studies have 
reported findings on the one-dimensional structure of this scheme, in line with our 
results. The one-dimensional structure of Glock’s scheme is not surprising in the 
scientific study of religion. Clayton and Gladden (1974) discussed the Glock-Stark 
typology in their article and reported the existence of a single general factor. They 
concluded that religiosity is not multidimensional. According to further analysis of the 
Glock-Stark typology, religiosity seems to be one-dimensional in two cases: in the 
case of very high religiosity and in the case of complete irreligiosity. In the first case, 
all dimensions exhibit high intensities or frequencies, in the second case, all 
dimensions show very low values and are therefore (almost) perfectly correlated 
(Hubert, 2015). Perhaps the one-dimensional structure of the general religiosity scale 
is affected by the high religiosity characteristics of our sample. We elaborate on these 
considerations in the next chapter. 
The second type of research, the intra-dimensional aspects of Glock’s five 
dimensions, has so far not been taken into account in our analysis of the data. Glock 
proposed a number of tentative components within the various dimensions, but 
emphasized that there was still a great deal of work to be done in the field of intra-
dimensional differentiation. The following part of our work focuses on such a research 
objective. Until this point in the survey, the believers were asked about the frequency 
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and quantity (kammiyyāt) of their religious beliefs and practices, accumulating scores 
on the general religiosity scale inspired by Glock (1962). Not the difference between 
elite and popular religion (intra-dimensional aspects of belief, practices, experience, 
knowledge), but the difference between belief and non-belief clearly emerged. In the 
next part of the survey, the central questions become ‘how?’ and ‘why?’ participants 
believe and practice. This brings into view rather different forms of beliefs and 
practices, and the motivations lying behind them (kayfiyyāt).57 
Inspired by Allport’s definition of the two ideal types intrinsic/extrinsic, our 
definition of elite/popular shows a clear development towards viewing the phenomena 
as types of motive, i.e., we zoom in on the motivations associated with religious beliefs 
and practices. We use the term ‘form’ to refer to the cognitive styles of religious beliefs 
and practices. In this study, then, the elite/popular distinction is operationalized as a 
measurement of two different kinds of motivations or cognitive styles in each of the 
dimensions (ideological, ritualistic, experiential and intellectual) which divide each of 
these dimensions in two subdimensions, ‘elite’ and ‘popular’. For instance, within the 
ideological dimension of religiosity, what will be measured is not the belief-content 
itself, but elite/popular motivations or cognitive styles shaping the belief. These two 
different kinds of motivations or cognitive styles measured within each of the 
dimensions can be called ‘elite motivations and cognitive styles of religiosity’ and 
‘popular motivations and cognitive styles of religiosity’. 
The starting point of our investigation is that elite forms and motivations, and 
popular forms and motivations, are both manifestations of strong religious affiliation. 
In other words, what distinguishes elite religiosity and popular religiosity is not a 
commitment to certain beliefs and practices, but different motivations and cognitive 
styles, or, to use a metaphor, the distinction concerns the vehicles used instead of the 
cargo carried. One can, for example, start from the Islamic definition of ‘Islam’ as 
‘submission to God’. All Muslims will agree to this definition. The difference lies in 
defining how one should go about with submitting to God. From that point on, a 
57 The Arabic term kammiyyāt comes from the root “kam”, which means “how many”. This 
question therefore emphasizes the numerable or calculable side of faith. The Arabic term 
kayfiyyāt, on the other hand, comes from the root “kayfa” which means “how” or “in what 
way”. This question mainly emphasizes motivations and cognitive styles of beliefs and 




comparative study of the different interpretations of how to submit to God (that is, how 
to be a Muslim) is central to the research. 
Therefore, from this point on, participants with low or non-existent religious 
affiliations will be excluded from further analysis. In the general religiosity scale, we 
employed a 5-point Likert scale and a multiple-choice scale. To divide the variable 
‘general religiosity’ into two categories - an upper and a lower half - we used the 
median of its frequency distribution. The lower half represents low religiosity and the 
upper half represents high religiosity.58 By means of this criterion, 272 (23.3%) of the 
respondents were excluded, because - due to their low religious commitment - they are 
unable to assist us in our search for the forms and motivations of different aspects of 
high religiosity. Our analysis will therefore focus on the remaining 893 respondents 
(76.7 % of the initial sample), who have strong religious affiliations and are therefore 







                                                 
58 Scoring method: Likert scale items scored 1 to 5. Multiple-choice scale items scored from 
1, signifying a “wrong answer”, to 5, signifying a “right answer”. Other answer options were 
“not sure” and “no idea”, recoded as ‘1’.  
5.3. Findings Concerning Aspects of Elite and Popular Religiosity 
Table 18 - Correlation matrix 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Means SD n 
(1) Elite belief . 2,67 1,12 893 
(2) Elite ritual ,62** . 2,58 ,99 893 
(3) Elite experience ,23** 33** . 2,86 ,86 893 
(4) Elite knowledge ,60** ,60** ,23** . 2,55 1,03 893 
(5) Popular belief -,65** -,51** -,23** -,47** . 3,37 1,06 893 
(6) Popular ritual -,36** -,52** -,31** -,40** ,51** . 3,55 1,12 893 
(7) Popular experience -,35** -,38** -,54** -,32** ,31** ,27** . 2,87 1,09 893 
(8) Popular knowledge -,53** -,52** -,25** -,53** ,65** ,58** ,31** . 3,42 1,02 893 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
The interrelations were tested by computing correlation coefficients between the 
eight components (four subcomponents of elite religiosity, and four subcomponents of 
popular religiosity). The correlation coefficients range from a high negative correlation 
(-.65) to a high positive correlation (+0.65). The subcomponents of elite religiosity are 
negatively correlated with the subcomponents of popular religiosity. The 
subcomponents of elite religiosity are positively correlated with each other, just as the 
subcomponents of popular religiosity are positively correlated with each other. 
5.3.1. Factor Analysis of Elite Religiosity Scale and Popular Religiosity Scale 
In this section, we try to answer the third sub-question among the research questions. 
The third sub-question (RQ1c) was: ‘What are the characteristics of elite and popular 
religiosity among Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands?’ 
In chapter 3 several characteristics and motivations were presented, which range 
from popular religiosity on one side of the spectrum to elite religiosity on the other. 
These two aspects of religiosity reflect subcomponents, including belief, practice, 
knowledge, experience and consequences. Under these subcomponents, this study has 
identified several characteristics that we believe distinguish elite religiosity from 
popular religiosity. These characteristics were: dynamism versus stability, critical 
versus uncritical, without material expectations versus with material expectations, 
differentiated versus undifferentiated, experiential inessentiality and privacy versus 
experiential desirability and shareability. 
If we look at the factor analysis of elite religiosity (see Appendix one, Table 37) 
and the factor analysis of popular religiosity (see Appendix one, Table 38), we can 
clearly see an overlap between several of the dimensions. There is an area of overlap 
between elite belief and elite knowledge, which together generate attitudes of criticism 
and openness to spiritual and intellectual change. Another area of overlap exists 
between popular belief and popular knowledge, which together generate a lack of 
criticism and resistance to spiritual and intellectual change. 
After initial factor analysis, we assumed that at least one or two dimensions of elite 
and popular religiosity might be represented by one factor. The final factor analysis 
revealed that 11 items of elite religiosity loaded on two factors, as expected. The 
correlation between the two factors was 0.41. The pattern loadings of these two factors 
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are presented in Table 37 (see Appendix one). The first factor turned out to mainly 
represent elite belief, elite ritual and elite knowledge. In this study, all the factors listed 
below are labelled on the basis of the loadings of the indicator variables, i.e., the 
variables within the factor with the highest loadings, and also on the basis of the 
common features of variables. Based on this criterion, the first factor may be labelled 
‘[spiritual and intellectual] differentiation’. The second factor turned out to mainly 
represent elite experience. This factor may be labelled ‘experiential inessentiality and 
privacy’.  
The final factor analysis revealed that 11 items of popular religiosity scale loaded 
on two factors as well. The correlation between the two factors was 0.34. The pattern 
loadings of these two factors are presented in Table 38 (see Appendix one). This table 
shows all the items loaded on these two factors. Factor 1 turned out to mainly represent 
popular belief, popular ritual and popular knowledge. This first factor may be labelled 
‘material expectations and [spiritual and intellectual] stability’. The second factor 
turned out to mainly represent popular experience. This factor may be labelled 
‘experiential desirability and shareability’.59 The main reason for this structural 
similarity is that these groups of items were formulated by taking mutual interrelations 
between elite and popular religiosity into account.  
Researchers may prefer to merge variables when they reveal strong correlations, in 
order to reduce the complexity of the representation. An indicator is available in all 
statistical software packages that estimates the strengths of the average correlations 
between two or more variables that are eligible for a merger into a single dimension. 
This indicator is called ‘Cronbach’s alpha’ (Minkov, 2012, p. 139). Since the elite and 
popular religiosity variables reveal a strong correlation with each other (respectively 
α = .82 and α = .84, see chapter 4), we prefer to combine them in a single dimension. 
Combining the 2-factors structures for the elite and popular religiosity scales into a 
single data set can simplify the analysis. It is precisely with a view to this simplification 
that the two 2-factor structures for the scales were merged into a single factor per scale, 
factors which were then considered a single dimension for the scales in question. In 
other words, based on the factor analysis of elite religiosity, a single score ‘elite 
59 In these statements, we prefer to use the formulation “may be labelled” because of the 
subjective and controversial character of these labels, which are designed based on the 
personal judgement of the researcher. 
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religiosity’ was constructed by combining the 2-factor structure ‘[spiritual and 
intellectual] differentiation’ and ‘experiential inessentiality and privacy.’ Likewise, 
based on the factor analysis of popular religiosity, a single score ‘popular religiosity’ 
was constructed by combining the 2-factor structure ‘material expectations and 
[spiritual and intellectual] stability’ and ‘experiential desirability and shareability.’ 
This means that the scores obtained on the two 2-factor structures will be evaluated as 
a total score when measuring elite religiosity and popular religiosity. 
The fourth sub-question (RQ1d) among the research questions was: ‘What are the 
patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity?’ The present study 
expects to find that ‘Elite and popular forms of religiosity are negatively correlated 
with each another’ (H1).  
We tested correlation coefficients among the three religiosities (elite, popular and high 
religiosity). 
The study found a negative correlation between elite religiosity and popular 
religiosity (r = -.72) and also a negative correlation between high religiosity and elite 
religiosity (r = -.09). The study found no correlation between high religiosity and 
popular religiosity.  
The null hypothesis60 (there is no relationship between elite and popular religiosity) 
was therefore rejected. 
60 H1 may be formulated in terms of absence of similarity or the presence of difference, and 
the null hypothesis may be formulated in a reversed manner, in terms of presence of similarity 
or the absence of difference. If there is no similarity or if there actually is a difference, the null 
Table 19 - Correlation matrix (elite, popular and high Religiosity) 
(1) (2) (3) Means SD n 
(1) High religiosity . 4,24 ,34 893 
(2) Elite religiosity -,09** . 2,75 ,67 893 
(3) Popular religiosity ,054 -,72** . 3,30 ,81 893 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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5.3.2. Average Means of Elite and Popular Religiosity 
We now turn to the other part of the empirical question raised in this section:  RQ1e: 
‘How are elite and popular religiosity recognizable in the Dutch-Turkish research 
population, and how is this phenomenon socially located?’ The first hypothesis of the 
present study in this context was that ‘Turkish Muslim minorities living in the 
Netherlands predominantly experience popular religiosity’ (H2).  
Table 20 - Average means of elite and popular religiosity (n = 893) 
A median split formed the low and high scores for the elite and popular religiosity 
groups (high level of elite religiosity ≥ 3 and high level of popular religiosity ≥ 3). 
According to this criterion, 611 (% 68.4) of the respondents experience popular 
religiosity while 269 (% 30.1) experience elite religiosity.61 
hypothesis is rejected, and if there is similarity or there is no difference, the null hypothesis is 
not rejected. 
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Table 21 - Cross tabulations 
Cross-tabulation shows that 79 (% 8,8) of the respondents experience low levels of 
elite and popular religiosity, and 66 (% 7,3) respondents experience high levels of elite 
and popular religiosity, even after exclusion of the group of respondents who 
experience low religiosity. This means that a significant number of the respondents 
subscribe to both the elite and popular religiosity items. Some of these items are 
positively and negatively worded versions of virtually the same item. The problem we 
are encountering here is essentially the same as that of the various researchers who 
have tried to reverse the wording of items, in order to avoid an unwanted response-set 
bias.  
An example from the intellectual dimension of the elite and popular religiosity 
scales would be: ‘For me, doubting the validity of my current religious knowledge is 
an important part of what it means to be religious’ (elite religiosity). ‘If I find answers 
to my religious questions trough imams, I never doubt their correctness’ (popular 
religiosity). (For a comparison of the items, see the following tables in Appendix one: 
Table 37, Table 38) 
The approach used by Peabody (1961) provides us with a model for meaningfully 
analyzing our data. By comparing each individual’s responses to the same question, 
which was formulated positively in one place and reversely formulated in another, he 
was able to distinguish between those who were consistently pro or anti the content of 
authoritarian items. Table 22 above applies Peabody’s paradigm to our data. 
In assigning our 893 cases to these categories, we used the following criteria. 
Individuals who consistently agree with elite religiosity scale items and who 
disagree with popular religiosity scale items, are assigned to Elite religiosity. Due to 
Popular religiosity 
1<2 2<3 3<4 4<5 Total 
Elite 
religiosity 
1<2 1 5 42 68 116 
2<3 8 65 346 89 508 
3<4 83 94 56 4 237 
4<5 15 11 6 0 32 
Total 107 175 450 161 893 
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the scoring method used, these individuals fall above the median scores on the elite 
religiosity scale. 
Individuals who consistently agree with popular religiosity scale items and who 
disagree with elite religiosity scale items, are assigned to Popular religiosity. Due to 
the scoring method used, these individuals fall above the median scores on the popular 
religiosity scale. 
Concerning the respondents who experience low levels of elite and popular 
religiosity simultaneously, we can say that definitions of elite and popular religion do 
not cover all aspects of high religiosity. These results mean that a high level of 
religiosity should be considered with a number of additional aspects. Concerning the 
respondents who experience elite and popular religiosity simultaneously, we can recall 
the interrelation existing between elite religiosity and popular religiosity. In this case, 
it could be said that it is perfectly possible that some respondents experience some 
aspects of elite and popular religiosity simultaneously. These results will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 








66 (% 7,4) 
Consistently popular religiosity 
545 (% 61) 
Disagrees with 
popular religiosity 
Consistently elite religiosity 
203 (% 22,7) 
Double disagreement 
79 (% 8,8) 
 total = 269    total = 624 
Finally, our study excludes those who display a double agreement (or double 
disagreement) with both scales. In view of further analysis, these cases diminish the 
statistical significance of our data to some degree. We temporarily halted the analysis 
of these groups, and continued to investigate the differences between those 748 
respondents who experience a high level of elite religiosity and a high level of popular 
religiosity (after exclusion of 145 respondents). 
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In the following paragraphs and tables, we give participants who consistently 
experience a high level of elite religiosity the label ‘elite religiosity’, and participants 
who consistently experience a high level of popular religiosity the label ‘popular 
religiosity’. 
5.3.3. Independent Variables and Elite and Popular Religiosity 
In this section, this study continues to research the following research question RQ1e: 
‘How are elite and popular religiosity recognizable in the Dutch-Turkish research 
population, and how is this phenomenon socially located?’ 
Firstly, we will discuss the remaining three hypotheses regarding education, income 
and generational differences. We then discuss our expectations with regard to gender 
and age. A series of ANOVA results revealed that there were some significant 
differences regarding elite/popular religiosity in relation to demographic variables. 
5.3.3.1. Educational Status 
The first research question was: in what manner does the educational status of an 
individual impact on elite /popular religiosity? 
Table 23 - Education and elite/popular religiosity 
Our hypothesis was: ‘High level of elite religiosity significantly increases with 
education. High level of popular religiosity significantly decreases with education’ 
(H4). 
n Means SD F Sig. 
Elite religiosity Primary education 11 3,41 ,24 
2,83 ,039* 
Secondary education 31 3,63 ,32 
Undergraduate 111 3,69 ,33 
Postgraduate 50 3,69 ,29 
Total 203 3,67 ,32 
Popular religiosity Primary education 79 3,91 ,47 
10,83 ,000* 
Secondary education 153 3,92 ,41 
Undergraduate 267 3,72 ,40 
Postgraduate 46 3,66 ,37 
Total 545 3,80 ,42 
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
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A one-way ANOVA was used to test this research question (see Table 23) and the 
findings showed that there was a significant difference in the means of elite and 
popular religiosity based on educational status.  
The null hypothesis (there is no relation between the educational level of the 
participants and elite and popular religiosity) was rejected.  
Table 23 shows that respondents with a higher educational status experience elite 
religiosity more clearly than respondents with a lower educational status. A significant 
difference (F = 2,83, p = .039) was found between the means of these values. 
This table also shows that respondents with a lower educational status experience 
popular religiosity more clearly than respondents with a higher educational status. A 
significant difference (F = 10,83, p = .000) was found between the means of these 
values. 
Table 24 considers respondents who experience high religiosity. A one-way 
ANOVA was used to test whether there are differences in the means of high religiosity 
and the findings showed that there was a significant difference based on educational 
status (F = 3,78, p = .010). The null hypothesis (there is no relation between the 
educational level of the participants and high religiosity) was rejected. Table 24 shows 
that the intensity of high religiosity decreases with education. 
Table 24 - Education and high religiosity 
n Means SD F Sig. 
High religiosity Primary education 107 4,28 ,32 
3,78 ,010* 
Secondary education 215 4,30 ,30 
Undergraduate 456 4,21 ,37 
Postgraduate 115 4,21 ,33 
Total 893 4,24 ,34 
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
5.3.3.2. Income 
The second research question was: in what manner does the income of an individual 
impact the score on the elite/popular religiosity scale?  
Our hypothesis was: ‘High level of elite religiosity significantly increases with 
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economic status. High level of popular religiosity significantly decreases with 
economic status’ (H5). 
Table 25 - Income and elite/popular religiosity (n = 748) 
A one-way ANOVA was used to test this research question (see Table 25) and the 
findings showed that there was no significant difference in the means of elite religion 
based on income. The null hypothesis (there is no relation between the income of the 
participants and scores on the elite religiosity scale) was maintained. 
Surprisingly, however, we found that there was a significant difference in the means 
of popular religiosity based on income. If the respondents who earn more than 100,000 
Euros are excluded, we can read this table as showing that respondents with a higher 
income experience popular religiosity more clearly than respondents with a lower 
income. A significant difference (F = 2,49, p = .042) was found between the means of 
these values. 
According to these results, our hypothesis is rejected. 
5.3.3.3. Generational differences 
The third research question was: in what manner does the generational status of an 
individual impact the score on the elite/popular religiosity scale? 
Income n Means SD F Sig. 
Elite religiosity Below €10,000 12 3,71 ,38 
,60 ,659 
€ 10,000 - €30,000 88 3,68 ,32 
€ 30,000 - € 60,000 67 3,64 ,32 
€ 60,000 - € 100,000 30 3,64 ,26 
Above € 100,000 6 3,83 ,44 
Total 203 3,67 ,32 
Popular religiosity Below €10,000 30 3,75 ,45 
2,49 ,042* 
€ 10,000 - €30,000 232 3,76 ,40 
€ 30,000 - € 60,000 202 3,80 ,41 
€ 60,000 - € 100,000 64 3,94 ,49 
Above € 100,000 17 3,87 ,51 
Total 545 3,80 ,42 
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Our hypothesis was: ‘First-generation respondents experience popular religiosity to 
a larger degree than second-generation respondents’ (H3). 
A group t-test for differences between the first and second-generation respondents 
supported the hypothesis that there would be differences between the two groups. 
The means of elite religiosity were compared for the first and second-generation 
respondents. No significance was found within this group ( p > .05). 
The means of popular religiosity were compared for the first and second-generation 
respondents. Significance at the .05 level was found within this group ( p < .001).  
The means of high religiosity were compared for the first and second-generation 
respondents. Significance at the .05 level was found within this subscale ( p < .001). 
The means of low religiosity were compared for the first and second-generation 
respondents. No significance was found within this group ( p > .05). 
The means of education were compared for the first and second-generation 
respondents. Significance at the .05 level was found within this group ( p < .001).  
Looking at the average mean values of each group, we can conclude that the first-
Table 26 - Independent samples t-test – Religiosity and generational differences 
Generations n Means SD F Sig. 
Elite religiosity First generation 115 3,66 ,331 ,12     ,646 
    ,644 Second generation 88 3,68 ,316 
Popular religiosity First generation 338 3,86 ,438 4,65 ,000* 
,000* Second generation 207 3,69 ,387 
High religiosity First generation 528 4,32 ,311 4,21 ,000* 
,000* Second generation 365 4,13 ,370 
Low religiosity First generation 120 2,16 ,245 ,63     ,568 
    ,570 Second generation 152 2,14 ,236 
Education First generation 648 2,51 ,889 77,87 ,000* 
,000* Second generation 517 2,88 ,718 
* Significance is based on a 2-tailed test.
t-test statistics based on the assumption of equal variances.
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generation respondents were stronger in popular religiosity and stronger in high 
religiosity compared to the second-generation respondents. 
5.3.3.4. Gender 
The fourth research question was: in what manner does the gender of an individual 
impact on elite /popular religiosity?  
Table 27 - Gender and elite/popular religion 
Our expectation was: ‘The experience level of popular religiosity is higher among 
Muslim women than among Muslim men’ (E1)  
A one-way ANOVA was used to test this research question (see Table 27) and the 
findings showed that there was no significant difference in the means of elite 
religiosity (F = ,38, p = .586) and popular religiosity (F = 1,10, p = .294) based on 
gender.  
The null hypothesis (there is no relation between the gender of the participants and 
scores on the elite religiosity scale) was maintained. 
5.3.3.5. Age 
The fifth research question was: in what manner does the age of an individual impact 
on elite / popular religiosity? 
Gender n Means SD F Sig. 
Elite religiosity Male 120 3,65 ,32 
,38 ,536 Female 83 3,68 ,32 
Total 203 3,67 ,32 
Popular religiosity Male 281 3,82 ,43 
1,10 ,294 Female 264 3,78 ,41 
Total 545 3,80 ,42 
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Table 28 - Age groups and elite/popular religiosity 
Our expectation was: ‘Respondents who are middle-aged (36-55) or older (56 and 
above) experience popular religiosity to a larger degree than young respondents (18-
35)’ (E2). 
A one-way ANOVA was used to test this research question (see Table 28) and the 
findings showed that there was no significant difference in the means of elite 
religiosity based on age groups. The null hypothesis (there is no relation between the 
age of the participants and scores on the elite religiosity scale) was maintained. 
However, the findings showed that there was a difference in the means of popular 
religiosity based on age groups. Table 28 shows that the middle-aged (36 - 55) and 
older participants (56 and above) experienced popular religiosity more intensely 
compared to young respondents. A significant difference (F = 3,39, p = .003) was 
found between the means of these values. The null hypothesis (there is no relation 
between the age of the participants and scores on the popular religiosity scale) was 
rejected.  
n Means SD F Sig. 
Elite religiosity Between 18 - 25 64 3,69 ,34 
1,38 ,242 
Between 26 - 35 47 3,73 ,35 
Between 36 - 45 38 3,65 ,30 
Between 46 - 55 27 3,62 ,29 
56 and older 27 3,57 ,26 
Total 203 3,67 ,32 
Popular 
religiosity 
Between 18 - 25 159 3,72 ,40 
3,39 ,003* 
Between 26 - 35 144 3,77 ,43 
Between 36 - 45 108 3,80 ,40 
Between 46 - 55 80 3,92 ,44 
56 and older 54 3,91 ,43 
Total 545 3,80 ,42 
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 29 shows a correlation matrix of age, residence duration and religiosity. 
According to this table, the older generations tend to be more religious than the 
younger generation (r = .21). Moreover, age group turns out to be negatively correlated 
with elite religiosity (r = -.13) and positively correlated with popular religiosity (r = 
.16).  
We found a negative correlation between the residence duration of respondents who 
were not born in the Netherlands and elite religiosity (r = -.26). In other words, living 
in a non-Muslim environment does seem to weaken ties with elite religiosity. 
5.3.3.6. Elite / Popular religiosity and Feeling Oneself More Religious 
The seventh research question was: in what manner does a sense that one is more 
religious than most people, impact on elite /popular religiosity? 
Our expectation was: ‘Respondents who identify themselves as ‘more religious than 
most’ predominantly experience popular religiosity’(E3). 











** -,139* ,162** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,048 ,000 






Sig. (2-tailed) ,117 ,004 ,556 
n 502 111 316 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Table 30 - Item 12 - I believe myself to be more religious than most people 
In elite religiosity, 27 % (55) of the respondents stated they were more religious 
than most, while 58 % (113) of the respondents stated they were no more religious 
than most. 15 % (31) stated they had no opinion. 
However, in popular religiosity, 49 % (269) of the respondents stated they were 
more religious than most, while 33 % (179) of the respondents stated they were no 
more religious than most. 18 % (97) stated they had no opinion. 
A one-way ANOVA with post-hoc analysis was used to test this research question 
(see Table 30) and the findings showed that there was a significant difference in the 
means of elite religiosity (F = 5,75, p = .005) and popular religiosity (F = 4,77, p = 
.017) based on the item ‘believing oneself to be more religious than most’. (Between 
two items: right and wrong). The null hypothesis (there is no relation between 
‘believing oneself to be more religious than most’ and scores on the elite and popular 
religiosity scales) was rejected. According to these results, our expectation is 
confirmed. 
n Means SD F Sig. 
Elite religiosity 
Right 55 3,57 ,26 
5,75 ,005* Wrong 117 3,73 ,33 No idea 31 3,60 ,32 
Total 203 3,67 ,32 
Popular religiosity 
Right 269 3,85 ,43 
4,77 ,017* 
Wrong 179 3,74 ,41 
No idea 97 3,74 ,40 
Total 545 3,80 ,42 
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
5.3.4. Factors Influencing Elite and Popular Religiosity 
Table 31 - Correlation matrix of factors influencing elite/popular religiosity 
Family Friends School Books R. Leaders Mosques R. Found. TV Internet 
Elite religiosity Pearson correlation ,184** ,086 ,129 ,266** ,141* -,018 ,041 -,221** ,038 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,009 ,225 ,067 ,000 ,045 ,799 ,559 ,002 ,591 
n 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 
Popular religiosity Pearson correlation ,074 ,079 ,010 -,005 ,177** ,174** ,057 ,187** ,104* 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,085 ,064 ,810 ,900 ,000 ,000 ,180 ,000 ,015 
n 545 545 545 545 545 545 545 545 545 
Education Pearson correlation -,001 ,000 -,041 ,242** -,066* -,094** -,015 -,184** -,073* 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,974 1,000 ,163 ,000 ,025 ,001 ,612 ,000 ,013 
n 1165 1165 1165 1165 1165 1165 1165 1165 1165 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
This part of the study will seek to identify bivariate associations, and therefore, will 
utilize the Pearson correlation coefficient. 
The respondents were asked how much the following items influenced their 
religious education: family, friends, school, books, religious leaders, mosques, 
religious foundations, television and the Internet. 
Our expectations were: 
‘Respondents who state that they acquire much of their religious knowledge 
through television programmes, experience a high level of popular religiosity’ (E4). 
‘Respondents who state that they acquire much of their religious knowledge 
through their family experience a high level of popular religiosity’ (E5). 
Since this aspect of the present study was exploratory, no hypotheses and further 
expectations were presented. 
We found that elite religiosity is positively correlated with family (r = .18), books 
(r = .26), religious leaders (r = .14), while negatively correlated with television (r = -
.22). We found that elite religiosity is not significantly correlated with friends, school, 
mosques, religious foundations and the Internet. 
At the same time, we found that popular religiosity is positively correlated with 
religious leaders (r = .27), mosques (r = .24), television (r = .25) and the Internet (r = 
.15). We found that popular religiosity is not significantly correlated with family, 
friends, school, books and religious foundations. 
We also looked at the way in which educational status itself influences religious 
education. We found that educational status is positively correlated with books (r = 
.24), while negatively correlated with religious leaders (r = -.06), mosques (r = -.09), 
television (r = -.18) and the Internet (r = .07). 
According to these results, our first expectation was confirmed while our second 
expectation was rejected. 
186 
5.3.5. Socio-psychological Factors Affected by Elite and Popular Religiosity 
Consequential Dimension of Religiosity 
We now turn to the other part of the empirical question raised in this section: RQ2: 
‘What are the socio-psychological differences in behaviour and attitudes among 
Dutch-Turkish Muslims who experience elite and popular religiosity respectively?’ 
The consequential dimension of religiosity was measured through the use of several 
attitude scales. The consequential dimension includes all those religious prescriptions 
that specify what people ought to do and the attitudes they are supposed to have as a 
consequence of their religion. Therefore, this dimension can also be described as an 
attitudinal aspect. This attitudinal aspect is interpreted here as the connection of elite 
and popular religiosity with people’s daily lives. The scales used in previous studies 
that have similar characteristics of popular religiosity, have generally shown that 
aspects of popular religion are not only related to racial and ethnic prejudice (Allport 
& Ross, 1967, p. 441) but to a large number of other socially divisive characteristics 
as well. On the other hand, scales used in previous studies with equivalent 
characteristics of elite religiosity have generally shown that aspects of elite religion 
are unrelated or negatively related to racial and ethnic prejudice (Allport & Ross, 1967, 
p. 441) and also that these aspects are positively related to a variety of socially
productive characteristics (Capucao, 2010; Hood, 1998; Nelson, 2015). In order to
measure these various non-religious characteristics, several attitude scales have been
developed in this study.
The attitudinal aspects were chosen to cover a wide range of life issues, including 
modernity, gender, sectarian issues, social relations in society, and attitudes towards 
Christianity (numerically the strongest religion in the Netherlands). 
Accordingly, in order to measure attitudinal consequences of elite and popular 
religiosity, this study presents the following scales that make up the fourth part of our 
questionnaire. These scales are: 
Attitudes towards other religions (Christianity) 
Attitudes towards women 
Attitudes towards race/ethnicity 
Attitudes towards others  
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Attitudes towards modernity 
In-group attitudes 
These scales consist of 27 items (see Appendix one, Table 38). The respondents were 
asked to answer on a 5-point Likert scale (5 referred to ‘completely agree’ and 1 to 
‘completely disagree’). 11 items were structured negatively, and 16 positively. 
Positively phased items were scored as 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 and negatively phased items were 
reversely scored as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. This scoring method suggests that mean scores ranging 
from 1 to 3 indicate a positive tendency towards the listed attitude, and that mean 
scores ranging from 3 to 5 indicate a negative tendency towards the listed attitude. 
The following tables show the average mean distributions for elite and popular 
religiosity. 
According to table 32, 188 (% 93) respondents out of 203 participants ranged from 
1 to 3, while 15 (% 7) respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale ‘hostile attitudes 
towards other religions’. 
121 (% 98) male respondents out of 123 male participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 
2 (% 2) male respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale ‘subordinate attitudes 
towards women’. 
188 (% 93) respondents out of 203 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 15 (% 7) 
respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale ‘prejudiced attitudes towards others’. 
197 (% 97) respondents out of 203 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 6 (% 3) 
respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale ‘hostile attitudes towards others’. 
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179 (% 88) respondents out of 203 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 24 (% 12) 
respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale ‘harmonious attitudes towards modernity’. 
112 (% 70) respondents out of 158 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 46 (% 30) 
respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale ‘conservative in-group attitudes’. 
Table 33- Average mean distributions for popular religiosity 
According to table 33, 435 (% 80) respondents out of 545 participants ranged from 
1 to 3, while 110 (% 20) respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale ‘hostile attitudes 
towards other religions’. 
255 (% 89) male respondents out of 285 male participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 
30 (% 11) male respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale ‘subordinate attitudes 
towards women’. 
467 (% 86) respondents out of 545 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 78 (% 14) 
respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale ‘prejudiced attitudes towards others’. 
495 (% 91) respondents out of 545 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 50 (% 9) 
respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale ‘hostile attitudes towards others’. 
461 (% 85) respondents out of 545 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 84 (% 15) 
respondents ranged from 3 to 5 on the scale ‘harmonious attitudes towards modernity’. 
216 (% 74) respondents out of 293 participants ranged from 1 to 3, while 77 (% 26) 
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Table 34 - t-test comparison of some socio-psychological attitudes for elite and popular religiosity 
Subscale Type of religiosity N Mean Std. Dev. Sig. 
(Hostile) attitudes towards other religions 
(i.e., Christianity) 
Elite religiosity 203 1,90 ,730 ,000* 
Popular religiosity 545 2,34 ,895 ,000* 
(Subordinate) attitudes towards women 
Elite religiosity 123 1,66 ,595 ,000* 
Popular religiosity 281 2,13 ,728 ,000* 
(Prejudiced) attitudes towards race 
Elite religiosity 203 1,82 ,744 ,000* 
Popular religiosity 545 2,20 ,906 ,000* 
(Hostile) attitudes towards others 
Elite religiosity 203 1,78 ,652 ,000* 
Popular religiosity 545 2,15 ,806 ,000* 
(Harmonious) attitudes towards modernism 
Elite religiosity 203 2,17 ,965 ,842 
Popular religiosity 545 2,18 1,007 ,839 
(Conservative) in-group attitudes 
Elite religiosity 168 2,52 ,970 ,000* 
Popular religiosity 393 2,99 ,944 ,000* 
* Significance is based on a 2-tailed test.
t-test statistics based on the assumption of equal variances.
(n = 748)
Socio-psychological Attitudes 
The second research question was: ‘What are the socio-psychological differences 
in behaviour and attitudes among Dutch-Turkish Muslims who experience elite and 
popular religiosity respectively?’. 
Our hypotheses were: 
(H6) Respondents motivated by elite religiosity are more open to interaction with 
Christians than respondents motivated by popular religiosity. 
(H7) Men motivated by popular religiosity tend to have more subordinate attitudes 
towards women and more traditional ideas about gender, than men motivated by 
elite religiosity. 
(H8) Respondents motivated by popular religiosity tend to have more prejudiced 
attitudes towards other races/ethnicities than respondents motivated by elite 
religiosity. 
(H9) Respondents motivated by popular religiosity have a more hostile attitude 
towards others than respondents motivated by elite religiosity. 
(H10) Respondents motivated by elite religiosity have a more harmonious attitude 
towards modernity than respondents motivated by popular religiosity. 
(H11) Respondents motivated by elite religiosity exhibit less conservative in-group 
attitudes than respondents motivated by popular religiosity. 
The fourth sub-question was addressed by conducting independent t-tests on each 
subscale of the questionnaire, to determine whether there were differences in the 
means of the socio-psychological attitudes in relation to elite and popular religiosity.  
The means of the ‘(prejudiced) attitudes towards race’ subscale were compared for 
elite and popular religiosity. Significance at the .05 level was found within this 
subscale ( p < .001). 
The means of the ‘(subordinate) attitudes towards women’ subscale were compared 
for elite and popular religiosity. Female respondents are excluded from this scale 
because of the question characteristics. Significance at the .05 level was found within 
this subscale ( p < .001).  
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The means of the ‘(hostile) attitudes towards other religions (i.e., Christianity)’ 
subscale were compared for elite and popular religiosity. Significance at the .05 level 
was found within this subscale ( p < .001).  
The means of the ‘(hostile) attitudes towards others’ subscale were compared for 
elite and popular religiosity. Significance at the .05 level was found within this 
subscale ( p < .001).  
The means of the ‘(harmonious) attitudes towards modernism’ subscale were 
compared for elite and popular religiosity. No significance was found within this 
subscale ( p> .05). 
The means of the ‘(conservative) in-group attitudes’ subscale were compared for 
elite and popular religiosity. Significance at the .05 level was found within this 
subscale ( p < .001).  
According to our scoring method, values ranging from 1 to 3 indicate a positive 
tendency towards listed attitudes, and values ranging from 3 to 5 indicate a negative 
tendency towards listed attitudes. If we look at the average mean values of each attitude 
scale, we can conclude that both participants who experience elite religiosity and 
participants who experience popular religiosity have negative attitudes towards each 
scale. This means that, according to the average result, the participants - regardless of 
their religious affiliations - are not hostile towards members of other religions; do not 
have subordinate attitudes towards women; are not prejudiced towards other races; are 
not hostile towards others; and do not have conservative in-group attitudes. 
However, the differences in the mean values between the two groups are significant. 
We found that respondents who experienced popular religiosity were less open and 
friendly towards other religions. Moreover, men who experienced popular religiosity 
had poorer views on the equality and rights of women compared to men who 
experienced elite religiosity. It also turned out that participants who experienced 
popular religiosity expressed more (racial/ethnic) prejudice, and showed more 
conservative in-group attitudes than participants who experienced elite religiosity. 
According to these results, hypotheses 6, 7, 8, 9 and 11 are confirmed. Hypothesis 10 
is rejected.
Table 35 - Correlation matrix of socio-psychological factors 
(Hostile) 

















Elite religiosity Pearson correlation -,159* -,239** -,150* -,214** -,069 -,004 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,024 ,008 ,033 ,002 ,330 ,962 
n 203 123 203 203 203 168 
Popular religiosity Pearson correlation ,159** ,301** ,106* ,111** ,065 ,170** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,013 ,009 ,131 ,001 
n 545 281 545 545 545 393 
High religiosity Pearson correlation ,073* ,166** ,061 ,019 ,042 ,068 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,028 ,000 ,068 ,572 ,214 ,081 
n 893 492 893 893 893 660 
Education Pearson correlation -,121** -,217** -,160** -,118** ,020 -,106** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,557 ,007 
n 893 492 893 893 893 660 
Age group Pearson correlation ,036 ,211** ,115** ,048 -,057 ,000 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,286 ,000 ,001 ,148 ,090 ,992 
n 893 492 893 893 893 660 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
The results of a Pearson correlation coefficient established that the correlation 
between the religiosity scales and the scales for socio-psychological factors, as well as 
the correlation between education and age group and the scales for socio-psychological 
factors, are all significant. 
The study observes a negative correlation between the subscale ‘(hostile) attitudes 
towards other religions’ and elite religiosity (r = -.159); between (subordinate) 
attitudes towards women and elite religiosity (r = -.239); between (prejudiced) 
attitudes towards race and elite religiosity (r = -.150); and between (hostile) attitudes 
towards others and elite religiosity (r = -.214). 
The study observes a positive correlation between the subscale ‘(hostile) attitudes 
towards other religions’ and popular religiosity (r = .159); between (subordinate) 
attitudes towards women and popular religiosity (r = .301); between (prejudiced) 
attitudes towards race and popular religiosity (r = .106); between (hostile) attitudes 
towards others and popular religiosity (r = .111); and between (conservative) in-group 
attitudes and popular religiosity (r = .170). 
The study observes a positive correlation between the subscale ‘(hostile) attitudes 
towards other religions’ and high religiosity (r = .073); and between (subordinate) 
attitudes towards women and high religiosity (r = .166). 
The study observes a negative correlation between the subscale ‘(hostile) attitudes 
towards other religions’ and education (r = -.121); between (subordinate) attitudes 
towards women and education (r = -.160); between (prejudiced) attitudes towards race 
and education (r = -.160); between (hostile) attitudes towards others and education 
(r = .118); and between (conservative) in-group attitudes and education (r = -.106). 
The study observes a positive correlation between the subscale ‘(subordinate) 
attitudes towards women’ and age group (r = .211); and between (prejudiced) attitudes 
towards race and age group (r = .115). 
These findings show that there are important socio-psychological differences in 
behaviour and attitudes among the two groups. Therefore, these research findings will 
be elaborated in the next chapter (see 6.2.4. Socio-Psychological Factors Affected by 
Elite and Popular Religiosity). 

6. Summary, Discussion and Conclusion
In the literature review we have argued that, although the distinction between elite and 
popular religiosity - as perceived in the Islamic world - seems to have had a far-
reaching influence on the way Muslims act and think, psychological and sociological 
literature has failed to investigate this influence - neither theoretical elaboration nor 
empirical research of this factor has taken place. Our study was designed to fill that 
gap. In order to conduct research in this neglected domain, we needed to develop a 
scale for assessing elite and popular religiosity. 
Starting from this point, the necessary steps of this study can be divided into several 
categories. The first step was a discussion of the general characteristics of elite and 
popular religiosity within Islam, together with an exploration of the differences and 
similarities between the two concepts. The second step was an exploration of the 
experience of elite and popular religiosity by considering demographic and social-
cultural factors in the Netherlands. Finally, the study aimed to reveal various socio-
psychological characteristics of elite and popular religiosity by surveying Dutch-
Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands. This chapter provides a summary of the 
most important research findings of our study and a discussion of the social and 
psychological implications for Dutch-Turkish Muslims. The contribution of this study 
to the scientific research of religion carried out in Muslim societies is also discussed. 
Finally, recommendations for future research are presented.  
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6.1. Summary of Research Findings 
This section presents the most important research results that contribute to answering 
the two research questions - with their sub-questions - that are central to this study. In 
addition, we will see which hypotheses found support, and which ones had to be 
rejected.  
6.1.1. Characteristics of the Respondents and the Questionnaire 
A survey was conducted among Turkish Muslims living in different parts of the 
Netherlands. There were 649 male and 516 female Turkish Muslim participants, 
varying in age from 18 to 68 years. The first part of the questionnaire was designed to 
identify the further demographic characteristics of the participants. The second part of 
the questionnaire was designed to obtain information about five dimensions of 
religion: the ideological, ritualistic, experiential, intellectual and consequential 
dimensions. This part of the questionnaire was not designed to discover the difference 
between elite and popular religiosity, but to investigate the difference between high 
religiosity and low religiosity, measured on a scale we called the General Religiosity 
Scale (GRS). 
In the GRS, as indicated in chapters 4 and 5, we divided the variable ‘general 
religiosity’ into two categories - an upper and a lower half - by using used the median 
of its frequency distribution. The lower half represents low religiosity and the upper 
half high religiosity. On the basis of this criterion, 272 (23,3 %) of the respondents 
were excluded from follow-up study and we continued the analysis of the other 893 
(76,7 %) respondents, who were labelled as experiencing ‘high religiosity’. 
The third part of the questionnaire consisted of two scales: the Elite Religiosity 
Scale and the Popular Religiosity Scale, both specially developed for the surveying of 
Dutch-Turkish Muslim communities. This part of the questionnaire, which 
distinguishes the current study from previous studies in the field, was specifically 
designed to uncover differences between elite and popular religiosity. 
6.1.2. Research Questions, Hypothesis and Results  
The following research questions were asked in this study: 
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RQ1: ‘What forms and motivations characterize elite and popular religiosity, what 
are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity, and how does 
this relate to the socio-economic status of Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the 
Netherlands?’ In order to be in a position to answer this main research question, we 
explored six sub-questions. The first sub-question was RQ1a: ‘How can the 
relationship between religion and culture be characterized, and how do we understand 
popular and elite religiosity in our research setting?’ (Chapter 2, ‘Theoretical 
Background’). 
In chapters 1, 2 and 3, which form the theoretical framework of this study, the 
relationship between elite/popular in culture and elite/popular in religion was explored; 
these insights were then applied to the sociological background of elite and popular 
religiosity and its foundations.  
The literature review showed that the ‘great’ and ‘little’ traditions in Islam, which 
are derived from the more expansive division of ‘great’ and ‘little’ traditions in culture, 
have great significance for understanding the religious structure of Turkish society. 
The second sub-question was RQ1b: ‘What are the characteristics of elite and 
popular religiosity in the context of Turkish - and possibly also Dutch - society, and 
how do these characteristics relate to the socio-economic status of (Dutch-) Turkish 
Muslims?’  
In chapter 3, some structural characteristics of a new Muslim religiosity scale were 
suggested, ranging from popular religiosity on one end of the continuum to elite 
religiosity on the other. These two extremes reflect the classification of the sub-
dimensions, which include belief (īmān), practice (ʿamal), knowledge (ʿilm / 
maʿrifah), experience (maʿūnat / ilhām) and consequences (natījah). Under these sub-
dimensions, the current study identified several characteristics, which according to us 
distinguish elite religiosity from popular religiosity. These characteristics are: 
dynamism versus stability, critical versus uncritical, without material expectations 
versus with material expectations, differentiated versus undifferentiated, experiential 
inessentiality and privacy versus experiential desirability and shareability, tolerant 
versus intolerant, and unprejudiced versus prejudiced. 
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The exploration of these two sub-questions was described in chapters 2 and 3. As a 
result of our literature review, we added additional research questions in order to 
achieve an even more articulated response to our main research question. The ensuing 
sub-questions were explored by way of a survey, and by means of an analysis of the 
collected data. The third sub-question was RQ1c: ‘What are the characteristics of elite 
and popular religiosity among Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands?’  
 Factor analyses and correlation analyses performed on the Elite Religiosity Scale 
and the Popular Religiosity Scale, showed that participants who experience elite 
religiosity tend to stress doubt and dynamism within the ideological aspect of 
religiosity. Within the ritualistic aspect, they tend to emphasize the intrinsic value of 
rituals (i.e., focus on quality). Within the intellectual aspect, they underline the 
importance of doubt about the validity of their current religious knowledge, and the 
dynamism of religious learning. Within the experiential aspect of religiosity, they 
consider miraculous religious experiences (special gifts from God in exchange for their 
religious effort) to be relatively unimportant: for them it is essential to keep these 
private.  
Participants who experience popular religiosity tend to stress the sureness and the 
stability of their current beliefs within the ideological aspect of religiosity. Within the 
ritualistic aspect, they emphasize the extrinsic value of rituals (i.e., focus on quantity) 
and they express material expectations. Within the intellectual aspect, they tend to be 
sure of their current religious knowledge and place intellectual stability at the centre. 
Within the experiential aspect of religiosity, they consider miraculous religious 
experiences to be an appropriate and necessary part of religious commitment, and they 
are eager to report such experiences to others.  
The fourth sub-question was RQ1d: ‘What are the patterns in the relationship 
between elite and popular religiosity?’ We hypothesized that ‘Elite and popular forms 
of religiosity are negatively correlated with each another’ (H1). We indeed found a 
negative correlation between elite religiosity and popular religiosity (r = -.72). 
The fifth sub-question was RQ1e: ‘How are elite and popular religiosity 
recognizable in the Dutch-Turkish research population, and how is this phenomenon 
socially located?’ The first hypothesis related to this sub-question was that ‘Turkish 
Muslim minorities living in the Netherlands predominantly experience popular 
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religiosity’ (H2). Of the 893 (76.7%) respondents with a strong religious affiliation, 
203 (22.7%) turned out to consistently experience elite religiosity, while 545 (61%) 
consistently experienced popular religiosity. 79 (8.8%) respondents who 
simultaneously experienced a low level of elite and popular religiosity and 66 (7.3%) 
respondents who simultaneously experienced a high level of elite and popular 
religiosity were excluded from further analysis. A total of 145 respondents (16.2%) 
were excluded after cross-tabulation analysis.  
The third hypothesis related to the fifth sub-question was: ‘First-generation 
respondents experience popular religiosity to a larger degree than second-generation 
respondents’ (H3). According to our findings, first-generation respondents do indeed 
experience popular religiosity more intensely than second-generation respondents. 
The fourth hypothesis related to the fifth sub-question was: ‘High level of elite 
religiosity significantly increases with education. High level of popular religiosity 
significantly decreases with education.’ (H4). The research results showed that there 
was a significant difference in the means of elite and popular religiosity based on 
educational status. Respondents with a higher level of education experienced a higher 
level of elite religiosity than respondents with a lower educational level. Similarly, 
respondents with a lower level of education experienced a higher level of popular 
religiosity than respondents with a higher educational level.  
The fifth hypothesis related to the fifth sub-question was: ‘High level of elite 
religiosity significantly increases with economic status. High level of popular 
religiosity significantly decreases with economic status.’ (H5). We found no significant 
difference in the means of elite religiosity based on income. However, we found a 
significant difference in the means of popular religiosity. Respondents with a higher 
income experienced a higher level of popular religiosity compared to respondents with 
a lower income. 
In addition to these hypotheses, we formulated a number of expectations with 
regard to the fifth sub-question (RQ1e). Because of the exploratory nature of our 
research, we explicitly described them as expectations rather than hypotheses. The first 
expectation was: ‘The experience of popular religiosity is higher among Muslim 
women than among Muslim men’ (E1). We found no significant difference in the 
means of elite and popular religiosity based on gender. The second expectation was: 
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‘Respondents who are middle-aged (36-55) or older (56 and above) experience popular 
religiosity to a larger degree than young respondents (18-35)’ (E2). The findings 
showed that there was a difference in the means of popular religiosity based on age. 
The middle-aged and older participants experienced popular religiosity more intensely 
than the young respondents. The third expectation was: ‘Respondents who identify 
themselves as ‘more religious than most’ predominantly experience popular 
religiosity’ (E3). We found that - based on the item ‘believing oneself to be more 
religious than most’ - there was a significant difference both in the means of elite 
religiosity and in the means of popular religiosity. Those who identified themselves as 
‘more religious than most’ predominantly experienced popular religiosity. The fourth 
expectation was: ‘Respondents who state that they acquire much of their religious 
knowledge through television programmes, experience a high level of popular 
religiosity’ (E4). We found that popular religiosity is positively correlated with 
acquiring religious knowledge through television programmes. The fifth expectation 
was: ‘Respondents who state that they acquire much of their religious knowledge 
through their family experience a high level of popular religiosity (E5). We found that 
elite religiosity was positively correlated with family (r = .18) while popular religiosity 
was not significantly correlated with family. The respondents were also asked how 
much the following items influenced their religious education: friends, school, books, 
religious leaders, mosques, religious foundations and the Internet. We found that elite 
religiosity was positively correlated with books (r = .26) and religious leaders (r = 
0.14), while negatively correlated with television (r = -.22). Elite religiosity turned out 
not to be significantly correlated with friends, school, mosques, religious foundations 
and the Internet. However, popular religiosity turned out to be positively correlated 
with religious leaders (r = .27), mosques (r = .24), TV (r = .25) and the Internet (r = 
.15), while not significantly correlated with friends, school, books and religious 
foundations. 
In light of our literature review, we expected a relationship between socio-
psychological attitudes and religiosity, and for this reason we formulated a second 
main research question and the following hypotheses: 
RQ2: ‘What are the socio-psychological differences in behaviour and attitudes 
among Dutch-Turkish Muslims who experience elite and popular religiosity 
respectively?’ Our hypotheses were: ‘Respondents motivated by elite religiosity are 
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more open to interaction with Christians than respondents motivated by popular 
religiosity (H6); ‘Men motivated by popular religiosity tend to have more subordinate 
attitudes towards women and more traditional ideas about gender, than men motivated 
by elite religiosity’ (H7); ‘Respondents motivated by popular religiosity tend to have 
more prejudiced attitudes towards other races/ethnicities than respondents motivated 
by elite religiosity’ (H8); ‘Respondents motivated by popular religiosity have a more 
hostile attitude towards others than respondents motivated by elite religiosity’ (H9); 
‘Respondents motivated by elite religiosity have a more harmonious attitude towards 
modernity than respondents motivated by popular religiosity’ (H10), and ‘Respondents 
motivated by elite religiosity exhibit less conservative in-group attitudes than 
respondents motivated by popular religiosity’ (H11). 
We found that respondents who experienced popular religiosity were less open and 
friendly towards other religions. Moreover, men who experienced popular religiosity 
had poorer views on the equality and rights of women compared to men who 
experienced elite religiosity. It also turned out that participants who experienced 
popular religiosity expressed more (racial/ethnic) prejudice, and showed more 
conservative in-group attitudes than participants who experienced elite religiosity. 
6.2. Discussion 
This theoretical and empirical study has yielded the result that the forms and 
motivations of high religiosity vary across different groups. Based on the findings of 
this study, out of the total group of participants who experienced high religiosity, six 
out of ten participants experienced popular religiosity, while only two out of ten 
experienced elite religiosity. 
Islam is not necessarily the most important factor in building the individual and 
social identity of Muslims. The literature and our sample suggest a number of 
demographic and socio-economic factors to explain why Dutch-Turkish Muslims 
generally experience popular religiosity. Some of these factors were briefly presented 
in the previous chapter, such as gender and age; educational status; household income; 
and social and cultural capital. There are many other factors that have not been directly 
addressed so far. These include the experience of immigration; structural and 
contextual factors such as the current economic and political crisis; government 




requires further investigation. In this section, therefore, we will continue to focus on 
the dynamic interrelation between elite and popular religiosity, and how this relates to 
the socio-economic situation of Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands. We 
discuss these relationships in light of our findings. We want to pay more attention to 
the role of these factors listed above, in order to deepen our understanding of the social, 
cultural and economic grounds of elite and popular religiosity.  
The following discussion consists of five parts. First, ‘Reflections on Glock’s Five-
Dimensional Scheme’ (6.2.1) discusses the validity of Glock’s 5-dimensional scale in 
the light of our findings. Second, ‘Multi-voiced-ness of Religious Identity’ (6.2.2) will 
discuss the patterns of the relationship between elite and popular religiosity. Third, 
‘Social-Cultural Factors Affecting Religiosity’ (6.2.3) will discuss factors that may 
have an impact on elite and popular religiosity. Six factors will be discussed in this 
part. Fourthly, in section 6.2.4 ‘Socio-Psychological Factors Affected by Elite and 
Popular Religiosity’, we continue to examine the processes and mechanisms by which 
religiosity may affect the socio-psychological attitudes of the research population. 
Finally, section 6.2.5 ‘Spirituality and Religiosity’ illustrates the relevance and 
significance of spirituality in the sociology of elite and popular religiosity. 
6.2.1. Reflections on Glock’s Five-dimensional Scheme 
As we outlined in chapter three, Glock indicated two types of research that could be 
conducted utilizing his five-dimensional scheme (see 3.1.2). The first type of research 
to which Glock referred focuses on the specification of components. He proposed a 
number of tentative components within the various dimensions, but emphasized that 
there was still a great deal of work to be done in the field of intra-dimensional 
differentiation. As we pointed out in chapter 3, Glock’s exploration in collaboration 
with Rodney Stark progressed according to this principle, in line of work done by 
Weber (1963), Allport (1967) and Allen and Spilka (1967). Afterwards, in 1968, Glock 
and Stark identified and measured three components within the ideological dimension 
and two components within the ritualistic dimension. In light of this finding, they had 
to conclude that at least some of the five dimensions (e.g., the ideological) might 
encompass unrelated or even negatively related phenomena, and that the specific 
components of the different dimensions “are much more independent of one another 
than they are measures of the same thing” (p. 181). In order to make a meaningful 
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distinction within these dimensions, this study applied the elite/popular religiosity 
distinction. Our data, to some extent, are consistent with Glock and Stark’s 
assumptions. In this study we found a negative correlation between our Elite 
Religiosity Scale and our Popular Religiosity Scale (r = -.72), scales that include elite 
and popular aspects of the ideological, ritualistic, intellectual and experiential 
dimensions.  
The second type of research to which Glock referred focuses on the question of 
inter-dimensional independence. As a result of this type of research, we found that 24 
items of our General Religiosity Scale loaded on a single dimension (see Appendix 
one: Table 36). In addition, our analysis revealed that 11 items of our Elite Religiosity 
Scale loaded on two factors. The first factor turned out to mainly represent elite belief 
(ideological dimension), elite ritual (ritualistic dimension) and elite knowledge 
(intellectual dimension). We labelled this factor ‘[spiritual and intellectual] 
differentiation’. The second factor turned out to mainly represent elite experience 
(experiential dimension). We labelled this factor ‘experiential inessentiality and 
privacy’. In the same way, factor analysis revealed that 11 items of our Popular 
Religiosity Scale loaded on two factors. The first factor mainly represented popular 
belief (ideological dimension), popular ritual (ritualistic dimension) and popular 
knowledge (intellectual dimension). We labelled this factor ‘material expectations and 
[spiritual and intellectual] stability’. The second factor primarily represented popular 
experience (experiential dimension). We labelled this factor ‘experiential desirability 
and shareability’.  
The data were generally in line with the study’s expectations. The ideological, 
ritualistic and intellectual dimensions appear to represent a single dimension and seem 
to encompass phenomena that are analytically separable and empirically negatively 
related (‘[spiritual and intellectual] differentiation’ and ‘material expectations and 
[spiritual and intellectual] stability’). The experiential dimension also seems to 
encompass phenomena that are analytically separable and empirically negatively 
related (‘experiential inessentiality and privacy’ and ‘experiential desirability and 
shareability’). Based on these findings, it can be said that our data support the first 
approach, i.e., ‘intra-dimensional differentiation’, but not the second, i.e., the ‘inter-
dimensional independence’ of the four dimensions. In other words, our research 
findings do not support the view that the five dimensions are empirical wholes. 
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Consequently, the findings of our research raise serious questions about the 
assumptions and conclusions found in many sociological studies of religion, especially 
serious questions about the research of scholars who focus on Turkish Muslims and 
generally support the view that the five dimensions are empirical wholes (Altınlı, 
2011; Atalay, 2005; Ayten, 2009; Kafalı, 2005; Mehmedoğlu, 2004;  Şahin, 2001; 
Uysal, 1995; Yaparel, 1987; Yapıcı, 2004; Yıldız, 1998, 2006). Most of these 
researchers have reported a positive relationship between the five dimensions, for 
instance. Our findings, on the other hand, suggest that the subcomponents of elite 
religiosity (elite belief, ritual, experience, knowledge) might be negatively correlated 
with the subcomponents of popular religiosity (popular belief, ritual, experience, 
knowledge) (see Table 17 in chapter 5, subsection 5.3). The findings of this study 
generally support the view that Glock’s five dimensions can be regarded as heuristic 
and exploratory devices encompassing a variety of phenomena, which should be 
operationalized, conceptualized and measured before other types of analysis are 
attempted.  
6.2.2. Multi-voiced-ness of Religious Identity. 
In this study we explored ‘What are the patterns in the relationship between elite and 
popular religiosity with regard to Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands’ 
(fourth sub-question, RQ1d). We hypothesized that ‘Elite and popular forms of 
religiosity are negatively correlated with each other’ (H1). We indeed found a negative 
correlation between elite religiosity and popular religiosity (r = - .72), as expected. 
However, this does not mean that there is a clear differentiation between the two forms 
of religiosity, since we found that 66 (7.3%) respondents experienced aspects of both 
types simultaneously. Moreover, the respondents who are labelled as displaying ‘elite 
religiosity’ are not completely opposed to popular forms of religiosity, and vice versa. 
So there is an important aspect that needs to be stressed before the relationship between 
elite and popular religiosity can be discussed. This concerns the simultaneous 
experience of both types of religiosity that appears to be characteristic of a significant 
number of respondents, as described in the previous chapter. Allport, faced with 
comparable results in his studies, criticized the logic of these respondents and tried to 
resolve this puzzle by describing the endorsement of both ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ 
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positions as “muddleheadedness” (Allport, 1967, p. 439).62 Pargament et al. reacted 
to this blunt statement by stating that scoring high on the two orientations is not 
necessarily logically inconsistent, in the sense that people both “live” (intrinsic) and 
“use” (extrinsic) their religion (1997, pp. 65-66). This intersectionality is one of the 
key features of the everyday context, the meeting and interplay between social 
categories and identities (Andrew Kam-Tuck Yip & Nynäs, 2012, p. 8). Based on the 
findings of this study, we would rather speak of a contextualized domination of one 
type of religiosity over another type, or in Hermans’ conceptualization, of the 
dominant position of one ‘voice’ over others at a given time and under specific 
circumstances (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010). The concepts of religious 
‘voice’ and position, and the Dialogical Self Theory (DST), can shed new light on the 
way in which individuals orchestrate their various voiced religious positions in so-
called I-positions in the ‘society of mind’ (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010). 
Hermans defines the dialogical self as a dynamic multiplicity of I-positions. The main 
characteristic of DST is: 
In the most succinct way, the dialogical self can be conceived of as a dynamic 
multiplicity of I-positions. In this view, the I emerges from its intrinsic contact 
with the (social) environment and is bound to particular positions in time and 
space. As such, the embodied I is able to move from one position to the other 
in accordance with changes in situation and time. In this process of 
positioning, repositioning and counterpositioning, the I fluctuates among 
different and even opposed positions (both within the self and between the self 
and perceived or imagined others), and these positions are involved in 
relationships of relative dominance and social power. As part of sign-mediated 
social relations, positions can be voiced so that dialogical exchanges among 
positions can develop. The voices behave like interacting characters in a story 
or movie, involved in processes of question and answer, agreement and 
disagreement, conflicts and struggles, negotiations and integrations. Each of 
them has a story to tell about their own experiences from their own 
perspective. As different voices, these characters exchange knowledge and 
information about their respective me’s, creating a complex, narratively 
structured self (Hermans, 2016, pp. 2-3). 
62 Allport defines “muddleheadedness” in the following way: “these individuals seem to opt 
for a superficial ‘hit and run’ approach. Their mental set seems to be ‘all religion is good’. 
‘My religious beliefs are what really lies behind my whole life’—Yes!’ ‘Although I believe in 
my religion, I believe there are many other important things in life’—Yes!’ ‘Religion is 
especially important to me because it answers many questions about the meaning of life’—
Yes!’ ‘The church is highly important as a place to cultivate good social relationships’—Yes!’ 
There seems to be one broad category— religion is OK.” (Allport, 1967, p. 439).  
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A strong key metaphor in DST is that of ‘voice’. When people take different 
positions, they tell different stories about themselves originating from different so-
called I-positions. All voices are coloured by the ideas, values, expectations and 
behavioural patterns of the different social and cultural groups of which an individual 
is a member. Other persons and cultural groups manifest themselves as voices 
speaking in the self (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010). 
For Hermans, ‘religion’ seems to have two meanings: ‘traditional religiosity’ and 
‘individual spirituality’. Hermans connects the traditional religious view with the 
traditional model of the self, and individual spirituality with the modern and 
postmodern model of the self. These conceptualizations include characteristics and 
motivations which are similar to those included in our conceptualizations of elite and 
popular religiosity, such as: reflective versus uncritical, openness to change versus 
closedness to change, associational versus communal, universal versus parochial, 
differentiated versus undifferentiated, personal versus institutional, and humility 
versus dogmatism. According to the traditional model of the self, “the self is not an 
autonomous entity but rather an integral part of a sacred whole” (Hermans & Hermans-
Konopka, 2010, p. 84). “The God of the traditional model is a sovereign who wishes 
humans to obey him, instead of getting involved in a mutual dialogue” (ibid., p. 85). 
Within this model “the hierarchical system suppresses individual autonomy and 
freedom” (ibid., p. 86), and “there is a strong belief in fate and destiny” (ibid., pp. 98-
99). The modern model of the self questioned these characteristics and found its 
justification not in a sacred order, but in the self as a sovereign, reflexive self. In the 
postmodern model of the self, the sovereign self is deconstructed as a multiple, 
fragmented, and decentred self, under the influence of diverse and constantly changing 
cultural forces (Zock, 2013, p. 19). 
Hermans does not see a strict distinction between these three models. He argues 
that a previous model of the self does not become completely obsolete in a subsequent 
stage, emphasizing that aspects of the traditional self are still present in the modern 
and postmodern self. He claims that traditional religion can easily go off the rails - 
reducing, contesting, and even replacing the reflexivity, autonomy, and openness that 
are dominant characteristics of the modern and postmodern self. Hermans draws 
attention to the ontological insecurity accompanying the complexity and diversity of 
the postmodern condition humaine. According to Hermans, religious fundamentalism 
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is an emotional and defensive coping mechanism to deal with the insecurity caused by 
the plurality and the fragmentation of the postmodern world. The voice of 
“fundamentalism” can be strong or weak depending on the context. According to 
Hermans, traditional religion is an important source of defensive localization 
(Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 114).  
This study acknowledges the ‘muddleheadedness’ of the religiosity of some 
participants, and suggests that DST provides an interesting theoretical framework for 
an explanation and further explanation of this phenomenon. Our quantitative analysis 
focused mainly on participants who strongly experienced either elite or popular 
religiosity. As explained earlier, we excluded participants who simultaneously 
experienced elite and popular religiosity from follow-up analysis, to enable a careful 
analysis of these two aspects of religiosity. We therefore preferred to analyze first 
those respondents for whom one of the religious voices was clearly dominant. In other 
words, we mainly analyzed those individuals who disagreed with or were in conflict 
with the other religious voice. But this does not mean that the other religious voice is 
completely absent and rejected in such individuals. On the contrary, certain 
circumstances led respondents to express themselves with certain religious voices and 
these expressions may change as circumstances change.  If we look, for example, at 
the participants who simultaneously expressed elite and popular religiosity, we can say 
that these different religious voices can, to a certain extent, be reconciled, even if they 
show very different and contradictory forms and motivations - just as postmodern 
relativism has drawn attention to the coexistence of disparate views and 
interpretations, even within one and the same person (Droogers, 2012, p. 72). 
In the following sections we will discuss the circumstances that can influence the 
nature of the interrelation between elite and popular religiosity, and which outcomes 
may be deduced from this.  
6.2.3. Socio-Cultural Factors Affecting Religiosity 
This section will discuss factors that may have an impact on elite and popular 
religiosity. Six factors will be discussed. The sub-paragraph ‘Immigration and 
Religiosity’ (6.2.3.1) discusses the impact of an immigration background on 
religiosity. The sub-paragraph ‘Education and Religiosity’ (6.2.3.2) highlights how 




We also discuss the issue of imam training and Diyanet’s position on the production 
of Islamic knowledge in regard to elite and popular religiosity. The sub-paragraph 
‘Age, Cohort and Generational Effects on Religiosity’ (6.2.3.3) illustrates the extent 
to which religiosity evolves in relation to age and generation. The sub-paragraph 
‘Economic Status and Religiosity’ (6.2.3.4) discusses the relation between a person’s 
economic situation and his/her religious orientation. The sub-paragraph ‘Digital Media 
and Religiosity’ (6.2.3.5) considers the religious education offered by television 
programmes, and how such programmes affect religiosity. Finally, ‘Gender and 
Religiosity’ (6.2.3.6) discusses the extent to which gender plays a role in elite and 
popular religiosity.   
6.2.3.1. Immigration and Religiosity 
The urban popular culture in Europe simply drew from various traditional cultures that 
were brought to the city, improvised in their forms, adapted by city dwellers to their 
new situation. For example, the festival and trade-fair culture which had long been a 
part of the ‘little’ tradition found its way into cities (Battani, Hall, & Neitz, 2004). 
Most Dutch-Turkish Muslims have a migrant background, although many were born 
in Europe. The first concern of Muslim migrants who came to the Netherlands was 
finding employment. First-generation migrants generally had a low level of education, 
and concerns about making money clearly took precedence over their Islamic identity 
(Böcker, 2000, p. 156). Most so-called ‘guest workers’ came from the rural areas of 
Turkey, and were joined by their family members in the years that followed (Abadan-
Unat, 1976). Islamic life in the Netherlands therefore exhibited a very rural character. 
At the same time, there was a steady influx of well-educated migrants, but these were 
fewer in number (Güngör & Küçükcan, 2006). On the basis of Norris and Inglehart 
(2004) and their axioms for religious adherence levels, we would assume that 
religiosity is influenced by the developmental level of the country of origin, whether 
this is primarily agricultural or industrial, or religiously pluralistic. 
In sum, although Turkey is considered to be an industrialized country, the migration 
from Turkey to the Netherlands in the last five decades was very rural in character. It 
seems that this rural character of migration did not only strongly influence the 
economic and educational status of Turkish migrants, but also their religious 
experience. A recent analysis of religion in the Turkish countryside in the twenty-first 




members of the rural working class who were religious, religiosity was only partly 
based on Muslim beliefs. Mardin showed that the structure and content of religious 
beliefs differed from what was promulgated in the city, and were heavily based on 
traditional beliefs, for example concerning magic (Mardin, 1995, p. 231).  
The rapid internal migration and urbanization taking place in Turkey, which began 
around 1950, was accompanied by cultural pressure for the large numbers of people 
of rural origin who moved to the city. In sociological analyses, this evolution brought 
the concept of centre-periphery to attention. This process was interpreted by Mardin 
(1995, p. 234) and Sarıbay (1985) as an invasion of the traditional urban culture by the 
periphery. However, according to Gellner’s (1994) and Türköne’s model (1993), 
traditional popular religiosity in the city is diluted in favour of elite Islam. According 
to Mardin’s and Sarıbay’s model, this change moves from the periphery towards the 
centre, while according to Gellner’s and Türköne’s model this change takes place from 
top to bottom. Mardin’s and Sarıbay’s model views this change as a corruption, while 
Gellner’s and Türköne’s model views it as an improvement. In this study, we object to 
defining social dynamics through such kind of moral evaluation. Instead, we will try 
to investigate how local practices and interpretations of groups refer to Islam and how 
they overlap, interconnect and feed into (or alter) the negotiation of Islam. 
From 1960 onwards, the external migration from Turkey to Europe and the 
continuing urbanization process triggered certain related problems and questions. The 
religious expressions of Muslim guest workers in the European public sphere in the 
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s can be described as signalling a kind of agoraphobia.63 
Muslim migrants were not often seen in the public sphere and even less heard. 
Gradually, during this period, the construction of mosques in the Netherlands led to a 
greater public visibility of Islam (Landman & Wessels, 2005). The 1990s can be 
characterized as the decade that encouraged Muslim migrants to discover the European 
society beyond the doors of their mosque, and to enter the public sphere in order to 
gain visibility. The growth of religious expression in the public sphere led to new 
                                                 
63 Agoraphobia is an anxiety disorder characterized by fear symptoms  in places or situations 
where the person experiences the environment as unsafe and feels trapped, helpless or 
embarrassed. These situations can include various kinds of open or public spaces, or simply 
being outdoors. 
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encounters for Europe’s secular societies, a process that many observers described as 
the return or revival of religion in the public sphere (Cherribi, 2010). 
This growing visibility of a Turkish-Muslim identity took place in relation to three 
distinct groups: the non-Muslim European majority, Muslim communities of different 
ethnic origins, and Turkish-Muslim communities that continued to reflect the old 
political and ideological divisions in Turkey. Some scholars have given voice to the 
view that this web of relationships enables Muslims to adopt an Islamic perspective 
that appreciates democratic values, recognizes the plurality of Islam in the 
Netherlands, and resists attempts to portray Muslims as a homogenous population 
(Güngör & Küçükcan, 2006).  
In order to understand the nature of the relationships between these groups, we must 
emphasize the pillarization model (verzuiling) that was peculiar to the Netherlands 
(Lijphart, 1975; Ter Avest & Bakker, 2013; Vink, 2007). In recent decades Muslims 
have defended their interests on the basis of two Dutch constitutional principles. The 
first is the constitutional principle of the neutrality of the state towards all religious 
groups. The other is the pillarization system, a socio-political system of organization. 
This is a denominational system for organizing not only religious but also ideological 
communities, such as Catholics, Protestants, Socialists, and Liberals. These groups 
used to have separate organizations in the field of education, health, media, and politics 
(Shadid & van Koningsveld, 1995; Sunier, 1998). In the 1970s followed an era of de-
pillarization, during which the Dutch population rapidly lost interest in religion.   As a 
result, the pillars have lost much of their salience  (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014, p. 35).  
In spite of this de-pillarization trend, the position of Muslims was strengthened by 
the emphasis placed on the equality principle in the 1983 constitutional reforms (Rath, 
Penninx, Groenendijk, & Meyer, 2001). Nowadays, the Dutch authorities use the 
pillarization system to anticipate the need for religious, educational, media, and health 
facilities. With the ongoing discussion as the separation of state and religion grows 
and religion in the majority society melts away, the opportunities for Muslim 
organizations to be accepted as a separate pillar diminish. Nevertheless, the residual 
system from the pillarization period provides Muslims with a strong basis for applying 
for government funding to found public broadcasting organizations and educational 
facilities (e.g., Islamic schools and the Islamic University of Rotterdam). The 
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pillarization system also gives Muslims access to the state-supported national and local 
media (Yükleyen, 2011, p. 151; See also Akbulut, 2016; Budak, Bakker, & ter Avest, 
2018). 
Critics have claimed that this strategy stimulated a separatist approach and did not 
promote ‘integration’ (Landman, 2002). It was further argued that this produced a new 
type of  structurally excluded ghettoes (Kaya, 2009, p. 167), and did little to improve 
the marginal situation of Dutch Muslims (Vasta, 2007).  
Nevertheless, the pillarization system has had many advantages for Muslim 
communities. It provided them with a plural religious market for a peaceful 
modernization process, for instance. Pillarization has played a crucial role in the 
external opportunities that have shaped Muslim mobilization and the 
institutionalization of Islam over the past 35 years (Kaya, 2009; Maussen, 2012). The 
confessionally defined pillars, which nearly organized every aspect of citizen’s daily 
lives in a religious way, helped many Dutch-Turkish Muslims to enter modernity 
without losing their sense of ontological security (Ter Borg, 2009).64 However, the 
side effects of modernization, in particular the loss of ontological security, cannot be 
underestimated. The argument put forward in recent articles (Turner & Arslan, 2013; 
Voyé, 2004) is that, in a globalizing context, divisions between religions have 
increased rather than decreased and that there is a risk that multicultural societies 
become seriously divided. The fear and uncertainty65 may encourage people to 
delegate religious power to ‘specialists’ or persons with a potential for charisma who 
64 Ontological security is term used by Giddens to describe the basic human need for 
predictability and understandability of the world: people need the social and natural worlds in 
which they live  to show a recognizable pattern, so that they can operate in these worlds with 
a certain degree of confidence. The term thus refers to the search for some sort of order in an 
uncertain and often changing world (Giddens, 1979). 
65 Hermans and Hermans-Konopka indicate that “uncertainty can be reduced by giving the 
lead to one powerful position that is permitted to dominate the repertoire as a whole. When 
people are located in a field of divergent and contradictory positions where they have to give 
answers to a variety of complex situations, the transfer of responsibility to some authority, 
guru, strong leader, or “godfather’’ may be a way to reduce the burden of uncertainty when it 
has reached the level of negative feelings. This reaction can be seen in cases of religious 
orthodoxy or political fundamentalism as they thrive on simplification. It can also be noticed 
in the supporters of political parties that take an extreme and radical stance on issues of 
immigration and want to close national boundaries for newcomers” (See: Hermans & 
Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 45). 
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will seize this opportunity, and seek to increase the religious power offered to them by 
converting it into other types of power (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 45; 
Ter Borg, 2009). As Ter Borg points out, popular religion is usually fragmentary and 
ad hoc, and on permanent standby for any occasion when ontological security is at risk 
(2004, 2008). For this reason, popular religiosity can stimulate fundamentalist and 
ethnocentric views in a globalizing context. 
On the basis of our earlier observations in the field, we can express the view that 
the construction of society through pillars is not beneficial for religious pluralism, 
coherence or cosmopolitanism in the long run. Turkish religious and political groups 
constitute parallel mental worlds to a certain extent, and remain relatively independent 
of each other. Intra-religious and cultural dialogue between these groups has little or 
no effect. Each group has its own religious and ideological reality, and this reality is 
emphasized, for example, through Friday sermons and periodical publications (such 
as newspapers and magazines) with particular reference to their religious and 
ideological basis. As one imam put it, “They don’t go to each other’s mosques. These 
communities and their mosques behave like churches”  (Yükleyen & White, 2007, p. 
30). Further observations indicate that zones of encounter are steadily diminishing. 
The feast of Ramadan and the feast of Sacrifice, which brought the broader community 
of Muslims together in the 1980s and 1990s, are now celebrated in much narrower 
settings. Each community prefers to celebrate its festivals with its own members: those 
with whom one shares a particular worldview or religious understanding. However, 
these special days are intended to bring the wider Muslim community together, despite 
differences in religious, cultural and political worldviews. On the basis of our 
observations, we have to conclude that the opposite is happening today: the ‘pillars’ 
are strongly encouraged not to mix. Group interests are prioritized and the cohesive 
objectives of religion are suspended. In such communitarian settings, group solidarity 
is maintained and strengthened by serving God, and, if necessary, by demonizing other 
groups (a strategy also used in the ideology wars between the traditional Dutch pillars 
(Ter Borg, 2009)).  
The 2012 report of the Social Cultural Planning Bureau (SCP, scientific institute 
that conducts social scientific research and reports to the Dutch government) strongly 
supports these observations. Dutch-Turkish citizens score low on ‘integration’ 
compared to other groups. They have less contact with the Dutch majority society, 
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they are less proficient in the Dutch language, they lag behind on the labour market 
and in schools, and have a ‘traditional’ view on moral values (Huijnk & Dagevos, 
2012). According to the SCP, this low integration score could be linked to a number 
of factors. One of the possible factors is the strong attachment to religious 
organizations within the Turkish community. A recent survey has revealed that, 
compared to three other groups of migrants (Moroccans, Surinamese, and Antilleans), 
Dutch-Turkish citizens have strong and stable religious organizations. The dominant 
image that has taken root in the Dutch public debate - particularly in politics and in the 
media -  is that the Dutch-Turkish community is less open to Dutch society as a whole 
and is more oriented towards Turkish society. In this context, the term ‘parallel 
community’ or ‘parallel society’ has often been mentioned (Speelman, 2016, p. 166). 
Recently, many scholars have stressed the need for a process of de-pillarization. 
They see a direct relationship between the rise of popular culture and the de-
pillarization of Dutch society. For the pillarized organizations, which were based on 
political and religious values, popular culture posed a threat because it was thought to 
create undisciplined and uncontrolled collectives of individuals, who would follow 
their own taste and emotions, which would ultimately lead to the dissolvement of the 
pillarized organisation’s very disciplined religious/ideological basis (Moore & Nierop, 
2006). The de-pillarization trend will undoubtedly also stimulate new religious 
transformations in Muslim communities. The question then becomes to what extent 
and in what way processes of individualization and de-pillarization encourage the 
Dutch-Turkish Muslim communities? According to some, the search for a ‘pure’ Islam 
without local communities and culture could push Muslims towards Salafism (see 
6.2.3.2). Others, however, believe that new forms of spirituality might emerge within 
European societies, which could attract a considerable number of people (see 6.2.5). 
We will briefly discuss these issues in the following paragraphs. 
6.2.3.2. Education and Religiosity 
Different studies have offered different conclusions regarding the relation between 
religiosity and education, depending on whether religiosity is measured by religious 
practice (e.g., attendance at places of worship) or specific religious beliefs (e.g., belief 
in miracles). Substantial differences between nations have emerged. For example, 
some studies indicate  that the intensity of belief decreases with education, while 
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attendance at places of worship and religious practice increases with education (Eilers, 
Seitz & Hirschler, 2008; Sacerdote & Glaeser, 2001). Other studies indicate that 
religious people have, on average, a higher level of education than people with little to 
no religious faith (Kavanagh, 2011; Norris & Inglehart, 2011;Smith, 1998). Yet other 
studies find that the positive correlation between low religious affiliation / absence of 
religious affiliation and education has been reversed in recent decades (Smith & Snell, 
2009; Voas & McAndrew, 2014). One study concluded that in the US the majority of 
professors, even at ‘elite’ universities, are religious (Gross & Simmons, 2009). 
Looking at the overall picture generated by the studies carried out in Western 
countries, it can be shown that a positive relationship between religiosity and education 
is more common (Köktaş, 1993). However, studies carried out in particular in Turkey 
show that a higher level of education causes a general decline in several aspects of 
religiosity. For example, Köse and Ayten (2009) indicate a negative relationship 
between education and popular religious beliefs. Günay (1999) and Köktaş (1993) 
indicate that as the level of education increases, the tendency to carry out daily prayers 
and fasting decreases. In the Netherlands, for example, more highly educated Muslims 
of Turkish descent practice their religion considerably less, and adhere less strictly to 
the rules than their less well-educated compatriots (Maliepaard & Gijsberts, 2012).66  
One of the important conclusions that can be drawn from the present study is the 
important role of education in the changes in the level of elite and popular religiosity 
observed among Dutch-Turkish Muslims. We found that the intensity of elite 
religiosity increases with education, while the intensity of popular religiosity decreases 
with education (see: Table 23 in chapter 5, subparagraph 5.3.3.1).  
This raises questions for further analyses. Will popular religiosity decline in the 
coming years? Will popular religiosity still appeal to Dutch-Turkish Muslims in the 
future as the new generations grow up and as the average level of education among 
young Muslims increases? Future longitudinal studies on popular religiosity might be 
able to answer these questions. Researchers found that Dutch-Turkish citizens lag 
66 If we look at mosque attendance by Dutch-Turkish Muslims with higher and lower levels 
of education, it is striking that until 2004 the higher educated visited the mosque less often 
than the lower educated; however, since 2004 this difference has disappeared and the higher 
and lower educated visit the mosque with equal frequency (Maliepaard & Gijsberts, 2012). 
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behind in education when compared to indigenous Dutch citizens (Driessen, 2012, p. 
74; Hartgers, 2012, pp. 18-21; Staring, Geelhoed, Aslanoglu, Hiah & Kox, 2014). 
According to recent research by the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (‘Statistics 
Netherlands’, CBS), the educational level of Dutch-Turkish citizens is the lowest 
among the non-native populations living in the Netherlands.67 However, a slight 
increase in the education level of the Dutch-Turkish population has been noted 
(Driessen, 2012, p. 25; Gijberts & Iedema, 2012, pp. 90-91; Gijberts & Vervoort, 2009; 
Herweijer, 2009, p. 106; Herweijer, 2012, pp. 103-104; Stevens, Clycq, Timmerman 
& Van Houtte, 2011, p. 13). There is also an educational gap between the first and 
second-generation Muslims living in the Netherlands: while the first generation 
received little education, the second generation is gradually entering higher education 
(CBS, 2010; Dagevos, Gijsberts & Praag, 2003; Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2009; SCP, 
2011). 
It therefore seems that education, one of the important socio-economic factors 
linked to religiosity, plays a varied and important role in different aspects of Turkish 
religiosity. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to generalize the results. As we will 
discuss below, the education provided by Dutch Muslim organizations and the 
religious elite, and the religious education provided by the parents, are also significant 
socio-economic factors in the development of Muslim religiosity, and therefore need 
more attention. 
Education Supplied by Official Elites 
There are many factors that could influence the religious characteristics of Turkish 
Muslim minorities in the decades to come. Insight into suppliers of Islam (the supply 
side) is just as important as insight into the demand side. Among these suppliers, 
Islamic communities have a particularly strong position in the Netherlands. They will 
determine the course of the interaction between elite and popular religiosity, and might 
push current developments into new directions. 
Just like in Turkey, where the Qurʾān schools undertook pioneering work within 
the Muslim community, Islamic educational groups started to organize themselves in 
67 See Figure 5 in the appendix two: ‘Proportion of highly-educated 25 to 64-year olds by 
ethnic background’. 
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the Netherlands in the 1970s. These included the Turkish Diyanet Foundation, the Nur 
movement68, the Milli Görüş Movement, and the Süleymancı Movement (Bommel, 
1992, pp. 135-137). We found no significant differences in the distribution of elite and 
popular religiosity linked to community involvement. We prefer to avoid 
generalizations with regard to these Islamic communities, as such small subsamples 
cannot possibly lead to valid generalizations with regard to the community as a whole. 
These communities deserve special attention.  
However, it may be appropriate here to consider a problem that is shared by all of 
them. It concerns the training of imams. The relations between Islamic communities 
such as Milli Görüş, the Nur Movement, Süleymancı, Diyanet and others are based on 
competition. Although they use different strategies, they all have the priority to 
increase their number of followers. This has led to competition when organizational 
interests clash. The differences in imam training and the failure to establish a 
representative body for Muslims, illustrate this clash of interests (Yükleyen & White, 
2007, p. 129). Dutch public debates assume that there is an inherent tension between 
the traditional task of an imam and his tasks in the secularized Dutch society (Boender 
& Kanmaz, 2002; Boender, 2007). The questions that arise relate to  two central issues: 
the transmission of Islam to young people living in European secular societies and, at 
a more abstract level, the criteria that ‘proper’ leaders of European Muslim 
communities must meet. Can they act as intermediaries between European and Islamic 
societies? Do they have sufficient knowledge of the host country to counsel young 
people? To what extent do the countries of origin exert political and ideological 
influence on Muslims in the host countries through these key figures? How can these 
imams function in the host society if they do not speak Dutch? How do they interpret 
the norms and values of their host societies? Should they not receive their training in 
the host country instead of in their country of origin? (Boender, 2013; Boender & 
Kanmaz, 2002). These pressing questions and the changing political climate should 
stimulate the development of an educational programme for training imams in the 
Netherlands, which has gone through a very complicated process of discussion and 
negotiation for almost a quarter of a century (Ghaly, 2008). The issue remains highly 
relevant. These Islamic groups all have their own mosques and their own imams, 
68 This is not a homogeneous group. Although all members are declared followers of Said 




specifically chosen from individuals with the same ideological background in Turkey. 
Most of these imams are incompetent in many respects even they have received high 
education; they can recite the Qurʾān in phonetic Arabic but do not understand the 
language; they know little more about Islamic law than the basic elements, which they 
have not learned to interpret. To this day, imported imams have no experience of 
European urban life, they often do not speak Dutch, and are appointed only for a 
limited period of time. 
In the 1980s, it seemed that mosque imams had much more influence in the diaspora 
than in their home countries, because of the different functions that the mosque 
fulfilled in the diaspora. However, second and third-generation migrants tend to 
understand the language of their country of residence better than the language of their 
parents or grandparents (Bruinessen, 2011). Recently, this influential role of imams 
has begun to fade. Young Muslims became dissatisfied with imams whose experiences 
lacked any connection with their own Dutch lives. Instead, they began to nurture their 
own Islamic self-understanding and they feel no need for religious guidance or 
authority. It has been observed that young Muslims prefer to develop their own 
individual religiosity and prefer to find their own answers, independent of mosques or 
religious specialists (Becker & De Hart, 2006; Borg, 2008; Sunier, 2014; WRR, 2006). 
The evolution was that parents stopped sending their children to Qurʾān schools, and 
that the position of the imam as a religious authority became threatened. It is clear that 
an imam with insufficient knowledge of Dutch is seriously handicapped in his 
communication with second and third-generation Muslims (Landman, 1999).   
One of the respondents, Yunus (44), stated that: 
When I have questions in my mind, I prefer to just search for answers on Google 
rather than asking imams. My friends don’t want to ask their imam any more 
questions either, because they already know that he won’t have the right answer. 
Unfortunately, the imams come from Turkey and you cannot apply their answers 
here.  
This is because officials have become indifferent and ‘lazy’ in their work and have 
lost their ability to be socially responsive, as was the case in the context of state-
supported religious monopolies in pre-modern and early modern Europe (Stark & 
McCann, 1993). Turkish Muslim immigrants are faced with the challenge to reconcile 
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their religious identity with the Dutch culture in which they grew up.69 Moreover, the 
terrorist attacks in Europe and the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a 
Dutch-Moroccan Islamic fundamentalist shocked the entire nation, forcing the 
government to take measures against what it feared was an increasingly radical culture 
among Muslims. The lack of knowledge of the Dutch culture and Dutch language 
among imams was seen a major obstacle to Muslim integration. With respect to 
second-generation radicalization, Tillie (2010), Kepel (2006) and Olivier Roy (2004) 
indicate that many young people reject a large part of their parents’ (and their imams’) 
understanding of Islam as irrelevant local culture, and that the search for a ‘pure’ Islam 
without culture almost inevitably draws them towards Salafism.70  
In response, the Dutch government set up pilot programmes in Islamic theology in 
2005 (De Koning, 2014). In 2007, government-funded imam training initiatives,71 
arguing that “training for imams in the Netherlands may significantly contribute to the 
integration of young migrants in particular, and help them to defend themselves against 
radicalization” (Dutch Ministry of Justice, 2007). It has also been brought up that 
imams trained in the Netherlands would be better acquainted with the Dutch 
situation.72 They could also act as a bridge between the Muslim community and Dutch 
69 Here we are mainly focusing on Turkish institutions and communities. Outside the Turkish 
communities, however, there are certain initiatives which are rarely consulted by members of 
the Turkish communities. In general, Muslims in the West to a certain extent consult a variety 
of religious authorities on all kinds of problems related to the application of the norms and 
values of their faith in the Western context. The religious authorities consulted by them are 
located in both the Muslim and the Western world. Moreover, councils of Islamic 
jurisprudence, both at the national and the international levels, are developing new 
interpretations of Islamic values as well, based on the modern principle of collective ijtihâd. 
For more information see: Shadid & van Koningsveld, 2002, pp. 149-170.  
70 However, Olivier Roy notes that compared to other Muslims, Turkish migrants tend to 
preserve their language and ethno-national identity (Roy, 2004, p. 123) 
71 Welmoet Boender discusses the immigration policy with regard to imams. In her view, fear 
of fundamentalism should not be the sole motivation for governmental action in this domain. 
Boender questions whether this interference is appropriate, given a long history of creating a 
negative image of Islam. According to Boender, “only if there are real extremist actions - on 
religious or political grounds - which disturb the public order, should the government interfere 
and let the public interest prevail” (see Boender, 2000, pp. 155-169). 
72  The Ministries of Internal Affairs and Education formulate this as follows: “The 
organisational religious and worldview levels can contribute to the views of their members on 
Dutch society and can strengthen their sense of responsibility towards that society. They can, 
together with other societal forces, prevent their members from decaying into marginality and 
worse [sic]; they may help their members to make the right choices concerning their 
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society and thus contribute to the integration of Muslim migrants (Rath, Penninx, 
Groenendijk & Meyer, 2001). The government intended to develop a socio-cultural 
policy that encompassed religion and ‘life principles’ (Landman, 1999).  
Over the past decades, the Dutch Diyanet Foundation (Islamitische Stichting 
Nederland, ISN) succeeded in becoming the largest mosque organization in the 
Netherlands, controlling 143 of the 220 Dutch-Turkish mosques (Sunier & Landman, 
2011, 2014). However, the representatives of Turkish Islam in Europe have refrained 
from participating in this project as partners due to reservations about Diyanet’s 
curriculum and the teacher’s educational backgrounds. The training of imams in 
Europe and the recruitment of candidates among Muslims living in Europe have not 
been Diyanet’s priorities in recent years. Instead, Diyanet draws from a vast pool of 
imams trained in Turkish high schools for imams (imam hatip lisesi), and from 
preachers and practitioners at their theological faculties. However, increasing criticism 
of this policy by European Muslims and politicians has prompted Diyanet to take up 
this issue and to enter into negotiations about setting up imam training facilities in 
Europe (Sunier & Landman, 2014). Diyanet chose to develop its own project, whereby 
Muslim students who graduated from the Imam Hatip School73 in the Netherlands 
would move to Turkey to study at Turkish theology faculties under Turkish scholars. 
In this way, young Muslims who have been predominantly immersed in the Dutch 
language and culture, could learn the Islamic sciences directly from Muslim scholars 
and become the new generation of imams in Europe. Under this policy, the Imam Hatip 
School supported by Diyanet started to work in 2013 under the umbrella of Ibn 
Ghaldoun, an Islamic school for VMBO, HAVO and VWO students in Rotterdam 
(Anadolu Ajansı, 2013). 
The project of the Dutch government ended due to high costs and low participation 
of Muslim students. Moreover, Diyanet’s project was stopped by the Dutch Ministry 
of Education because of a scandal that broke out at the time, which resulted in the 
functioning in the economic, social and cultural sense, while respecting Dutch law and Dutch 
social rules. Imams can make an important contribution to this.” See: Nota Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken en OC&W, 1998, pp. 8-9. 
73 As the name suggests, these schools were originally founded to train government-employed 
imams, after the abolition of madrasas in Turkey through the Unification of Education act. 
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closure of the Ibn Ghaldoun School (Kasteleijn, 2013).74 
The other question is whether Diyanet really is able to train elite imams for 
European societies through working with Turkish theology faculties. Recent 
developments have aroused doubts. In 2012, the attempt of the he Council of Higher 
Education (CoHE)75 to abolish the philosophy courses offered by the faculty of 
theology seemed to signal anti-academic sentiment in Turkey (Demircan, 2015b). In 
response, a considerable number of theologians stated that abolishing the philosophy 
courses offered by theology faculties would in the medium and long term promote 
Salafism in Turkey, and that this form of theological education would lead nowhere 
(Demir, 2015; Kara, 2013). These sharp reactions from academics led to the 
withdrawal of the proposal (Today’s Zaman, 2013). However, afterwards, the Council 
of Higher Education unexpectedly made a number of changes to the curriculum, which 
led to renewed discussions. These changes in the curriculum of theology faculties 
prove to a certain extent that Fatih M. Şeker was right when he stated in his books The 
Formation Period of Turkish Religious Thought (2013) and The Turkish Mindset and 
Philosophy of Life (2015) that the new Salafism increasingly dominates the 
contemporary Turkish interpretations of Islam. Such interpretations of Islam can lead 
to extreme hostility towards traditional interpretative communities and towards all 
forms of rationalism, intellectualism and mysticism in Islam (Reddig, 2011). 
Yapıcı (2002) illustrated some characteristics of dogmatic religiosity. Although the 
orientation of popular religion and Salafism is not identical, it can be seen that both 
types of religiosity share a number of similar dogmatic characteristics. Both types of 
religiosity emphasize a homogenized idea of Islam and textually and philologically 
centred interpretative orientations; they share a belief in the fixed, stable meaning of 
the Qurʾanic text; and they lack a thematic value- and goal-centred approach to 
Qurʾanic hermeneutics (Demircan, 2015a; İşcan, 2006, 2015; Lohlker, 2011; Scalett, 
74 In September 2014, it was succeeded by the Avicenna College, a new Islamic secondary 
school with a new board of management (De Koning, 2015). 
75 The higher education system in Turkey is supervised by the Council of Higher Education 
(CoHE). The CoHE is an autonomous institution which is responsible for the planning, 
coordination and governance of higher education system in Turkey in accordance with the 




2006; Yapıcı, 2002). For this reason we believe that it is not very difficult for Salafi 
movements to manipulate and influence those population groups that experience 
popular religiosity. According to recently published data collected by the Pew 
Research Center in 11 countries with a significant Muslim population, respondents 
overwhelmingly expressed negative views on ISIS. Seven out of ten respondents in 
Turkey had unfavourable opinions about ISIS, while one out of ten (8%) had positive 
opinions (Poushter, 2015). Although these numbers are encouraging, 8% of a 
population of 79 million in Turkey is still 6 million people, a frighteningly large 
number. Other reports found fewer positive opinions among Muslim respondents 
(Akyol, 2014; Global Turkey Social Trends Survey, 2016). 
From this point of view, it can be said that the religiosity experienced by Dutch-
Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands is to some extent exposed to Salafi ideologies.  
6.2.3.3. Age, Cohort and Generational Effects on Religiosity 
Studies on the effect of age and generation on religiosity report that intense religious 
changes are taking place among second-generation migrants (Azak, 2008; Berger, 
2015). But the direction of the change is interpreted differently by scholars. A majority 
of scholars indicate that the second generations who descend from North African or 
Turkish migrant families, consider themselves more strongly as Muslims when 
compared to their elders. The second generation is more religious, in the sense that it 
is more strict in its observance of the rules of Islam and its search for an authentic or 
‘pure’ Islam (Roeland, Aupers, Houtman, De Koning & Noomen, 2010), i.e., an Islam 
based on its normative sources (Bartels, 2000; Buijs, 2009; Buijs, Demant & Hamdy, 
2006; Buitelaar, 2006; Korf & Bovenkerk, 2007). However, a different analysis shows 
that there is a pattern of secularization among Muslims in Europe: the longer they stay 
in Europe, the higher their level of education, and the more they participate in the 
labour market, the less concerned they become about their religion. (For the 
Netherlands see: Huijnk, 2018; Lans & Rooijackers, 1992; Phalet & Haker, 2004; 
Phalet & van Praag, 2004) (For Germany see: Şen, 2008). 
Islam in the EU countries shows a range of differences which are linked to the 
countries of origin. The findings of our study, which largely revolve around a Dutch-
Turkish sample, are to a certain extent in line with the findings referred to above, which 
report the secularization of the second generation (cf. Huijnk, 2018, p. 84). Our 
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analysis revealed a positive correlation between age and general religiosity, which 
indicates that the older respondents - who in our study are mainly first generation - are 
more religious than the younger respondents - who in our study are mainly second 
generation. Our main objective, however, is not just to measure the correlations 
between general religiosity and age and generation. Instead, we seek to measure the 
correlations related to age and generation with a focus on the intra-religious aspects of 
general religiosity, i.e., with a focus on elite and popular religiosity. 
Our expectation was that ‘Respondents who are middle-aged (36-55) or older (56 
and above) experience popular religiosity to a larger degree than young respondents 
(18-35)’ (E2). Our findings indicated that older respondents experience popular and 
high religiosity to a larger degree than younger respondents (see Table 28 in chapter 
5, sub-paragraph 5.3.3.5). In connection with this result, we also found that first-
generation respondents experience popular and high religiosity to a larger degree than 
second-generation respondents (see Table 26 in chapter 5, sub-paragraph 5.3.3.3).  
If we look at the age effect, the religious tendencies of the respondents can be 
explained in a different way. Sociologists have specified how religiosity changes 
depending on age or life-cycle events, such as leaving the parental home or marriage. 
These are referred to as ‘age effects’ on religiosity. This approach assumes that the 
effects of ageing on religiosity are constant over time (Roof & Wilson, 1983). For 
example, young adults currently have little religious involvement, but when they are 
40 and married, their involvement in a religious community will increase, and when 
they are 60 and face death, that involvement will increase even further. The following 
ideas may also be suggested in order to explain the results listed above. Young people 
are a less socialized group and less likely to fulfil traditional roles, which may reduce 
their interest in popular religiosity. On the other hand, older people invest more in 
traditional role patterns, attitudes and beliefs, and are less motivated to re-examine 
them. These beliefs could make them receptive to popular religiosity (Güngör, 2012; 
Hökelekli, 2006, 2009; Karaşahin, 2012). 
Other questions that arise here are to what extent the power of religious heritage 
differs for Turks living in the Netherlands and Turks living in Turkey, and to what 
extent the religiosity of the parents and grandparents influences the religiosity of the 
second and third generation. Another theory that should be mentioned here is ‘the 
continuity theory of ageing.’ This theory states that:  
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In making adaptive choices, middle-aged and older adults attempt to preserve and 
maintain existing psychological and social patterns by applying familiar 
knowledge, skills, and strategies. According to this theory, continuity in aging is 
seen as a dynamic and evolutionary developmental process in which individuals 
grow, adapt, and change; however, these changes are consistent with the person’s 
underlying ideology and past experiences (Diggs, 2008, p. 233). 
Our study is not a longitudinal study and therefore does not investigate changes in 
faith, belief, and behaviour over time. This study is cross-sectional because it has been 
performed only once and the results are limited to the time at which the study was 
performed. All we can say here is that our findings were counterintuitive to our 
expectations. Our expectations were that religious elites tend to emphasize verification 
of beliefs, which includes doubt and questioning, and that respondents who adhere to 
popular religiosity tend to emphasize imitation through the family connection. Initial 
analysis showed that items 39 and 68 related to the family connection did not correlate 
significantly with the other elite and popular religiosity scale items. Therefore, these 
items were excluded.76 In addition, respondents were asked to what extent their family 
influenced their religious education. Contrary to our expectations (E5), we found that 
elite religiosity is positively correlated with family (r = .18). We found no significant 
correlation between popular religiosity and family-based religious education, contrary 
to our qualitative findings gathered through participant observation. On the basis of 
these qualitative findings, we continue to believe that the religiosity of family elders 
is an important and influential factor in popular religiosity. We estimate that this aspect 
of religiosity is very sensitive and needs more attention in the area of item construction, 
in order to obtain reliable findings and to avoid irritation on behalf of the respondents. 
To explore this issue further, we can consult a recent study on the intergenerational 
effects of migration published in 2015. This study compared three dimensions77 
between Turks living in Europe and Turks living in Turkey from generation to 
generation. It was found that first-generation migrants and non-migrants did not show 
76 The excluded items related to family connection were: Item 39 - A major factor in my 
religious development has been the importance of religion for my parents; Item 68 - I gained 
my religious knowledge mainly through my parents. 
77 The three dimensions that were measured were: subjective religiosity - reflects a person’s 
judgment of his/her own piety; individual religiosity - comprises the practice of religious 
duties such as prayer or fasting which can be performed on an individual basis in private 
places; communal religiosity  -  public manifestations of religion, such as communal worship 
or Friday prayers. 
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a significant difference on any religiosity measures (Guveli & Ganzeboom, 2015, p. 
303). This finding contradicts the assimilation hypothesis that migrants adopt the 
secular way of life of European countries over time. On the other hand, this finding 
does support the religious reliance hypothesis,78 according to which migrants are 
expected to be more religious than non-migrants or as religious as non-migrants. The 
authors of the study concluded that grandparents and parents had a significant positive 
influence on each of the three measurements of religiosity (Guveli & Ganzeboom, 
2015, p. 305). This also indicates that the manner in which parents and grandparents 
believe and practice their religion has positive effects on their children or 
grandchildren.79 Empirical results of international surveys like the one conducted by 
Gallup (2002, 2009), confirm that Turks involve their families, especially their parents, 
in making important decisions. A high degree of continuity in religious ideas and 
practices was observed (Sunier, 1992). This may mean that the majority of young 
Turkish Muslims will experience a higher degree of popular religiosity as they grow 
older, precisely because their family elders experience popular religiosity to a high 
degree.  
However, some aspects of cultural-religious heritage can only be retained with 
considerable difficulty. This applies in particular to religious practices and rituals 
connected with a local or regional religious infrastructure in the country of origin, such 
as aspects connected with the veneration of saints, the celebration of seasonal festivals, 
and many other aspects of popular religion (Shadid & van Koningsveld, 1992). As 
Landman (1992, p. 52) points out: “whereas about 300 mosques have been established 
in the Netherlands so far, it may take quite some time before the first Sufi saint whose 
tomb could become the centre of religious activity will be buried in this country. Only 
then will popular Sufism be institutionalized in Holland.” 
Relations between religious and ethnic identity, age and generation can reflect the 
effect of living through a particular period in history, in specific circumstances. This 
is called a period effect or, in sociology, a ‘cohort effect’. Cohort analysis reminds us 
78 Religious reliance theory argues that migrants retain their religious involvement, identity, 
and beliefs because religion is a resource in their new environment. See: (Levitt & Jaworsky, 
2007). 
79 Marjo Buitelaar’s qualitative study is one of the important publications on life stories about 
parenting styles and the transmission of religion. See: Buitelaar, 2013.  
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that the cultural context shapes social expectations regarding age-related behaviour. 
The status of Islamic communities as diasporic settlements around the globe has been 
profoundly and perhaps permanently influenced by ‘the global war on terror’ (Es, 
2012; Savage, 2004), which was spurred on by events such as 9/1180, the bombings in 
London in 2005 and the more recent Paris (2015) and Brussels (2016) terrorist attacks, 
and the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh (2004). This generates new cohorts 
at the local level. Xenophobia and racism do not make a subtle distinction between 
religious fundamentalism and moderate Islam, and therefore anyone who has a Middle 
Eastern appearance can become the target of public distrust or anger. For 
convenience’s sake, people with completely different backgrounds were lumped 
together under the common denominator of ‘Muslim culture’ (Sunier, 2005). After the 
murder of Theo van Gogh, at least 10 Muslim schools and mosques were subjected to 
burning and vandalism. In 2005, a survey among 800 Dutch citizens living in four 
major cities revealed that a large majority saw relations between Muslims and non-
Muslims in a very negative light.81 Furthermore, numerous recent court cases against 
radicalized Muslim youths have kept terrorism in the media, and the majority of Dutch 
people claim that their sense of security has disappeared (Turner & Nasir, 2013). 
 In light of these findings, we express the opinion that the current European 
atmosphere, in which existential threats are perceived, could stimulate the growth of 
popular religiosity among the population, which could then acquire a fundamentalist 
character because of its fragmentary and pragmatist nature.  
6.2.3.4. Economic Status and Religiosity 
In this study, ‘elite religion’ was defined based on Weber’s ideas as comprising 
specific forms of religious praxis and belief, which are generally practiced by the 
socially and economically privileged strata of society. In social surveys, income is one 
of the indicators of socio-economic status and religious beliefs. Some studies indicate 
that the socio-economic conditions of Muslims largely regulate the direction of their 
religious choices. It turns out, for example, that Muslim migrants radicalize because 
80 Landman and Wessels state that in the broader field of political debates on multiculturalism 
and the position of Islam in the Netherlands, a shift hast taken place since 11 September 2001. 
See: Landman & Wessels, 2005. 
81 For a survey that measures ethnocentric attitudes of Dutch citizens towards Muslims, see: 
Eisinga, Kraaykamp & Scheepers, 2012. 
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they are unhappy with their low economic status (Heitmeyer & Schroder, 1997). In 
our analysis, we found that respondents with a higher income experience popular 
religiosity to a greater extent than respondents with a lower income. How can this 
result be explained? 
The ‘socially and economically privileged’ strata of society enjoy a kind of wealth 
in terms of education, art and high culture. If we look at the profile of rich and religious 
Turks living in the Netherlands, we see that until recently they had a low income and 
did not inherit any particular wealth from the previous generation. The phenomenon 
of rich Turks in the Netherlands is a new phenomenon which only applies to a very 
small number of individuals, rather than to communities.  
Based on Ibn Khaldūn’s and Durkheim’s work as we briefly outlined in chapter 3, 
we think that an improvement of economic conditions would provide Dutch-Turkish 
Muslims with the means to develop an elite religious culture in the long run. According 
to Islamic jurisprudence, the foundations of a good individual and social life are 
organized at three levels, namely (1) necessities (ḍarūriyyāt), (2) comforts (ḥājiyyāt) 
and (3) refinements or luxury items (taḥsīniyyāt).82 The third category includes items 
and activities that go beyond the category of comforts. These are items that do not 
primarily remove or relieve discomforts, but rather add beauty and elegance to life. 
These include innocent hobbies, recreation, objects of enjoyment, and ornamentations 
(quality furniture, paintings, flowers, jewellery, etc.) (Masud, 1995; Shāṭibī et al., 
2003). An example of this in religious experience is iḥsān. This term means ‘becoming 
excellent’ in the pillars of faith. The term is derived from the same root as the term 
taḥsīniyyāt (i.e., refinements or luxury items) and is an especially important concept 
in Sufi thought, representing a high level of religiosity and spirituality. Ibn Khaldūn 
uses these categories in the social theory that he develops in his work Muqaddimah. 
Although Ibn Khaldūn believes that Bedouin tribes and sedentary communities are 
natural groups, he believes in ‘movement’ from necessities to luxury items, and 
‘movement’ from primitive to civilized culture. This is based on the idea that the 
gathering of bare necessities in the desert precedes the luxury and comfort of the 
82 It should be noted that Islam jurisprudence does permit the consumption of ‘illegal’ luxuries 
which are prohibited. 
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sedentary social organization. The harshness of desert life precedes the ease of 
sedentary life: 
It should be known that differences of condition among people are the result of 
the different ways in which they make their living. Social organization enables 
them to cooperate toward that end and to start with the simple necessities of life, 
before they get to conveniences and luxuries… Sedentary people means the 
inhabitants of cities and countries, some of whom adopt the crafts as their way of 
making a living, while others adopt commerce. They earn more and live more 
comfortably than Bedouins, because they live on a level beyond the level of (bare) 
necessity, and their way of making a living corresponds to their wealth. It has 
thus become clear that Bedouins and sedentary people are natural groups which 
exist by necessity (Khaldūn & Rosenthal, 1958, Vol. 1, p. 250). 
Durkheim believed in the multiplication of human needs as well. He sketches the 
development of new institutions for the satisfaction of those needs. The following 
words from Durkheim are reminiscent of Ibn Khaldūn: 
Thus, it is an historical law that mechanical solidarity, which first stands alone, 
or nearly so, progressively loses ground, and that organic solidarity gradually 
becomes preponderant. But when the mode of solidarity becomes changed, the 
structure of societies cannot but change (Giddens, 1990, p. 140). 
Durkheim’s typology of mechanical and organic solidarities is highly relevant to 
Ibn Khaldūn’s typology. Within the mechanical solidarity that exists in the Bedouin 
civilization, life is very simple, and relationships between people are close and 
personal. The organic solidarity within sedentary civilization manifest itself in 
excessive division of labour, great luxury, and impersonal relationships. 
We are of the opinion that the economic disadvantages of Muslim immigrant life 
play an important role in the types of religiosity they choose on the religious market. 
However, we do not consider economic factors to be the only factors that shape 
Muslim religiosity - this would constitute an over-deterministic view on the role of 
material conditions. Individuals can opt to use their income and personal wealth to 
support a ‘great’ culture and elite forms of Islam. However, if income and wealth are 
distributed equitably among Islamic communities and can thus penetrate education and 
culture, after the example of Khaldūnian and Durkheimian social theory, we can expect 
the long-term impact of economic progress on religiosity to become noticeable. 
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6.2.3.5. Digital Media and Religiosity 
On the one hand Muslims become rooted in their local environments, yet at the same 
time modern mass media enable Muslims to build networks and communities across 
borders (Sunier, 2012). The new media play a crucial part in the production of Islamic 
knowledge in Europe (Bruinessen, 2011). The media professionals who broadcast 
Islamic responsa are therefore at least as important as the religious scholars who issue 
them (Caeiro, 2011). Mass education and the new media have contributed to the shift 
and disintegration of classic religious authority, while modernity has challenged the 
very credibility of the ʿulamās discourses (Zaman, 2002, 2009). Television and the 
Internet have supplanted imams, whose influential role as the main source of religious 
knowledge for immigrants has diminished. Our analysis showed that elite religiosity 
was negatively correlated with television and the Internet, while popular religiosity 
was positively correlated with these media. 
With regard to the production of religious education encapsulated in television 
programmes, the general level of education of the viewer is taken into account, due to 
concerns about audience ratings (Warren, 2006). This form of education focuses on 
the ‘enthusiasm’ that is the most powerful motivation in popular religiosity. Especially 
during Ramadan (the month of fasting), this religious discourse targets the masses. 
Therefore, the language of these programmes is necessarily superficial, following 
certain popular religious trends. Some television programmes target religious elites 
and are infused with mystical and spiritual language, which inevitably helps the re-
formation of a popular Sufi culture, in accordance with the demands signalled by 
audience ratings. Two historical representatives of elite religiosity, Rumi and Yūnus 
Emre, which have exerted enormous influence on Turkish religious literature, are 
regularly encountered in these programmes, and are made into figures for mass 
consumption. 
Globalization and the spread of modern mass media have seriously weakened the 
traditional normative religious frameworks (Mandaville, 2007). The effects of new 
digital media on Islamic discourse have reinforced new perceptions. The search for 
religious information on the Internet involves a highly subjective choice between 
information on popular religious culture and elite religious culture, both of which are 
freely available. It has been said that individual desires and wishes determine the type 
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of information that is accessed (Campbell, 2006; Turner & Nasir, 2013c). When 
someone is looking for a religious fatwā related to a problem, a search in ‘Sheikh 
Google’ using the right keywords will yield the expected information. Four elements, 
muftī, mustaftī, iftāʿ and fatwā 83, which constitute the traditional process of fatwā, 
have been discarded since the Internet became widespread. Publication “converts a 
form of highly personalized interpretation... into more generic messages for a mass 
audience... thereby shift[ing] part of the burden of interpretation to the listener/reader” 
(Eickelman & Anderson, 2003, p. 3). Olivier Roy (2004) has stated that increasing 
numbers of young Muslims are constructing their own ‘cut-and-paste’ version of 
Islam, selected from heterogeneous sources. Other researchers have pointed to the rise 
of a phenomenon called Muslim ‘Protestantism’, in which Muslim youths look for 
answers, usually on the Internet, while they lack basic knowledge of the theological 
framework of Islam (De Koning, 2008; Sunier, 2010). 
This also contributes to the production of conflicting religious ideas, and creates the 
conditions for market differentiation. The fatwā wars in different media playing out 
between Islamic authorities effectually force the Muslim individual to make a choice 
and to select the most appropriate answer (Caeiro, 2011).  There is one big difference 
here compared to the past. As Bryan Turner (2005, p. 309) pointed out, “in the past, 
the educated and disciplined elites determined the official or popular form of religion. 
Periodically, religion gets ‘cleaned up’ as the elites expel the magical, popular and 
cultic accretions.” According to Ibn Khaldūn, prophets periodically enter the city to 
reform the House of Faith. In the modern world, however, lay people have some 
literacy and can access radio, television, the Internet, foreign travel and mass 
consumption. The globalization of popular religion makes it increasingly difficult for 
the elites to regulate the masses. The growth of global spiritual marketplaces means 
that ‘religion’ constantly transforms itself, becoming increasingly hybrid and 
reflective (Parna, 2010; Young, 2004). 
83 The muftī, or jurist consultant, stands between man and God, and issues opinions (fatwā) to 
a petitioner (mustafti), either with regard to the laws of God or the deeds of man. The task, or 




6.2.3.6. Gender and Religiosity 
Gender seems to play a central part in popular religions, both now and in the past. 
Contemporary research reveals that religion - in terms of faith and participation - plays 
a much greater role in the lives of women than those of men, and yet the dominant 
roles in religious organizations are characteristically occupied by men (Roberts & 
Yamane, 2012, pp. 262-291). Women struggle for recognition and representation in 
the official religious institutions of Islam, as is the case in Roman Catholicism, Thai 
Buddhism, and so on (Turner, 2013, pp. 235-40). This situation drives women to find 
meaning in popular themes. 
One of our expectations was that ‘The experience of popular religiosity is higher 
among Muslim women than among Muslim men’ (E1). This expectation was based on 
the findings of previous studies carried out in Turkey (Köse, 2015; Köse & Ayten, 
2010; Saktanber, 2002; Asım Yapıcı, 2012b). 
However, we found no significant differences between men and women in our 
sample. Lack of significance can be informative, however. Reporting non-significant 
results has been identified as ‘the file drawer problem’ in all scientific areas 
(Rosenthal, 1979). Scientists must be willing to report the absence of statistically 
significant findings if they are to advance the social sciences, in particular psychology 
and sociology. This lack of significant differences between men and women in our 
sample may be due to the different characteristics of our scale, which does not quite 
match the scales developed in Turkey. 
In Turkey, for example, traditionally minded women regard ziyārat (grave visit) as 
a valuable means of gaining access to sacred power without male mediation (Günay, 
Güngör, Taştan & Sayim, 2001), yet men often deride such activities as 
‘superstitious’84 (Smith, 2008). Such practices are of greater importance to women 
than to men, since many characteristics of female social life are strictly linked to its 
religious aspects, such as the visiting of graves and the veneration of saints (Köse, 
2015; Shadid & van Koningsveld, 1992). As pointed out above, such aspects of 
religious cultural heritage, which are tightly connected with popular religiosity, are 
rarely transferred to the host countries. These conditions had an impact on our 
                                                 
84 Such visits have also been criticized and banned by official Islam, even though they remain 
a  tradition within Turkish popular religiosity (see: Açıkgöz, 2004; Çelik, 2004; Günay et al., 
2001). 
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measuring tools. Grave visit, which in a sense is closely connected to the experiential 
and ritualistic aspect, could not be taken into account in this study. According to 
previous observations, this aspect of religiosity was not observable in the Dutch-
Turkish community. But as Landman predicts (1992, p. 52), this aspect of popular 
religiosity may emerge in the Netherlands in future decades. Only then will we be able 
to measure this aspect of religiosity, and we assume that this side of religiosity will to 
some extent affect female religious life more than male religious life.85 
6.2.4. Socio-Psychological Factors Affected by Elite and Popular Religiosity 
Interest in studying the relationship between religiosity and health continues to grow. 
Although various hypotheses have been developed to explain this association, there 
has been a lack of research into the processes and mechanisms by which religiosity 
might influence the mental and physical health of populations. In particular, there was 
a lack of research with a specific focus on migrants. There was a lack of studies on 
spirituality in migrant and non-migrant populations as well (Abraido-Lanza & 
Viladrich, 2012, p. 1285). The present study is one of the first to pay more attention to 
this issue in the context of Dutch-Turkish Muslim society. The interactions between 
individual and broader social and cultural factors were also briefly examined.  
Considering the average mean values of the attitude scales employed in this study 
(which measure negative attitudes towards other religions, women, other 
races/ethnicities, out-groups and modernity), we can conclude that both groups - 
participants who experience elite religiosity and participants who experience popular 
religiosity - express negative attitudes towards the items of the attitude scales (see 
Table 32 and Table 33 in chapter 5, sub-paragraph 5.3.5). Therefore, it cannot be 
concluded from the existing data that Turkish religiosity impinges on cultural 
integration. These results suggest that there is no general danger of ethnocentrism and 
fundamentalism. 
85 However, this may not be the case in Europe for the coming years. It is not easy to make 
predictions or generalizations by looking at processes taking place outside Europe. The idea 
of European exceptionalism is increasingly accepted by scholars active in the field of 
sociology of religion. European patterns of religion are no longer seen as a global prototype, 
but constitute an unusual case in a world where vibrant religiosity is becoming the norm. Peter 
Berger (1992, 1999) is a notable exponent of this idea. It follows that explanations for 
European patterns of religion must lie in Europeanness rather than in connections between 
religion and modernity (Davie, 2001). 
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Furthermore, a Pearson correlation coefficient test found that elite religiosity was 
negatively correlated, and popular religiosity was positively correlated with racial 
prejudice, hostile attitudes towards other religions and subordinate attitudes towards 
women (see Table 34). These findings will be further elaborated in separate sub-
paragraphs. 
6.2.4.1. Ethnocentrism and Religiosity 
One of the aims of this study was to investigate whether there are socio-psychological 
behaviours related to elite and popular religiosity. Scales such as ‘(Hostile) attitudes 
towards other religions (i.e., Christianity)’, ‘(Prejudiced) attitudes towards race’, 
‘(Hostile) attitudes towards others’ generally focus on ethnocentrism that can be 
characterized as the attitude that one’s own people, nation, or ethnic group is inherently 
superior to others (Capucao, 2010; Stuckrad, 2006, p. 1574). Since the beginning of 
the Second World War, social scientists have been trying to understand the relationship 
between religion and ethnocentrism.86 Most of the results of these studies have shown 
that religion is one of the main factors contributing to ethnic prejudice (Allport & 
Kramer, 1946). Recent studies have also confirmed that religion is a key factor 
affecting ethnic or racial prejudice. They argue that the more religious an individual 
is, the more prejudiced he/she will likely be (Hood et al., 1996). Yet, some 
contradictory results have also been obtained, in which it is noted that religion has an 
aspect that encourages prejudice and an aspect that unmakes prejudice (Allport, 1966; 
Kayıklık, 2001; Kirkpatrick, 1993; Yapıcı & Kayıklık, 2005). Other studies illustrate 
that the different dimensions of religiosity may have very different effects on prejudice 
(Glock & Stark, 1965; 1968). The findings of the present study support these latter 
findings. These findings suggest that the real question is not whether one is a believer 
or not, but rather whether the kind of things a person believes in make him or her 
ethnocentric. In other words, it is not that one believes, but what and how one believes 
that makes a person ethnocentric. 
86 Botson summarized 47 sets of findings based on 38 studies conducted between 1940 
and1990. He categorized these findings according to three manifestations: church membership 
or attendance, positive attitudes towards religion, and orthodoxy or conservatism. He also 
categorized 4 kinds of intolerance, i.e., ethnocentrism, racial prejudice, anti-Semitism and 
other prejudices. He discovered that 37 sets out of the 47 sets indicated the existence of a 
positive relationship, while the others indicated the opposite (Lawrence Binet Brown, 1985). 
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It has been said that every religion and every social group, to some extent, imparts 
conservative and ethnocentric views to its members (Dittes, 1969). On the basis of this 
social reality, the level of prejudice and ethnocentrism of Dutch-Turkish Muslims can 
in certain respects be defined as ‘normal’. As Watt (1963) has shown, no one would 
easily become a member of a group that does not claim to represent the truth.87 
However, these socio-psychological attitudes may be influenced by a number of other 
factors that can produce some ‘abnormal’ outcomes. 
According to Speelman, most Dutch-Turkish citizens are tolerant (2016). However, 
how religious tolerance is shaped and conceptualized depends on the historical, 
political and social circumstances of the specific environments in which these 
minorities live (Berger, 2007). During the period in which our quantitative research in 
the Netherlands took place (2012 - 2013) there was a relatively peaceful atmosphere, 
with few conflicts. But insecuritization88 is unstable, fragile and contested. While there 
is resistance, change and transformation are possible. The history of Europe and the 
Netherlands demonstrates that many and frequent insecuritizations of identities have 
taken place (Canatan, 2008, 2013; Cesari, 2009; Gündüz, 2007; Seufert & 
Waardenburg, 1999). Insecuritization of the Dutch Muslim identity is a foreseeable 
possibility (Mijnhart, 2010).89 The changing political climate following the coup of 15 
July 2016 seems to have seriously affected the religious sentiments of Turkish 
Muslims living in the Europe. Nationalism, anti-Western resentment, and a strong 
attachment to Turkey’s sovereignty are the main factors that unite Turkey’s new 
political actors (Tol & Taşpınar, 2016). When linked to a social I-position, the religion 
87 Comenius can shed some light on this point. Just like today, Comenius was confronted with 
cultural and religious clashes. He was critical of religions, including Christianity. According 
to Comenius no one can claim to possess the whole truth, because all interpretations are the 
work of men (Marjoke Rietveld-van Wingerden, Ter Avest & Westerman, 2012, p. 69). 
88 The concept of ‘insecuritization’ suggests that ‘security’ should be understood as a situation 
where the dominant power can decide who should be protected and who should be designated 
as capable of being controlled, objectified or feared.  
89 Dutch tolerance would turn out to be a conditional affair once again. Although some hostile 
views could be heard in the late twentieth century, the new millennium put an end to the 
atmosphere of optimism, tolerance and permissiveness. After 9/11, Muslims soon came to 
serve primarily as the image of the ‘Other’, as the counter-image of the beloved Dutch self-
image of a nation of tolerant individuals, as a representation of a past that the Dutch were now 
glad to have shaken off, and even as a danger that  they might function as the Dutch base for 
a world-wide Islamic revival (Mijnhart, 2010). 
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of Dutch-Turkish migrants may get mixed with other collective identity elements 
(national, ethnic, cultural).90 
Further analysis shows that the perception of cultural incompatibility mainly stems 
from the politicization of socio-economic dissatisfaction; structural conditions have 
provoked an existential malaise among Muslims and the Dutch. National politics and 
elections are dominated by emotions, lack of self-confidence, fear of the other, and by 
feelings of insecurity (Ramadan, 2009a). When existential insecurity erupts in public 
violence, ideological arguments take over from the real causes of unrest and generate 
‘block thinking’ - the inability to enter into a reasonable dialogue to achieve fruitful 
integration and coexistence (Taylor, 2007). Bhatia’s research (2007) showed that 
before 9/11 there were many upper-class, privileged Indian immigrants who believed 
they had achieved full ‘cultural citizenship’ and ‘integration’ in America. But a single, 
cataclysmic, political event like 9/11 disrupted their taken-for-granted acculturation 
process and migrant identity. Unexpectedly and quite dramatically, they moved from 
a comfortable sense of belonging to an uneasy state as an outsider, and a threatening 
one at that. Existential insecurity therefore gives integration issues a cultural and 
political overtone, translating pluralism into a clash.  
Some articles suggest that the current terrorist threats are due to the politicization of 
the Islamic faith, rather than being rooted in Islamic teachings (Esposito, 1992; Yo, 
2005). Today, intolerance is a common problem in Turkish society, both amongst the 
religious and the secular (Bilgili, 2015). On the other hand, the extreme right is gaining 
ground in Europe and especially in the Netherlands (BBC, 2016; Kakebeeke & 
Reijerman, 2015). The asylum debate has also influenced voting behaviour in the 
Netherlands. Geert Wilders continues to gain popularity, along with his right-wing 
party, the PVV (De Koning, 2016).  
Norris and Inglehart claim that experiencing a high level of existential security in 
their formative years reduces the importance of religion in people’s lives, while 
experiencing a high level of existential insecurity increases the subjective importance 
of religion (2004, p. 219). The current and future situation in Europe may stimulate 
the prevalence of popular religiosity. In an atmosphere where conflicts arise and 
90 Verkuyten and Yıldız (2009) described in their paper that the Sunni Muslim minority, which 
is the largest minority group in Europe, has a very high Muslim group identification. 
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existential security is threatened, popular religiosity, as noted above, can acquire a 
fundamentalist character, one element of which is a strong sense of belonging to a 
group (Johnson, 2012, p. 653). 
The terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, which killed 132 people and 
injured hundreds of others, were the worst terrorist atrocities on the French mainland 
since the Second World War. Once again they brought Islamic extremism to the 
forefront of international relations. Many Turkish-Dutch people report experiences of 
discrimination and prejudice: more than 66–75% according to research (Andriessen, 
Fernee, & Wittebrood, 2014). According to a report of the European Monitoring 
Centre on Racism and Xenophobia on Muslims in Europe, policies and public 
discourse on Islam and experiences of discrimination have had a negative impact on 
Muslim migrants’ feelings of belonging to the host countries (Choudhury, 2009). 
6.2.4.2. Sexism and Religiosity 
Sexism or gender discrimination is discrimination based on a person’s sex or gender. 
Sexism can affect any gender, but it is mostly documented as affecting women and 
girls (Johnson, 2000; Lorber, 2011; Masequesmay, 2015; Stevenson & Lindberg, 
2010). It has been linked to stereotypes and gender roles (Matsumoto, 2001), and may 
include the belief that one sex or gender is intrinsically superior to the other. Studies 
carried out in different countries show that gender role expectations are strictly 
influenced by cultural factors, including religion (Burn & Busso, 2005 [in the United 
States]; Glick, Lameiras & Castro, 2002 [in Spain]; Taşdemir & Sakallı-Uğurlu, 2010; 
Yapıcı, 2012a [in Turkey]). Morgan (1987) demonstrated a direct link between 
religiosity and sexism. But the process by which religiosity leads to sexism is still 
being investigated (Seguino, 2011).   
It is often said that Islamic law tends to keep women in a subordinate position 
compared to western law, and uses principles that are not always compatible with those 
that inspired western law on human rights and fundamental liberties (Foblets, 2003; 
Kadıoğlu, 2003). For almost all European respondents, Islamic gender relations are 
centred upon the subordination of women to men (FES, 2011; Verney, 2013). While 
most authors point out that the oppression of women is a product of societal and 
cultural norms rather than religion, they also recognize that political leaders have 
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legitimised the physical, legal, or psychological subordination of women in religious 
terms (Silvestri, 2008).  
In the field of social psychology, research has clearly demonstrated that religiosity 
has both positive and negative correlations with prejudice (Hall, Matz & Wood, 2010; 
Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). McFarland (1989) posited that extrinsic religiosity 
orientation among men tends to give rise to discriminatory attitudes towards women, 
and that an intrinsic religiosity orientation shows a negative association with prejudice 
against women. 91 
Here the present study focuses on the question how religiously based differentiation 
affects inequality between men and women. Our hypothesis was that ‘Men motivated 
by elite religiosity tend to have more positive attitudes towards women and more 
progressive ideas about gender, than men motivated by popular religiosity.’ 
Based on the average mean values, we can say that both groups - participants who 
experience elite religiosity and participants who experience popular religiosity - have 
no prejudiced or subordinate attitudes towards women. However, the differences in 
mean values between the two groups were significant. We found that men who 
experienced elite religiosity had stronger views on the equality and rights of women 
than men who experienced popular religiosity (see Table 34 in chapter 5, sub-
paragraph 5.3.5). 
In summary, popular religiosity among men tends to give rise to discriminatory 
attitudes towards women, and elite religiosity among men shows negative association 
with prejudice against women. These findings and results support the position of social 
psychologists who state that religiosity can have both positive and negative 
correlations with prejudice against women. 
6.2.5. Spirituality and Religiosity 
Since the turn of the millennium, the use of the concept of ‘spirituality’ has become 
increasingly widespread in sociology of religion (Kieran Flanagan & Jupp, 2007; 
Younos, 2011). Spirituality comprises numerous sociological aspects, such as an 
91 Gordon Allport (1966) found that intrinsic religiosity (valuing religious experience for its 
own sake and not because of secondary rewards) was related to lower rates of racial antipathy. 
However, in the case of sexism, it was intrinsic religiosity that correlated highly with sex bias 




individualistic orientation, a weak organisational drive, and a holistic function, which 
have been pointed out by various academics (Knoblauch, 2008). Theoretically, 
Muslim spirituality in general and Turkish spirituality in particular are rooted in the 
Qurʾān, and, on the practical level,  in the religious life of flourishing sects and orders 
(for empirical results on Turkish spirituality, see: Ayten, 2010; Altınlı-Macić & 
Coleman, 2015; Dastan & Buzlu, 2010; Düzgüner, 2007, 2011; Horozcu, 2010). Rose 
(2001) discovered that the majority of professionals claimed that religious belief did 
not require spirituality. Compared with adherents of other traditions, however, the 
religious life of the majority of Muslim respondents indicates that, in their case, 
spirituality cannot be experienced without religious belief. In line with Rose’s general 
findings derived from a Muslim sample, the results of another study (Altınlı-Macić & 
Coleman, 2015) indicates that out of a Turkish Muslim sample (41.8%), a majority of 
respondents identified spirituality as a term derived from religion.  
One of the aims of this study was to measure the spiritual aspect of religion by 
developing an elite religiosity scale. The term ‘spirituality’ is equivalent to the Arabic 
term iḥsān (Renard, 2005). Spirituality encompasses many forms and motivations, 
embodied in our study’s concept of elite religiosity, including spiritual dynamism, the 
search for meaning and a quest to understand religiosity in all its depths (Wood, 2010). 
By looking at the close relationship between elite religiosity and spirituality, this study 
tried to assess the significance of spirituality in the sociology of Islam.  
Nowadays, Muslim majority societies are seriously lacking in spirituality 
(Cündioğlu, 2009, 2008); Geaves, Dressler & Klinkhammer, 2009; Ramadan, 2004, 
2009b, 2012). In Islamic societies there is extensive support available for conventional, 
scriptural religion in the realm of everyday life (Hassan, 2003). Many European 
Muslims struggle with finding a balance between spirituality and orthodox 
interpretations of Islam (Phalet, Gijsberts & Hegandoorn, 2008). 
The current Islamic discourse in Turkey and the Netherlands has too often lost its 
substance, namely the search for meaning, an understanding of ultimate goals, and a 
gauging of the state of the heart. As we have shown in this study, Islam has been largely 
reduced to popular religiosity - to jurisprudence, rituals, and, above all, prohibitions 
characterized by exoteric, unreflective, and uncritical forms and motivations (see 
Table 38). European Muslim families experience Islam under a comprehensive set of 
rules, interdictions, and rulings that explain Islam in the context of a specific relation 
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of protection against an environment that is perceived as too permissive and even 
hostile (Ramadan, 1999). The findings of our study largely confirm this attitude. 
Within our group of participants who experienced high religiosity, only 24% 
experienced elite religiosity while 61% experienced popular religiosity. If we take the 
other participants into account - those who experienced low religiosity - this ratio drops 
to 19%. In other words, only two out ten participants experienced elite religiosity to 
some extent.  
In the short term we do not foresee any growth in the spiritual side of religion 
because of the insecurity that will likely be felt in the near future.92 The majority of 
respondents participating in Dutch surveys (FES, 2011; Smith, 2006) assert that Islam 
is incompatible with modern Western society. Most of the citizens polled expressed 
negative views on Islam and Muslims. For highly committed Dutch-Turkish Muslims 
it can be difficult to maintain a stable religious identity without the respect of the Dutch 
majority. Religious identity development depends importantly on the acceptance and 
recognition of others (other Muslims and society as a whole) (Phalet, Baysu & 
Verkuyten, 2010; Visser-Vogel, Bakker, Barnard & Kock, 2015). Moreover, social 
and political activism in Turkey and in Europe currently prevails over spiritual 
considerations; the struggle for power has largely overshadowed the search for 
meaning. Religious styles certainly cannot be reduced to identity politics, but identity 
politics do inform the kind of religiosity developed by individuals (Buitelaar, 2013, p. 
271). The political and ideological thinking of an established party usually does not 
allow for critical thinking, as a result of which there is insufficient room for spirituality 
92 However, this insecurity felt all over the world might actually trigger spirituality in the long 
run. In his book on 13th century Iran, George Lane stated that the extraordinary creativity of 
the Mongolian period, particularly manifested in the development of Sufi thought and the 
creation of mystical poetry,  was a response to the widespread social and political uncertainty 
caused by the Mongol invasions and the unprecedented prevalence of violence. These 
disruptions led to the collapse of many pillars of people’s lives (2003, pp. 229-230). 
Lewisohn concluded that “the only consolation for the ordinary man faced with such barbarity 
lay in the cultivation of Sufism” (1995, p. 56).  
This blossoming of Sufism took place against the sombre background of a barbarian invasion 
- the Crusaders descending on the Islamic world from the West and the Mongols from the East
- and might almost be seen as a kind of compensation for the social and political disasters of
the period (see: Dāya, 1982, pp. 1-2).
Arberry suggested that it was the embracing comfort of mysticism that helped formal Islam
survive this ‘terrible’ catastrophic period in the thirteenth century (see: 2010, p. 26).
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(Cündioğlu, 2007, 2005, 2010; Kara, 2016). Predominantly, ideological organizations 
are somewhat hesitant and suspicious, which is an attitude that is incompatible with 
elite Islam or spiritual religiosity.  
To a certain extent, Sufi Muslims nowadays continue to practice and expand the 
traditional modes of Sufi activity (Dressler, 2009). However, a large part of the 
sociological literature on Muslim societies has identified Sufism or the tariqas - which 
are expected to be the bearers of the spiritual side of Islam - with the illiterate and rural 
parts of society (Köse & Ayten, 2010; Ocak, 1996, 2003, 2010). In this perspective, 
the tariqas represent the disappearing ‘traditional’ elements of the contemporary social 
order (Günay & Ecer, 1999; Kara, 2002). This image of tariqas continues to influence 
scholarship and the general public opinion, both in the West and in the Muslim world 
(Bruinessen, 2003; Voll, 2007, p. 282). In such a conceptual framework, a renewed 
success of elite religiosity and an increased visibility of Sufism among the highly 
educated in the ‘modern’ sector of society - and in modern and modernizing societies 
- is not expected nor predicted.93
In the long term, however, we are assuming some development of elite religiosity.
Most scholars foresee a development “from institutionalized/organized religion to 
individualized spirituality” (Abraido-Lanza & Viladrich, 2012; Cündioğlu, 2010; 
Heelas, 2008, p. 227; Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010, p. 103). In one sense, 
secularisation has won. Organised religion has declined sharply. Yet spirituality does 
not seem to have undergone the same fate. It has become “the solace of soul survivors 
who journey outside organised religion” (Flanagan, 2007, p. 6). In Modernization, 
Cultural Change, and Democracy (2005), Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel draw 
on survey data collected in 81 countries - which comprise 85 % of the world’s 
population - between 1981 and 2001, to reach the following conclusion: the 
contemporary socio-economic developments result in an increasing interest in 
spirituality (p. 93). If the socio-economic developments and their relation to elite 
93 In his classic text Sufism, published in the mid-twentieth century, A.J. Arberry remarked 
that Sufi orders in many places were continuing to attract the “ignorant masses, but no man of 
education would care to speak in their favour” (Arberry, 1950, p. 122). Gilsenan reported some 
60 orders in Egypt at the time of his field research, but he assessed that relatively few people 
were actually involved in them, especially compared to the pre-modern period when most men 
were reputedly members of such orders (Gilsenan, 1967, pp 11-18).  
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religiosity are taken into consideration, we may also expect that the Dutch-Turkish 
Muslims living in the Netherlands will gain in spirituality.  
Moreover, the majority of Western countries have a positive understanding of 
multiculturalism, particularly of ethnic and religious pluralism (Canatan, 2009; 
Ziebertz & Kay, 2009). New forms of Islamic spirituality may appear in European 
societies, which could attract considerable numbers of people. Such a movement could 
develop guided by a modern spiritual language (Halstead, 2006) and by the re-
individualization of Islamic mysticism, which is more expressed in personal thought 
and in the intellectual relationship between master and disciple, than in community life 
or the emotion felt during collective rituals (Maréchal, 2003, p. 153).  
Citizens in Western Europe are more open to an elite religiosity that is closely 
linked to the spiritual side of Islam, than an orthodox or popular Islam, because of the 
historical religious and cultural heritage of the latter (Köse, 1996, 2003). Van 
Bruinessen (2009) recently pointed out that Sufism has regained its appeal as a 
spiritual doctrine and practice among many Muslims in the modern world, as an 
alternative to the political and puritan styles of Islam. These neo-Sufi movements and 
new spiritualities may stimulate elite forms of religiosity that are more tolerant and 
moderate, and open to dialogue with other religions.  
The number of people who define themselves as “spiritual but not religious”, or as 
more spiritual than religious, is increasing in the United States and Western Europe. 
This development supports meaningful exercises within the spiritual domain (Altınlı-
Macić & Coleman, 2015; Altınlı, 2011; Streib & Hood, 2008; Zinnbauer, Pargament 
et al., 1997). A religion without spirituality is difficult to imagine. Hanegraaff (1999, 
p. 151) underlined that the reverse - a spirituality without religion - is in principle quite
possible. Spirituality can arise on the basis of an existing religion, but can very well
do without it. The concept of ‘spirituality without religion’ is a relatively new issue in
both Turkey and the Islamic world. A more collectively orientated religiosity is still
present and dominant in Turkey, although recently religious individualism has
emerged in Islam (De Koning, 2008; Huijnk, 2018; Noor, 2018; Wagemakers &
Koning, 2015) but it is not as widespread as in the US and other Western countries
(Altınlı-Macić & Coleman, 2015). New Age is a prime example of this last possibility:
a complex of spiritualties that arose on the foundation of a pluralistic secular society.
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For future research it is important to also focus on this side of spirituality, in order to 
understand different aspects of Turkish religious life. 
6.3. Conclusion and Future Research 
One of the important findings of our empirical research is that the theoretical approach 
that Glock’s five dimensions are empirical wholes, is not sufficient to gain insight into 
the complex expressions of Muslim religiosity. There are various intra-dimensional 
aspects to these dimensions, such as the elite and popular aspects. General conclusions 
reached in other studies on Glock’s scale, regarding a relationship between the 
dimensions (i.e., relationships based on a single measurement of each dimension), are 
in need of further exploration. The conceptualizations of elite and popular religiosity 
seem to have an important theoretical value for the exploration of intra-dimensional 
aspects of religiosity. Our theoretical and empirical study showed that forms and 
motivations of high religiosity, which have different aspects such as the ideological, 
ritualistic, experiential, and intellectual, differ among groups or individuals. We 
believe that more research is needed into the already proposed intra-dimensional 
aspects of religiosity. While much of the evidence from our study compares favourably 
with Stark and Glock’s (1968) data, in particular with regard to various aspects of 
single dimensions, more research is needed before religion analysts can be confident 
that the relationships which have been published in the present study are more 
generalizable. 
The elite and popular religious orientations in this study included several 
components that Stark and Glock did not measure (dynamism versus stability, critical 
versus uncritical, without material expectations versus with material expectations, 
differentiated versus undifferentiated, experiential inessentiality versus experiential 
desirability). Attempts to apply other schemes to Glock’s five dimensions may reveal 
other components. Conceptualizing and measuring these components is another 
fruitful direction for future research. I recommend that greater efforts be made to 
generate new conceptualizations and measurements of the kinds of phenomena that 
are encompassed by the five dimensions which Glock proposed. Based on the results 
of this study, I also recommend that future research based on Glock’s scheme should 
treat the five dimensions as heuristic and exploratory devices, and not as empirical 
wholes. 
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In addition, it was very difficult to conduct a long-term sociological study of 
Turkish Muslims in the current context, because there are very large differences 
between the situation in Turkey 7 years ago and today (2018). I have to express the 
difficulties I encountered in linking the concluding part of this study to the introductory 
part written at the beginning of the project. When this project began, Turkey’s trend 
towards democratization was relatively high and Turkey was moving closer to Europe. 
Turkey’s membership of the European Union was discussed openly and developments 
seemed to run in a positive direction. Now, in 2018, it must be said that Turkey’s 
integration into the European Union has largely failed and that Turkey is now further 
away from the West. Slowly but surely after 2010 and especially after the coup in 
2016, Turkey has turned its face from the West to the East. It seems that this may have 
long-term and short-term consequences, not only in economic and political terms, but 
also in religious terms. 
The will of the Islamic community leaders to act by leaning on the power of the 
government, forced them to fulfil the demands of the political centre. This tendency, 
driven by practical concerns, was for a long time the main driving force behind the 
perversion of Islamic thought and spirituality. Religious communities still seem to 
have failed to learn the lessons of recent events, in particular those relating to the Gülen 
Movement, which has long been backed by political leaders. The dramatic changes 
following the coup appear to have profoundly affected the religious identity of Turkish 
Muslims in both Turkey and Europe. Only one decade ago, concepts such as cohesion 
and integration had emerged to describe the relationship between Turkey and Europe. 
But circumstances have changed completely today. Turkishness, anti-Western 
resentment and a strong attachment to Turkish sovereignty have once again become 
strong among Turkish Muslims in Turkey and in the Netherlands. The discourse of the 
religious communities is inevitably influenced by these evolving political events 
because it is closely tied to politics. Projects such as interfaith dialogue, which refers 
to a cooperative, constructive, and positive interaction between adherents of different 
religions and/or spiritual or humanistic beliefs, give place to the voice of Turkish civil 
religion which refers to the sacralisation of the state through Islamic symbols.94 In this 
context the other became kāfir (infidel), and Christianity became ‘evil’ again. Popular 
religiosity stimulates such negative image formation when its basic characteristics play 
94 See the following article for the extended definition of civil religiosity and its fundamentals 
in Dutch society (Ter Borg, 2013). 
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out in a context of insecurity, which we pointed out in the discussion section. Every 
coup did not only damage democracy, but also nourished radical Islam. The last 
attempt is undoubtedly an example of this. It should be an obvious insight that Islam 
can be understood at many different levels. However, it seems that nowadays we are 
largely witnessing the least developed forms of understanding, all because of the 
influence of the level of understanding of preachers who preach only popular and 
superficial aspects of religiosity. The voices of Niyāzi-i Misrī, Yūnus Emre, and 
Mavlānā, which emphasize the grace of the human being, are mainly ignored in times 
when the strengthening of national identities is politically necessary. The Islamic 
world today, and Turkey in particular, has lost its ability to say “O People”, only “O 
Muslims” remains. The reason is that politics today puts the voices of Molla Kāsım 
and Vāni Effendi at its service. 
In the early chapters of this study, an attempt was made to critically assess the new 
paradigms in sociology of religion. Rational choice theory and publications exploring 
postmodernity recognize the growth of a spiritual marketplace. The key question, 
however, is whether the emergence of such a market has stimulated elite religiosity or 
popular religiosity. Or whether this emergence affects the relationship between the 
two. We must not forget that traditional beliefs and institutions already existed in 
modernity. Traditional religiosity is still present in modern and postmodern times. The 
popular religiosity that includes many elements of traditional religiosity can easily go 
off the rails - reducing, contesting, and even replacing the reflexivity, autonomy, and 
openness that are dominant characteristics of spiritual religiosity. In line with many 
cultural theorists, we would like to draw attention once again to the ontological 
insecurity brought about by the complexities, uncertainty, and diversity of the 
postmodern condition. We see religious fundamentalism as an emotional and 
defensive coping mechanism to deal with the insecurity caused by the plurality and the 
fragmentation of the postmodern world. According to the findings of our study, 
popular religiosity could remain an important and dominant source of defensive 
localization within Turkish religiosity, at least in the short term, both in Turkey and in 
the Netherlands due to the recent developments outlined above.  
Another significant issue is that in some studies on elite and popular religiosity, 
these two concepts are dealt with in theological and political terms. Elite religiosity 
has been linked to ‘great’ tradition, official tradition, while popular religiosity has been 
linked to ‘superstition’, unofficial religion, and other forms of pejoratively labelled 
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religiosity. As a consequence, popular religiosity is defined as the ‘object’ of all 
negativity in a religious sense. Today, this mistake is often made by religious officials 
and scholars. Elite and popular religiosity, however, arise as a result of cultural 
differentiation and stratification in society, as we have shown in this study, and are in 
fact phenomena that fall within the field of sociology of culture and religion. Future 
research should therefore not participate in theologico-political power rationalizations, 
nor participate in the essentializing of historicizing perspectives. We believe that 
attempts to solve the problems of religious thought without exploring the possibilities 
for change and transformation between elite and popular, signal the use of an 
incomplete and inaccurate research methodology.  
This tension is mainly fuelled by the official elites (promoted by the state via 
Diyanet). Once the official religion is in the hands of a particular religious elite, and 
has been defined by this elite, it can continue to exist as an absolute religious ideal 
with the call ‘Back to true Islam!’, wholly separated from the needs and ideals of the 
everyday, lived religion. The mentality of (religious or political) governments and the 
mentality of their subjects can therefore be in conflict with each other. Diyanet defines 
its role as maintaining the social order in Turkey by promoting a moderate Islam based 
on rationality, not ‘superstition’. This model has been faulted for presenting popular 
religious practices as a deviation from the ‘official religion’ or ‘pure’ Islam, which is 
supposedly represented by theologians and Diyanet leaders. These leaders clearly have 
a positivist ideology. If someone calls him/herself a Muslim and recognizes certain 
practices as Islamic, we as researchers must first accept this statement as true and then 
investigate how these practices differ from those of other Muslims. Moreover, it cannot 
be said that there is a purely popular religion practiced by the masses, which is 
completely independent of an ‘elite Islam’ supposedly represented by theologians and 
Diyanet leaders. Nor can it be argued that there is a purely ‘official’ and elite religion, 
which is completely independent of popular religion, as we have shown in this study. 
What is neglected is the intersectionality that exists between elite Islam and popular 
Islam.  
Modernity is usually conceived as constituted by a radical shift from Gemeinschaft 
to Gesellschaft, from community to society, from particularism to universalism. 
Today, many scholars observe that current Turkish interpretations of Islam actualize 
the new Salafism, with an emphasis on ʿumma. Although these interpretations, which 
emphasize gemeinschaft, community, and particularism, could be partly successful in 
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establishing an atmosphere of security for certain religious groups, it does not seem 
possible to promote peaceful coexistence in this way, in cities where pluralism is a 
reality. The embracing of such interpretations within an urban setting can lead to 
tensions between believers and secularists, and in the interreligious domain, to tensions 
between world religions such as Christianity, Judaism and Islam. It can also lead to 
extreme hostility towards traditional interpretative communities and towards all forms 
of rationalism, intellectualism and mysticism in Islam. If the new Salafism continues 
to dominate the current Turkish interpretations of Islam, and resists the competitive 
and open character of the Islamic religious market, we believe it would not be difficult 
for pro-violence groups to exist in such fertile ground. 
Sufis attach great importance to the following hadīth qudsī: “I am where My servant 
thinks of Me. Every servant has an image and an idea of Me. Whatever picture he 
forms of Me, there I am.”95 We admit that it would be unwise to suggest this Sufi 
principle to religious officials which emphasize equal reception of manifestations of 
religiosity, and suggest the ultra-liberal religious market. At the very least, we can say 
that official religious institutions should not completely ignore this principle, which is 
at the heart of Islamic wisdom, and should not stigmatize divergent religious 
expressions of the pious as ‘superstition’ or ‘bidʿah’. Although struggling against 
“irreligion and apostasy”, the Islamic religion has shown great leniency throughout its 
history to man’s weakness in the face of harsh reality and the strictness of religious 
demands (Waardenburg, 1978b). Official religious institutions could apply a number 
of religious development methods suggested by sociology and psychology of religion, 
instead of waging war on all popular manifestations of religion. In this light, we 
recommend that the current (official) elites read the dynamic and dialogical language 
of Al-Ghazālī and integrate it into their thinking. We also believe that this model is a 
promising basis for developing religious education strategies in Europe. With further 
improvements, this model, which creates room for a diversity of religious 
interpretations and flexibility with regard to a variety of religious production demands, 
could also be used as a tool for primary and secondary education, both in Turkey and 
in the Netherlands. 
95 Also called ḥadith ilāhī or rabbānī (divine tradition). This is a set of traditions which 
preserves words spoken by God, as distinguished from the hadith nabawī (prophetical 
tradition), which preserves the words of the Prophet. For the whole hadith see: Al Muslim, 
book Zhikr, ḥadith 21. For an English translation, see: Arberry, 2004, p. 43. 
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Dawson states that for “every fresh need there is an answer of divine grace and that 
every historical crisis is met by a new outpouring of the spirit” (2012, p. 129). Most 
research in contemporary sociology of religion foresees a development “from 
institutionalized/organized religion to individualized spirituality”. In fact, in the 
Netherlands, there is an intellectual accumulation that can nourish religious 
cosmopolitanism. As mentioned in the introduction, many research topics in regard to 
Islam are currently being studied by experts in many different fields. The Leiden 
University Centre for the Study of Religion (LUCSoR) directs this intellectual 
accumulation under the supervision of Maurits S. Berger. Unfortunately, the channels 
for reaching the Dutch Muslim community are weak. One aspect of this problem is the 
reluctance of the Islamic community to take advantage of this accumulation of 
knowledge. Some prejudices prevent these respected Islamic data from being accessed. 
The rector of the Rotterdam Islamic University has said that “Muslims want to learn 
Islam from Muslim scholars”. Although this could be a sociological fact, this can only 
be explained by a lack of confidence in one’s own values. It should not be forgotten 
that the tradition of intellectual Islam was built by the representatives of a civilization 
who followed the principle: “Even if science is in China, look for it and find it”. In the 
11th and 12th centuries, Muslim intellectuals had no issues whatsoever with being 
taught by Christian scholars. We recommend Muslim communities in the West to get 
rid of this idleness and to remove the dust from these treasures.  

Appendix One (Factor Analysis) 
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Table 36 - Factor analysis / General religiosity scale 
No Item Component Factor 1 
14 Oneness of God Ideological ,487 
15 Reward and punishment Ideological ,894 
16 Belief in sacred scriptures Ideological ,920 
17 Resurrection of the dead Ideological ,789 
18 Belief in Muhammad as the last prophet Ideological ,867 
19 Observance of five daily prayers Ritualistic ,635 
20 Observance of fast days during Ramadan Ritualistic ,714 
21 Observance of Friday prayer Ritualistic ,604 
22 Praying to God (Duā) Ritualistic ,650 
23 Observance of almsgiving (zakāt) Ritualistic ,488 
24 Experiencing a spiritual teacher Experiential ,729 
25 An experience of angels or guiding spirits Experiential ,676 
26 An experience of profound inner peace Experiential ,735 
27 An experience of a miraculous event Experiential ,741 
28 Feeling close to God Experiential ,736 
29 Which of the following answers provide lists that 
correctly sort successive chapters from the Qurʾān? Intellectual ,068 
30 Which of the following holy days occur during 
Ramadan? Intellectual ,599 
31 Which of the following rules is not considered one 
of the obligatory rules (farẓ) for prayer (salāh)? Intellectual ,488 
32 What is the meaning of Maqrūh? Intellectual ,647 
33 Which of the following rules is not one of the 
pillars of faith (īmān) in intellectual dimension Intellectual ,657 






In order to examine the factor structure of 25 items, a principal component analysis 
was conducted. Four factors emerged with eigenvalues >1. Most items clearly belong 
to one component, even if some items have component loadings between .3 and .4 on 
other dimensions. Item 29 loaded on the fourth factor. This item was not further 
included in the factor analysis due to interpretation difficulties. The other three factors 
accounted for 58.971 % of the total variance. But there is still a difficulty to interpret 
the second and third factor. We therefore preferred to use only the first factor that 









35 I try hard to carry my religion over into all my 
other dealings in life (reversed) Consequential  ,660 
36 A woman should be able to have an abortion for 
any reason Consequential  ,676 
37 Premarital sexual relations between a boy and a 
girl who are in love is not immoral Consequential  ,737 
38 Religion is something I have never felt personally 
compelled to consider Consequential  ,723 
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Table 37 - Factor analysis / Elite religiosity scale 
No Item Components Subcomponent Factor 1 Factor 2 
42 I think that there are many more 
things in my faith that I have not 
perceived yet.  
Elite belief 
Self-awareness and 
openness to change ,761 
45 My religious beliefs are not the 
same today as they were five 
years ago.  
Elite belief 
Self-awareness and 
openness to change ,648 
52 It is more important to me to 
spend periods of time in public 
religious rituals than in private 
religious thought and meditation. 
(R)  
Elite ritual 
Emphasis on the 
meaning of private 
ritual ,789 
54 When I pray, I mostly try to 
understand the meanings of 
chapters and prayers.  
Elite ritual 
Emphasis on the 
meaning of private 
ritual 
,546 
56 The prayers I say when I am 
alone don’t carry the same 
meaning and personal emotion 
as those said by me during 
services. (R)  
Elite ritual 
Emphasis on the 
meaning of private 
ritual ,676 
59 If I experience the presence of 
the Divine (i.e., guidance of God 
or the Prophet), I prefer to keep 




experience private ,537 
61 I don’t desire religious 
experiences (special gifts from 
God) in exchange for prayers.  
Elite 
experience 




64 I feel upset if I am not receiving 
any special divine gifts from 
God in exchange for prayers. (R) 
Elite 
experience 




65 My religious knowledge 
provides me with satisfying 
answers at this stage of my 
development, but I am prepared 
to readjust it as new information 
becomes available.  
Elite 
knowledge 
No certainty of 
current religious 
knowledge ,747 
69 For me, doubting the validity of 
my current religious knowledge 
is an important part of what it 
means to be religious.  
Elite 
knowledge 
No certainty of 
current religious 
knowledge ,704 
71 There are many religious issues 











Initial analysis showed that item 55 (related to elite ritual) and item 66 (related to 
elite knowledge) were not significantly correlated with the total 14-item scale. 
Therefore, these items were not included in the factor analysis. In order to examine the 
factor structure of the remaining 12 items, a principal component analysis was 
conducted. Three factors emerged with eigenvalues >1. Item 40 loaded on a third 
factor. This item was not further included in the factor analysis due to interpretation 
difficulties. The other two factors accounted for 51.174 % of the total variance. The 
correlation between these two factors was .41. The pattern loadings of these two 
factors are presented in Table 37. As can be seen in Table 37, all items loaded on one 
of the two factors. Factor 1 mainly represents elite belief, elite ritual and elite 
knowledge. This factor may be labelled as spiritual and intellectual dynamism. The 
second factor mainly represents elite experience. This factor may be labelled as 

















Table 38 - Factor analysis / Popular religiosity scale 
No Item Components Subcomponents Factor 1 Factor 2 
41 My religious beliefs are pretty 
much the same today as they were 





44 I completely understand what it 





53 I perform my prayers to God to 





57 The purpose of prayer is to secure a 





58 When I recall my experiences with 
religion I most readily remember 
the impressive formal rites and 
rituals. (Circumambulation of the 
Kaʿbah – salat al eid).  
Popular 
ritual 
Emphasis on the 
impressiveness of 
public ritual ,667 
60 It is essential for religious spiritual 




Giving high level of 
importance to 
miracles ,689 
62 I think it is important to tell about 
special gifts from God (i.e., peace, 




Tendency to share 
private religious 
experience ,725 
63 If I feel the guidance of the Prophet 
in my dreams, I prefer to share it 
with my family or friends.  
Popular 
experience 




67 I generally search and find quick 
answers to my religious questions 




intellectual stability ,663 
70 If I find answers to my religious 
questions through Imams, I never 
doubt their correctness.  
Popular 
knowledge 
Certainty of current 
religious knowledge ,701 
72 I completely understand what 
Allah wants by requesting the 







Items 39 and 43 (related to popular belief) and item 68 (related to popular 
knowledge) were not significantly correlated with the total 14-item scale. Therefore, 
these items were not included in the factor analysis. In order to examine the factor 
structure of the remaining 11 items, a principal component analysis was conducted. 
Two factors accounted for 55.109 % of the total variance. The correlation between 
these two factors was .34. The pattern loadings of these two factors are presented in 
Table 38. As can be seen in table 38, all items loaded on one of the two factors. Factor 
1 mainly represents popular belief, popular ritual and popular knowledge. This factor 
may be labelled as material expectations and spiritual and intellectual stability. The 
second factor mainly represents popular experience. This factor may be labelled as 
experiential desirability and shareability.   
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Table 39 - Factor analysis of scales of consequential dimensions 
No Item Components Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
73 I cannot endure beliefs that are 
different than mine.  
(Hostile) attitudes 
towards other religions 
(Christianity) 
,745 
74 It bothers me when religious 
differences keep people from 
becoming friends.  
(Hostile) attitudes 
towards other religions 
(Christianity) 
,725 
75 When a person from another religion 
publicly shares his testimony with me, 
I take it as a great gift. (R) 
(Hostile) attitudes 
towards other religions 
(Christianity) ,636 
76 My relations with Christians have 
always been characterized by conflict. 
(Hostile) attitudes 
towards other religions 
(Christianity) 
,720 
77 Talking to people from different 
religions helps me to have a broader 
view of life. (R) 
(Hostile) attitudes 
towards other religions 
(Christianity) 
,585 
78 Man’s superior strength and common 
sense show he’s more made in the 
image of God than women are.  
(Subordinate) attitudes 
towards women  ,613 
79 If a woman is unhappy in her 
subordinate role, she shows her sinful 
nature.  
(Subordinate) attitudes 
towards women ,655 
80 In marriage, husband and wife should 
make the important decisions 
together, with both having the final 
word. (R) 
(Subordinate) attitudes 
towards women ,590 
81 If a husband gets angry about his 
home situation, it is his wife’s fault 
because she did not prevent the 
problem.  
(Subordinate) attitudes 
towards women ,619 
82 I’m uneasy around people from 
different cultures or races.  
(Prejudiced) attitudes 
towards race  ,740 
83 People of some cultures or races are 
difficult to trust.  
(Prejudiced) attitudes 
towards race ,748 
84 My racial/ethnic group is an 
important reflection of who I am. 
(Prejudiced) attitudes 
towards race ,632 
95 I enjoy being around people of 
different cultures or races. (R) 
(Prejudiced) attitudes 
towards race ,695 
87 I secretly feel good when I learn that 
someone I dislike has gotten in 
trouble.  
(Hostile) attitudes 
towards others  ,448 
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88 I generally join in conversations in 
which the faults or misdeeds of others 
are discussed.  
(Hostile) attitudes 
towards others ,521 
89 I continue to wish the best for 
someone who has hurt me. (R) 
(Hostile) attitudes 
towards others ,493 
92 My religious beliefs cause conflicts 
with the modern world. (R) 
(Hostile) attitudes 
towards others ,802 
93 My religion is entirely compatible 
with what the modern world has to 
offer. 
(Harmonious) attitudes 
towards modernism ,796 
94 The world is always changing and we 
should adjust our view of what is 
right or wrong to these changes. 
(Harmonious) attitudes 
towards modernism ,769 
96 Denominational differences are not 
important to me. (R) 
(Positive) in-group 
attitudes ,763 
97 I avoid doing things that members of 




98 What members of my religious group 
expect of me is not important. (R) 
(Positive) in-group 
attitudes ,782 
99 The standards of my local religious 
group guide me in making decisions. 
(Positive) in-group 
attitudes ,681 
Items 85 and 86 (related to ‘(hostile) attitudes towards others’) and items 90 and 91 
(related to ‘attitudes towards Islam as self-discipline’) were not significantly correlated 
with the total 27-item scale. Therefore, these items were not included in the factor 
analysis. In order to examine the factor structure of the remaining 23 items, a principal 
component analysis was conducted. Six factors emerged with eigenvalues >1. 
However, further analysis indicated that four factors would offer the best solution. 
These four factors accounted for 54.376 % of the total variance. The pattern loadings 
of these four factors are presented in Table 39. According to this table, Factor 1 mainly 
represents ‘(hostile) attitudes towards other religions (Christianity)’, ‘(prejudiced) 
attitudes towards race’ and ‘(hostile) attitudes towards others’. This factor may be 
labelled as hostile attitudes towards others. The second factor mainly represents 
conservative in-group attitudes. The third factor mainly represents harmonious 
attitudes towards modernism. The fourth factor mainly represents subordinate 
attitudes towards women. 

Appendix Two (Additional Tables) 
260 
Figure 5 - Proportion of highly-educated 25 to 64-year old by ethnic background 
(CBS) 
Figure 6 - Muslims in the Netherlands by ethnic origin (CBS) 


















Figure 7 - Population of the Netherlands from 2010 to 2015, by religion (CBS, 2016) 
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Appendix Three (Paper-Based Questionnaire) 
	  
	  
Ömer	  Faruk	  Gürlesin	  
Dindarl ık üzerine sosyolojik bir araştırma 
Een sociologisch onderzoek naar rel igiositeit  
 
Değerli	  Katılımcı,	  
Araştırma anketi Hollanda’da yaşayan Türk vatandaşlar 
için düzenlenmiştir. Bu anket çalışmasına vereceğiniz 
cevaplar tamamıyla bilimsel amaçlar için kullanılacaktır. 
Sorular Türkçe sorulmuştur. Bazı yerlerde Hollandaca 
tercüme verilmiştir. Anketin tamamlanması yaklaşık 10-
15 dakikanızı alacaktır. Vereceğiniz içten ve samimi 
cevaplar çalışmamızı başarıya ulaştıracaktır. 
Kur’an-ı Kerim de inananlara şöyle seslenir; 
“Ey iman edenler, her zaman doğruyu söyleyiniz." (33:70) 
Katkılarınız için teşekkür ederiz. 
 
	  
Araştırmacı :  Ömer Faruk Gürlesin 
Kurum  :  Leiden Üniversitesi 
Bölüm  :  Din Sosyolojisi 
Tarih  : Kasım 2012 




Deze vragenlijst is opgesteld voor 
Turkse Nederlanders. Alle 
antwoorden zullen enkel voor 
wetenschappelijke doeleinden 
gebruikt worden. Uw gegevens 
zullen volledig anoniem blijven. 
De vragen zijn in het Turks 
gesteld met soms een 
Nederlandse vertaling. De 
vragenlijst zal in totaal 10-15 
minuten in beslag nemen. Uw 
weloverwogen en gemeende 
antwoorden worden zeer op prijs 

























































9. Resmi olarak bağlı olduğunuz veya gönüllü olarak katkıda bulunduğunuz 
dini vakıf veya cemaat. (Bu soru boş bırakılabilir) 
 
De stichting waar je officieel of als vrijwilliger lid van bent. 
o Diyanet Vakfı 
o Nur Cemaati  
o Süleyman Efendi Cemaati  
o Milli Görüş Hareketi   
o Hiçbiri 
o Diğer__________  
 
10. İslami vakıflara yaptığınız ortalama senelik bağış.  
Jaarlijkse bijdrage aan Islamitische organisaties 
 
o hiç bağış yapmıyorum (Ik doneer niet) 
o (onder) €1000'nun altında  
o €1000 - €5000'nun arasında  
o €5000 - €10 000'nun arasında  
o (boven) €10 000'nun üzerinde 
 
11. Evde en çok konuşulan dil  
Meest gesproken taal thuis 
O   Hollandaca  O   Türkçe  O   Kürtçe  O   Diğer: _________ 
12. Pek çok insandan daha çok dindar olduğumu düşünüyorum.  
Ik denk religieuzer te zijn dan de meeste mensen 
o Doğru (rechts) 
o Yanlış (onjuist) 
o Fikrim Yok (ik heb geen idee) 
 
13. Aşağıdaki maddelerin din eğitiminizde ne kadar etkili olduğunu sırasıyla belirtiniz.  































Aileden (Familie)      
Arkadaşlardan (Vriend(en))      
Okuldan (School)      
Kitaplardan (Boeken)      
Dini Liderlerden (Religieuze leiders)      
Camilerden (Moskees)      
Dini Vakıflardan (religieuze stichtingen)      
TV ve Radyo'dan      
İnternetten      
Aşağıdaki inanç esaslarına ne kadar inanıyorsunuz ? 
1 - Minimum inanç; 5 - Maksimum inanç 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. Allah’ın Birliği
15. Cennet ve Cehennem
16. Kutsal Kitapların Allah tarafından indirilmesi
17. Öldükten sonra tekrar dirilme
18. Hz Muhammed’in son peygamber olarak gönderilmesi

































19. Beş vakit namaz kılma
20. Ramazan orucunu tutma
21. Cuma namazını kılma
22. Dua etme
23. Zekat verme
Dikkat: Aşağıdaki duyguları ne kadar hissettiğinizi belirtiniz.   
1 - Minimum hissetme (minimaal ervaring) 5 - Maksimum hissetme (maximaal ervaring) 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. Manevi bir dini liderle buluşma veya onun sesini kalben hissetme
25. Koruyucu ve yardım edici melekleri(engelen) hissetme
26. Derin bir gönül huzuru (gemoedsrust) hissetme
27. Mucizevi (wonderbaarlijk) olaylarla karşılaşma
28. Allah'a çok yakın hissetme
o Nasr, Tebbet, İhlas, Felak, Nas Sureleri
o Tebbet, Nasr, İhlas, Felak, Nas Sureleri
o İhlas, Tebbet, Felak, Nasr, Nas Sureleri
o Felak, Nas, İhlas, Tebbet, Nasr Sureleri
o Emin değilim (ik ben niet zeker)
o Fikrim yok (ik heb geen idee)
29. Aşağıdaki şıkların hangisinde sure
sıralaması doğru olarak verilmiştir?
30. Aşağıdaki kutsal zamanlardan hangisi





o Emin değilim (ik ben niet zeker)












































































     
35. Dini inançlarımı ve ibadetlerimi hayatımın diğer bütün 
alanlarında uygulamaya gayret gösteriyorum. 
     
36. Kadın istediği zaman çocuk aldırma hakkını 
kullanabilmeli. 
     
37. Birbirini seven erkekle kadın arasındaki evlilik öncesi 
cinsel ilişki ahlaksızca bir davranış değildir. 
     
38. Din konusunda kendimi bir şey yapmak zorunda 
hissetmem. 



















































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Five  
(Measurements in Turkish Sociology and Psychology of Religion)
Table 40 - Adapted western-Christian measurements 
Author Measure (total # items) Factorial Structure (# items) α Subsequent Research Adapted from… 
Özbaydar (1970) 
Belief in God and Religion 
Measure (53) • Belief in God (18)• Belief in religion (35) Uyaver (2010) 
Religious beliefs (Kuhlen & 
Arnold, 1944) 
Yaparel (1987) Religious Life Inventory (31) 





α = .86 
Köktaş (1993) 
Yapıcı (2004) 
Multidimensions of religiosity 
(Glock & Stark, 1969) 
Mutlu (1989) Islamic Religiosity Scale (14) • Belief (14) α = .94 Kaya (1998) Religious attitudes 
Köktaş (1993) Religious Life Inventory (81) 
• Ideology: particularism, ethical behaviour (14)
• Rituals: obligatory worship, voluntary worship
(12)
• Experience: effects of religion, closeness to
Allah (4)
• Intellect: basic religious knowledge (7)
• Secular consequences: politics, economics,
family, education, neighbourhood, science (44)
Köktaş (1993) Multidimensions of religiosity (Glock & Stark, 1969) 





• Social functions of religious behaviour (3)





Multidimensions of religiosity 
(Glock & Stark, 1962) 
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Kaya (1998) Religious Attitudes Measure (31) • Positive attitudes (17)• Negative attitudes (14) α = .96 
Apaydın (2002)
Kafalı (2005) 
Religious attitudes and 
behaviours  
(Özbaydar 1970) 










Multidimensions of religiosity 
(Glock & Stark, 1962) 
Kotehne (1999) Age Universal I-E Scale (20) Quest Scale (6) 
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Summary in English 
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Over the past three decades, Islam has become increasingly visible in the European public 
sphere. Despite Islam’s rapid growth in Europe and the Netherlands, many people in the West 
know little about this religion. The reality of European Islam is very diverse. The differences 
are related to national, cultural, religious and linguistic elements. In the present study, we 
explored the inner differences of Dutch-Turkish religiosity in relation to social, economic, and 
cultural aspects. By means of this exploration we examined the possible directions Islam is 
taking in Europe. We sought a middle ground between two types of essentialist argumentation: 
one is to theorize incompatibility between Islam and European culture, and the other is to 
theorize compatibility between them. As many scholars who study Muslim society have noted, 
Islam, like any other religion, does not develop in a monolithic form, whether it is hostile to 
European values or assimilated, as the term ‘Euro-Islam’ suggests. It develops in a multiplicity 
of forms, such as political Islam, official Islam, popular Islam, spiritual Islam and radical 
fundamentalism, combining both radical and moderate religious voices.  
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The objective of this study was to contribute to the body of knowledge about the 
characteristics of the religiosity of Dutch-Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands, in relation to 
their socio-economic status. Our research is exploratory and descriptive. It seeks to examine 
and understand Muslim beliefs and practices from the perspective of elite and popular 
religiosity, exploring the characteristics of both kinds of religiosity. The main research 
questions are (1) ‘What forms and motivations characterize elite and popular religiosity, what 
are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular religiosity, and how does this relate 
to the socio-economic status of Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands?’ (2) ‘What 
are the socio-psychological differences in behaviour and attitudes among Dutch-Turkish 
Muslims who experience elite and popular religiosity, respectively?’  
Ethical traditions in Islam, in particular all Sufi traditions, generally classify the whole of 
humanity into three ranks. The ranks are: the common folk or general mankind (ʿawāmm); the 
elect or elite (khawāṣṣ); and the super-elite (khawāṣṣ al-khawāṣṣ). Nearly comparable 
conceptions of ‘elite’ and ‘popular’ are used by sociologists to explain the structure of Muslim 
society. In the academic study of Islam in Turkey, the spiritual and intrinsic dimensions of 
religiosity were mostly ignored or studied separately by sociologists, without taking the 
interrelatedness of elite and popular religiosity into account, while the relation between 
religiosity and social and economic factors was largely neglected by the scholars of religious 
studies. This was also the case for the study of Dutch-Turkish Muslims. There was very little 
information available in the literature about socio-economic issues relating to the religiosity of 
Dutch-Turkish Muslims. In order to fill this gap, in the present study, we concentrated both on 
the inner-Islamic differences of religiosity and their relation with the socio-economic situation 
in the Netherlands.  
Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical background of the main concepts in light of a social 
scientific study of religion. The notions of ‘great’ and ‘little’ traditions, ‘high’ and ‘popular’ 
culture are introduced and developed upon in a broader context. First, we discuss how the 
category of the ‘popular’ is approached by structuralists and culturalists. These concepts are 
also elaborated upon in light of Turkish sociology. More specifically, we sought to investigate 
the links between culture and religiosity drawing on the works of Ziya Gökalp and Fuad 
Köprülü. The literature review shows that the ‘great’ and ‘little’ traditions in Islam, which are 
derived from the more expansive division between ‘great’ and ‘little’ traditions in culture, have 
great significance for understanding the religious structure of Turkish society. 
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This study sheds light on the notion of elite and popular religion and its acquired meaning 
and content in the social scientific study of religion. We explain Weber’s status stratification 
and rational choice theories in order to clarify elite and popular religion from a sociological 
perspective. In this study it is then proposed to add a different definition of ‘elite’ based on a 
synthesis approach. It holds that: ‘Popular religion’ is constituted by specific types of religious 
praxis and belief exercised by generally socially and economically non-privileged strata. The 
definition of elite religion takes shape as follows: ‘Elite religion’ is constituted by specific types 
of religious praxis and belief exercised by strata that are generally socially and economically 
privileged. Thus, following these definitions we assumed that certain objective positions within 
the social field generally ‘go hand in hand with’ certain forms of religiosity. 
This study utilizes the five-dimensional scheme of the nature of religious commitment as 
developed by Glock and Stark (1962). However, it is important to stress that Glock and Stark’s 
scale does not wholly apply to the distinctive religious elements of the Islamic worldview. The 
present study focused on the intra-dimensional aspects of the five dimensions and proposed to 
use Allport’s conceptual schemes. Furthermore, this study revealed that Al-Ghazālī’s analysis 
of individual religiosity shows some striking similarities with the analysis of the psychologist 
Allport, and provides a fertile ground for uncovering a variety of motivations, cognitive styles 
and contents of Islamic beliefs and practices, and also forms an important example to explain 
intra-dimensional aspects of Islam.  
Chapter 3 will shed light on a somewhat narrower context and will focus on elite and popular 
religiosity in Islam. We will make a comparison between the two-dimensional scale devised by 
Allport and Ross (1967) and the multidimensional religiosity scales conceived by Stark and 
Glock (1968). Following this, our study develops a new elite and popular religiosity scale. The 
conceptual orientation suggests two poles within each of the five components of Glock and 
Stark’s model. These are: 5 components of elite religiosity, and 5 components of popular 
religiosity. These two extremes reflect the classification of the sub-dimensions, which include 
belief (īmān), practice (‘amal), knowledge (‘ilm/ma’rifah), experience (maunat/ilhām) and 
consequences (natajah). Under these sub-dimensions, we identified several motivational and 
cognitive characteristics and contents, which according to us distinguish elite religiosity from 
popular religiosity.  
Chapter 4 outlines the methodology for the study. The design of this present study has been 
shaped by a ‘mixed-methods’ approach, in which quantitative and qualitative methods are 
merged into one research project. Within a four-year period (2010 - 2013), the project began 
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with qualitative research to explore the various forms and motivations of elite and popular 
religiosity and the social location of these religiosities, focusing on Dutch-Turkish Muslims 
living in the Netherlands. One of the essential instruments we used was participant observation. 
The research design also included an extensive literature review, so that the results of the 
qualitative research and literature review could serve as a basis for aspects of the quantitative 
approach.  
The second method consisted of a questionnaire survey that formed the main part of the 
project. We used four different scales; (1) a general religiosity scale, (2) an elite religiosity 
scale, (3) a popular religiosity scale and (4) measurements for the consequential dimension. The 
general religiosity scale (1) was designed to obtain information under the five dimensions based 
on Glock and Stark (1962). This part of the questionnaire focused on high and low religiosity. 
The results of this part of the survey were used to identify respondents who experienced a low 
level of religiosity and to remove them from the sample. An elite religiosity scale (2) and a 
popular religiosity scale (3) were designed to highlight the intra-dimensional aspects of Glock’s 
five dimensions. The consequential dimension (4) was interpreted here as the relation(s) 
between, or even the possible influence(s) of being an elite or popular religious person for 
peoples’ day-to-day lives.  
Chapter 5 provides data analysis and results, and the answers to the sub-questions and, 
accordingly, to the main research question. The hypotheses as developed in chapters 2 and 3 
are tested. This first main research question was: ‘What forms and motivations characterize 
elite and popular religiosity, what are the patterns in the relationship between elite and popular 
religiosity, and how does this relate to the socio-economic status of Dutch-Turkish Muslims 
living in the Netherlands?’ The first sub-question was: ‘How can the relationship between 
religion and culture be characterized, and how do we understand popular and elite religiosity in 
our research setting?’ The literature review showed that the ‘great’ and ‘little’ traditions in 
Islam, which are derived from the more expansive division between ‘great’ and ‘little’ traditions 
in culture, have great significance for understanding the religious structure of Turkish society. 
The second sub-question was: ‘What are the characteristics of elite and popular religiosity 
in the context of Turkish – and possibly also Dutch – society?’ These characteristics are: 
dynamism versus stability, critical versus uncritical, without material expectations versus with 
material expectations, differentiated versus undifferentiated, experiential inessentiality and 
privacy versus experiential desirability and shareability, tolerant versus intolerant, and 
unprejudiced versus prejudiced. 
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The third sub-question was: ‘What are the characteristics of elite and popular religiosity 
among Dutch-Turkish Muslims living in the Netherlands?’ Factor analyses and correlation 
analyses performed on the elite religiosity scale and the popular religiosity scale, showed that 
participants who experience elite religiosity tend to stress doubt and dynamism within the 
ideological aspect of religiosity. Within the ritualistic aspect, they tend to emphasize the 
intrinsic value of rituals (i.e., focus on quality). Within the intellectual aspect, they underline 
the importance of doubt regarding the validity of their current religious knowledge, and the 
dynamism of religious learning. Within the experiential aspect of religiosity, they consider 
miraculous religious experiences (special gifts from God in exchange for their religious effort) 
to be relatively unimportant: for them it is essential to keep these private. Participants who 
experience popular religiosity tend to stress the sureness and stability of their current beliefs 
within the ideological aspect of religiosity. Within the ritualistic aspect, they emphasize the 
extrinsic value of rituals (i.e., focus on quantity) and they express material expectations. Within 
the intellectual aspect, they tend to be sure of their current religious knowledge and place 
intellectual stability at the centre. Within the experiential aspect of religiosity, they consider 
miraculous religious experiences to be an appropriate and necessary part of religious 
commitment, and they are eager to report such experiences to others.  
The fourth sub-question was: ‘What are the patterns in the relationship between elite and 
popular religiosity?’ We indeed found a negative correlation between elite religiosity and 
popular religiosity (r = -.72).  
The fifth sub-question was: ‘How are elite and popular religiosity recognizable in the Dutch-
Turkish research population, and how is this phenomenon socially located?’ Of the 893 (76.7%) 
respondents with a strong religious affiliation, 203 (22.7%) turned out to consistently 
experience elite religiosity, while 545 (61%) consistently experienced popular religiosity. First-
generation respondents do experience popular religiosity more intensely than second-
generation respondents. Respondents with a higher level of education experienced a higher 
level of elite religiosity than respondents with a lower educational level. Similarly, respondents 
with a lower level of education experienced a higher level of popular religiosity than 
respondents with a higher educational level.  
In light of our literature review, we expected a relationship between socio-psychological 
attitudes and religiosity, and for this reason we formulated a second main research question: 
‘What are the socio-psychological differences in behaviour and attitudes among Dutch-Turkish 
Muslims who experience elite and popular religiosity respectively? We found that respondents 
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who experienced elite religiosity were more open and friendly towards other religions. 
Moreover, men who experienced elite religiosity had stronger views on the equality and rights 
of women compared to men who experienced popular religiosity. It also turned out that 
participants who experienced elite religiosity expressed less (racial/ethnic) prejudice, and 
showed less conservative in-group attitudes than participants who experienced popular 
religiosity.  
Based on the findings of this study, out of the total group of participants who experienced 
high religiosity, six out of ten participants experienced popular religiosity, while only two out 
of ten experienced elite religiosity. The literature and our sample suggest a number of 
demographic and socio-economic factors to explain why Dutch-Turkish Muslims generally 
experience popular religiosity. Some of these factors are gender and age; educational status; 
household income; and social and cultural capital; the experience of immigration; structural and 
contextual factors such as the current economic and political crisis; government policies; and 
experiences with discrimination. In the discussion section, we tried to pay more attention to the 
role of these factors listed above, in order to deepen our understanding of the social, cultural 
and economic grounds of elite and popular religiosity.  
The findings of this study generally support the view that Glock’s five dimensions can be 
regarded as heuristic and exploratory devices encompassing a variety of phenomena, which 
should be operationalized, conceptualized and measured before other types of analysis are 
attempted. This study also recognizes the occurrence of respondents who simultaneously 
experience elite and popular religiosity, and suggests that the dialogical self theory (DST) 
provides an interesting theoretical framework for an explanation and further research of this 
phenomenon. We mainly analyzed those individuals who disagreed with, or were in conflict 
with the other religious voice. But this does not mean that the other religious voice is completely 
absent and rejected in such individuals. On the contrary, certain circumstances led respondents 
to express themselves with certain religious voices and these expressions may change as 
circumstances change. If we look, for example, at the participants who simultaneously 
expressed elite and popular religiosity, we can say that these different religious voices can, to a 
certain extent, be reconciled, even if they show very different and contradictory forms and 
motivations. 
In line with many cultural theorists, we would like to draw attention to the ontological 
insecurity brought about by the complexities, uncertainty, and diversity of the postmodern 
condition. We see religious fundamentalism as an emotional and defensive coping mechanism 
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to deal with the insecurity caused by the plurality and fragmentation of the postmodern world. 
According to the findings of our study, popular religiosity could remain an important and 
dominant source of defensive localization within Turkish religiosity, at least in the short term, 
and this both in Turkey and in the Netherlands, due to the recent socio-political developments 
outlined in the discussion section of this study.  
One of the aims of this study was to investigate whether there are socio-psychological 
behaviours related to elite and popular religiosity. Recent studies have confirmed that religion 
has an aspect that encourages prejudice, and an aspect that unmakes prejudice. The findings of 
the present study support these findings. These findings suggest that the real question is not 
whether one is a believer or not, but rather whether the kind of things a person believes in make 
him or her ethnocentric.  
One of the aims of this study was to measure the spiritual aspect of religion by developing 
an elite religiosity scale. As we have discussed in this dissertation, Islam has been largely 
reduced to popular religiosity – to jurisprudence, rituals, and, above all, prohibitions 
characterized by exoteric, unreflective, and uncritical forms and motivations. European Muslim 
families experience Islam under a comprehensive set of rules, prohibitions, and rulings that 
explain Islam in the context of a specific relation of protection against an environment that is 
perceived as too permissive and even hostile. Our findings largely confirm this attitude. Within 
our group of participants who experienced high religiosity, only 24% experienced elite 
religiosity while 61% experienced popular religiosity. If we take the other participants into 
account – those who experienced low religiosity – this ratio drops to 19%. In other words, only 
two out of ten participants experienced elite religiosity to some extent. In the short term, we do 
not foresee any growth in the spiritual side of religion because of the insecurity that will likely 






















In de afgelopen drie decennia is de Islam steeds nadrukkelijker zichtbaar geworden in de 
Europese publieke ruimte. Ondanks de snelle groei van de Islam in Europa en in Nederland 
weten mensen in het Westen weinig over deze religie. De Islam in Europa is heel divers. De 
verschillen zijn gerelateerd aan nationale, culturele, religieuze aspecten van de Islam en de 
manier waarop het verwoord is. In deze studie zijn de onderlinge verschillen onderzocht van 
Turks-Nederlandse religiositeit in relatie tot sociale, economische en culturele aspecten. Met 
dit onderzoek hebben we gekeken naar de verschillende richtingen die de Islam in Europa op 
gaat. We zijn op zoek naar het midden tussen twee types van essentialistische argumentatie: de 
ene is het uitgangspunt dat Islam en Europese cultuur niet samen gaan, en de ander zoekt naar 
verbinding tussen Islam en Europese cultuur. Zoals vele onderzoekers die de  islamitische 
samenleving tot onderwerp van onderzoek hebben vastgesteld ontwikkelt de Islam zich niet als 
één onveranderbaar geheel, of ze nu vijandig staat tegenover de Europese samenleving of zich 
wil aanpassen, zoals de term Euro-Islam suggereert. De Islam ontwikkelt zich op veel 
verschillende manieren, zoals een politieke Islam, een officiële Islam, een volks-Islam, een 
spirituele Islam en radicaal fundamentalistische Islam, waarin zowel radicale als gematigde 
vormen van Islam verenigd zijn.  
Het doel van deze studie is een bijdrage te leveren aan de ‘body of knowledge’ over de 
karakteristieke eigenschappen van religiositeit van Nederlands-Turkse moslims in Nederland, 
in relatie tot hun sociaal-economische status. Deze studie is beschrijvend en explorerend. Wij 
proberen het geloof en de praktijken van moslims te onderzoeken en te begrijpen vanuit het 
perspectief van elite en volks-religiositeit, waarbij we de karakteristieke eigenschappen van 
beide vormen in ogenschouw nemen. De belangrijkste onderzoeksvragen zijn: (1) ‘Welke 
vormen en motivaties kenmerken elite en volks-religiositeit, wat zijn de patronen in de relatie 
tussen elite en volks-religiositeit, en hoe verhoudt zich dat tot de sociaal-economische status 
van Nederlands-Turkse moslims die in Nederland wonen?’ (2) ‘Wat zijn de sociaal-
psychologische verschillen in houding en gedrag onder Nederlands-Turkse moslims die 
respectievelijk elite dan wel volks-religiositeit ervaren?’ 
Ethische tradities binnen de Islam, in het bijzonder alle Soefi georiënteerde tradities, 
onderscheiden in het algemeen de mensheid in drie categorieën. Dat zijn: het gewone volk of 
de mensheid in het algemeen (ʿawāmm); een geselecteerde groep of de elite (khawāṣṣ); en de 
super-elite (khawāṣṣ al-khawāṣṣ). De begrippen ‘elite’ en ‘volks-’ zijn bijna vergelijkbaar met 
de begrippen die sociologen gebruiken om de structuur in de islamitische samenleving te 
beschrijven. In het academisch onderzoek naar de Islam in Turkije werden over het algemeen 
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de spirituele en intrinsieke dimensies van religiositeit genegeerd, of afzonderlijk onderzocht 
door sociologen, zonder rekening te houden met de onderlinge relaties van elite- en volks-
religiositeit, terwijl de relatie met sociale en economische factoren grotendeels werd genegeerd 
door de onderzoekers op het gebied van religiestudies. Dit was ook het geval voor de 
Nederlands-Turkse moslims. Er was weinig informatie te vinden in de literatuur over socio-
economische onderwerpen in relatie tot de religiositeit van Nederlands-Turkse moslims. Om 
deze leemte te vullen richten we ons in dit onderzoek op zowel de verschillen in religiositeit 
van moslims binnen de Islam als ook op de relatie ervan met hun socio-economische situatie in 
Nederland.  
In hoofdstuk 2 staat de theoretische achtergrond van de belangrijkste concepten centraal in 
het licht van het sociaal-wetenschappelijk karakter van religie. De begrippen ‘grote’ en ‘kleine’ 
tradities, ‘hoge’ en ‘volks’-cultuur worden geïntroduceerd en verder ontwikkeld in breder 
verband. In de eerste plaats bespreken we hoe de categorie van ‘volks’- wordt benaderd door 
structuralisten en culturalisten. Deze concepten worden ook besproken in het licht van de 
Turkse sociologie. Meer in het bijzonder proberen we te kijken naar de verbanden tussen cultuur 
en religiositeit, gebaseerd op de werken van Ziya Gökalp en Fuad Köprülü. Het 
literatuuronderzoek laat zien dat ‘grote’ en ‘kleine’ tradities binnen Islam, die zijn afgeleid van 
het onderscheid tussen ‘grote’ en ‘kleine’ tradities in culturen, van groot belang zijn voor de 
betekenis van de religieuze structuur van de Turkse samenleving.  
Deze studie werpt een licht op de begrippen elite- en volks-religiositeit, en de inhoud en de 
betekenis daarvan in het sociaal-wetenschappelijk onderzoek van religie. We lichten Webers 
status-stratificatie theorie toe en de ‘rational choice’ theorieën, met het doel elite- en volks-
religiositeit te kunnen benaderen vanuit sociologisch perspectief. In dit onderzoek stellen we 
dan een andere definitie van ‘elite’ voor, gebaseerd op een synthetiserende benadering. We 
stellen dat: ‘volks-religie’ bestaat uit specifieke manieren van geloof en religieuze praktijken, 
zoals die uitgeoefend worden door in het algemeen mensen uit de lagere sociaal-economische 
bevolkingsgroepen in de samenleving. De definitie van elite-religiositeit is dan als volgt: ‘elite-
religiositeit’ is samengesteld uit specifieke manieren van geloof en religieuze praktijken zoals 
die worden uitgeoefend door in het algemeen mensen uit de sociaal-economisch bevoorrechte 
groepen in de samenleving’. Deze definities volgend nemen wij aan dat bepaalde objectieve 
posities in de samenleving hand in hand gaan met bepaalde vormen van religiositeit.  
We gebruiken in dit onderzoek een vijf-dimensionaal schema wat betreft de aard van de 
manier waarop mensen betrokken zijn op het religieuze, zoals ontwikkeld door Glock en Stark 
348 
(1962). Echter, het is belangrijk te benadrukken dat de schaal van Glock en Stark niet helemaal 
van toepassing is op de verschillende te onderscheiden religieuze aspecten van de Islamitische 
wereldbeschouwing. In ons onderzoek richten we ons op de te onderscheiden aspecten binnen 
(intra-) de vijf dimensies zoals die zijn voorgesteld binnen Allport’s conceptuele schema’s. 
Verder ontdekten we in ons onderzoek dat de analyse van Al-Ghazālī van individuele 
religiositeit opvallende overeenkomsten vertoont met de analyse van de psycholoog Allport, en 
dat biedt vruchtbare grond voor een variatie aan motivaties, cognitieve stijlen en inhouden van 
islamitische manieren van geloven en praktijken, en gaf ook een belangrijk voorbeeld waarmee 
de verschillen binnen de Islam van de onderscheiden dimensies beschreven kunnen worden.  
In hoofdstuk 3 is ingezoomd op de context van elite- en volks-religiositeit in Islam. We 
vergelijken de twee-dimensionale schaal zoals ontwikkeld door Allport en Ross (1967) met de 
multi-dimensionale schalen van religiositeit zoals samengesteld door Stark en Glock (1968). 
Daarop voortbouwend ontwikkelen wij in dit onderzoek een nieuwe schaal voor elite- en volks-
religiositeit. Het conceptuele onderzoek beschrijft twee polen binnen elk van de vijf 
componenten van het model van Glock en Stark, te weten 5 componenten van elite-religiositeit 
en 5 componenten van volks-religiositeit.  Deze twee extremen weerspiegelen de classificatie 
in sub-dimensies, waarin opgenomen geloof (īmān), praktijk (ʿamal), kennis (ʿilm / maʿrifah), 
ervaring (maʿūnat / ilhām) and gevolgen (natījah). Op grond van deze sub-dimensies hebben 
we verscheidene motivaties, cognitieve kenmerken en inhouden gerangschikt, die volgens ons 
het onderscheid bepalen tussen elite- en volks-religiositeit.  
Het vierde hoofdstuk bevat de methodologie van ons onderzoek. Het onderzoeksdesign van 
het huidige onderzoek volgt de ‘mixed-methods’ benadering, waarin kwantitatieve en 
kwalitatieve onderzoeksmethoden samen komen in één onderzoekproject. In een periode van 
vier jaar (2010 - 2013) is het project gestart met een kwalitatief deel om de verschillende 
vormen en motivaties van elite- en volks-religiositeit te beschrijven, en het voorkomen ervan 
in het sociale domein van deze vormen van religiositeit, daarbij gefocust op Nederlands-Turkse 
moslims die in Nederland leven. We maakten gebruik van participerende observatie, als 
belangrijkste instrument in het kwalitatieve deel van ons onderzoek. Het research design 
omvatte ook een uitvoerig literatuur onderzoek, zodat de resultaten van zowel het kwalitatieve 
onderzoek als van het literatuur onderzoek als basis konden dienen voor het kwantitatieve deel 
van het onderzoek.  
Een tweede belangrijk instrument, in het tweede deel van het onderzoek (het kwantitatieve 
deel), was een vragenlijst. Deze vragenlijst is de kern van ons onderzoeksdesign. We hebben 
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vier verschillende schalen gebruikt: (1) een schaal voor algemene religiositeit, (2) een schaal 
voor elite-religiositeit, (3) een schaal voor volks-religiositeit en (4) een maat met betrekking tot 
de gevolgen van religiositeit. De schaal voor algemene religiositeit (1) werd ontwikkeld om 
informatie te krijgen met betrekking tot de vijf dimensies gebaseerd op Glock en Stark (1962). 
Dit deel van het onderzoek richtte zich op het verkrijgen van informatie over ‘hoge’ en ‘lage’ 
religiositeit. De resultaten daarvan zijn gebruikt om respondenten te identificeren die een laag 
niveau van religiositeit ervaren; zij zijn vervolgens uitgesloten van het verdere onderzoek. De 
schalen voor elite-religiositeit (2) en voor volks religiositeit (3) zijn ontwikkeld om verschillen 
te kunnen signaleren zoals die voorkomen binnen de vijf dimensies van Glock. We verwachten 
dat de maat met betrekking tot de gevolgen van religiositeit (4) de relatie of zelfs de mogelijke 
invloed die er is van elite- of volks-religieus personen op het leven van alledag zichtbaar maakt. 
In hoofdstuk 5 worden de data gepresenteerd, de data analyse en de resultaten daarvan, en 
de antwoorden op de sub-vragen en daaruit voortvloeiend de antwoorden op de hoofdvragen. 
De hypotheses, zoals deze ontwikkeld waren in hoofdstuk 2 en 3 worden in dit vijfde hoofdstuk 
getest. De eerste hoofdvraag luidde: ‘Welke vormen en motivaties kenmerken elite- en volks-
religiositeit, wat zijn de patronen in de relatie tussen elite- en volks-religiositeit, en hoe verhoudt 
zich dat tot de sociaal-economische status van Nederlands-Turkse moslims die in Nederland 
wonen?’ Het literatuur onderzoek heeft laten zien dat ‘grote’ en ‘kleine’ tradities in Islam, die 
zijn afgeleid van de onderverdeling in ‘grote’ en ‘kleine’ tradities in culturen, van grote 
betekenis zijn voor het begrijpen van de religieuze structuur van de Turkse samenleving.  
De tweede sub-vraag was als volgt geformuleerd: ‘Wat zijn de sociaal-psychologische 
verschillen in houding en gedrag onder Nederlands-Turkse moslims die respectievelijk elite- 
dan wel volks-religiositeit ervaren?’ De resultaten van de data-analyse geven aan dat de 
kenmerken van respectievelijk elite dan wel volks-religiositeit zijn: dynamisch versus stabiel, 
kritisch versus onkritisch, zonder of met materiële verwachtingen (van gelovig 
zijn/geloofspraktijken) onderscheid makend versus een globaal perspectief; (individuele) 
religieuze ervaring belangrijk versus onbelangrijk, tolerant versus intolerant, en bevooroordeeld 
versus onbevooroordeeld.   
De derde sub-vraag was: ‘Wat zijn de kenmerken van elite- en volks-religiositeit van 
Nederlands-Turkse moslims die in Nederland wonen?’ Factor analyses en correlatie analyses 
die zijn uitgevoerd met de schaal voor elite-religiositeit en de schaal voor volks-religiositeit 
laten zien dat respondenten die elite-religiositeit ervaren tot twijfel en dynamisch geloven 
neigen in hun religiositeit. Wat betreft het rituele aspect neigen zij tot een nadruk op de 
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intrinsieke waarde van een ritueel (bijv. een focus op de kwaliteit van het ritueel). Wat betreft 
het intellectuele aspect onderschrijven zij het belang van twijfel wat betreft de geldigheid van 
actuele religieuze kennis, en staan zij een dynamische benadering van religieus leren voor. Wat 
betreft het ervarings-aspect van religiositeit beschouwen deze respondenten wonderen (speciale 
gaven van God in ruil voor hun religieuze inspanningen) als relatief onbelangrijk; voor deze 
groep respondenten is het belangrijk dit soort ervaringen voor zich te houden. Respondenten 
die volks-religiositeit ervaren neigen er toe de zekerheden van het geloof te benadrukken. Wat 
betreft rituelen is voor hen de extrinsieke waarde ervan belangrijk (bijv. een focus op hoe vaak 
ze de rituelen – moeten - doen) en voor hen zijn materiële beloningen voor religieuze 
inspanningen belangrijk. Wat betreft het intellectuele aspect benadrukt deze groep dat zij zeker 
zijn van hun huidige geloofs-kennis; voor hen staat intellectuele stabiliteit centraal. Wat betreft 
de ervarings-dimensie beschouwen deze respondenten in ons onderzoek religieuze ervaringen 
als gewenst, passend en behorend tot een noodzakelijk deel van hun geloof; zij gaan er prat op 
hun religieuze ervaringen met anderen te delen.  
De vierde sub-vraag luidde: ‘Welke patronen kunnen we onderscheiden in de relatie tussen 
elite- en volks-religiositeit?’ Uit de resultaten van de analyse van onze data blijkt dat er een 
negatieve relatie bestaat tussen elite- en volks-religiositeit (r = -.72).  
De vijfde sub-vraag luidde: ‘Hoe zijn elite- en volks-religiositeit herkenbaar in de 
onderzoeksgroep van Nederlands-Turkse moslims en wat is de relatie met hun sociaal-
economische situatie? Van de 893 (76.7%) respondenten met een sterke religieuze 
betrokkenheid, bleken 203 (22.7%) consistent een manier van elite-religiositeit te ervaren, 
terwijl 545 (61%) consistent een manier van volks-religiositeit bleken te ervaren. Eerste-
generatie respondenten ervaren volks-religiositeit vaker dan tweede-generatie respondenten. 
Respondenten met een hogere opleiding ervaren vaker een hoger niveau van elite-religiositeit 
dan respondenten met een lager opleidingsniveau. Evenzo ervaren respondenten met een lager 
opleidingsniveau een hoger niveau van volks-religiositeit dan respondenten met een hogere 
opleiding.  
Op basis van ons literatuur onderzoek verwachtten we een relatie tussen sociaal-
psychologische houdingen en religiositeit. Dat was de reden voor onze tweede onderzoekvraag: 
‘Wat zijn de sociaal-psychologische verschillen in gedrag en houdingen onder Nederlands-
Turkse moslims die elite- dan wel volks-religiositeit ervaren?’ De resultaten van de data-
analyse laten zien dat respondenten die elite-religiositeit ervaren opener zijn en vriendelijker 
naar mensen met een andere geloofsovertuiging. Daarbij hebben mannen die elite-religiositeit 
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ervaren sterkere meningen over de gelijk(waardig)heid en de rechten van vrouwen in 
vergelijking met mannen die volks-religiositeit ervaren. Het bleek ook dat respondenten die 
elite-religiositeit ervaren minder vooroordelen hadden (wat betreft ras, etniciteit) en minder 
conservatieve in-groep houdingen aangaven, dan respondenten die volks-religiositeit ervaren.  
Gebaseerd op de resultaten van ons onderzoek blijkt dat van de totale groep respondenten 
die hoge religiositeit ervaren, zes van de tien volks-religiositeit ervaren, terwijl slechts twee van 
de tien elite-religiositeit ervaren. Op basis van de literatuur en uit de resultaten van dit 
onderzoek komen een aantal demografische en sociaal-economische factoren naar voren die 
begrijpelijk maken waarom Nederlands-Turkse moslims over het algemeen volks-religiositeit 
ervaren. Enkele van de factoren zijn gender en leeftijd, opleidingsniveau, inkomen per 
huishouden, sociaal en cultureel kapitaal, de migratiegeschiedenis, structurele en contextuele 
factoren zoals de huidige economische crisis, overheidsbeleid, en de ervaring met discriminatie. 
In de discussie zullen we proberen meer aandacht te besteden aan de rol van de hierboven 
genoemde factoren, om ons begrip te verdiepen met betrekking tot de sociale, culturele en 
economische achtergrond van elite- en volks-religiositeit  
De resultaten van dit onderzoek ondersteunen de gedachte dat de vijf dimensies van Glock 
gezien kunnen worden als heuristisch en exploratief instrument dat een hoeveelheid van 
verschijnselen omvat, die nader geoperationaliseerd, geconceptualiseerd en vervolgens 
gemeten kunnen worden, voordat andere analyse methoden ingezet worden. De resultaten van 
dit onderzoek erkennen ook het feit dat respondenten tegelijkertijd elite- en volks-religiositeit 
blijken te kunnen ervaren, en suggereert dat de dialogical self theory (DST) een interessant 
theoretisch kader biedt om deze ogenschijnlijke tegenstrijdigheid te verklaren en nader te 
onderzoeken. We hebben voornamelijk de data geanalyseerd van personen waarvan de scores 
een tegenstrijdigheid in religiositeit aangaven. Maar dat betekent niet dat de ‘andere’ 
religiositeit volledig afwezig was of afgewezen werd door deze respondenten. In tegendeel, in 
bepaalde omstandigheden kwamen deze respondenten tot een bepaalde religiositeit, maar dat 
zou kunnen veranderen onder veranderende omstandigheden. Als we bijvoorbeeld kijken naar 
die respondenten die tegelijkertijd elite- en volks-religiositeit aangaven, dan kunnen we stellen 
dat deze verschillende religieuze ‘stemmen’ tot op zekere hoogte met elkaar verenigd kunnen 
worden ook al maken zij zich kenbaar in heel verschillende en soms tegenstrijdige vormen en 
motivaties.   
Evenals veel theoretici op het gebied van cultuur willen wij de aandacht vestigen op de 
ontologische onzekerheden die teweeg worden gebracht door de complexiteit, onzekerheden en 
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diversiteit in de postmoderne samenleving. Wij beschouwen het religieus fundamentalisme als 
een emotioneel en defensief copings-mechanisme om te kunnen omgaan met de onzekerheid 
die veroorzaakt wordt door pluraliteit en fragmentatie waardoor de postmoderne wereld 
gekenmerkt wordt. Op grond van de bevindingen in ons onderzoek zou volks-religiositeit een 
belangrijke en dominante bron kunnen worden van een defensieve positionering in Turkse 
religiositeit, tenminste op de korte termijn, zowel in Turkije als in Nederland, als gevolg van 
recente socio-politieke ontwikkelingen zoals die beschreven zijn in het discussie hoofdstuk van 
ons onderzoek.  
Een van de doelen van onze studie was te onderzoeken welke relatie er is tussen socio-
psychologische gedragingen aan de ene kant, en elite- en volks-religiositeit aan de andere kant. 
Recent onderzoek heeft bevestigd dat religie zowel de ontwikkeling van vooroordelen kan 
stimuleren, als ze teniet doen. Ons onderzoek bevestigt dat. Onze bevindingen doen 
veronderstellen dat de vraag waarom het gaat niet is of men gelooft of niet, maar eerder of de 
manier waarop men gelooft van iemand al dan niet een etnocentrische persoon maakt.   
Een ander doel van ons onderzoek was om het spirituele aspect van religiositeit zichtbaar te 
maken, door een schaal te ontwikkelen voor elite-religiositeit. Zoals we met ons onderzoek 
hebben laten zien, lijkt de Islam gereduceerd te zijn tot volks-religiositeit, tot jurisprudentie, tot 
verplichting van rituelen en bovenal tot verboden die gekenmerkt worden door niet-
bereflecteerde en onkritische vormen en motivaties. Europese moslim families ervaren de Islam 
als een omvattende set van waarden en normen, verboden en regels die de Islam doen verstaan 
als beschermend tegen de omgeving die moreel gezien veel te toelatend is en zelfs vijandig. Dat 
wordt door ons onderzoek bevestigd. Van onze groep respondenten met hoge religiositeit gaf 
slechts 24% aan elite-religiositeit te ervaren, terwijl 61% aangaf volks-religiositeit te ervaren. 
Als we de overige respondenten meerekenen – degenen die lage religiositeit aangaven te 
ervaren – dan zakt het percentage zelfs naar 19% voor elite-religiositeit. Met andere woorden, 
slechts twee van de tien respondenten heeft aangegeven tot op zekere hoogte elite-religiositeit 
te ervaren. Op de korte termijn voorzien wij geen groei op het gebied van de spirituele dimensie 
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